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Abstract 
The role that non-economic objectives play in determining the behaviour of the firm is 
said to be a key distinguishing feature of family owned firms. This, in conjunction with 
their economic significance, has prompted previous examinations into the effect of 
family ownership on firm performance. Although numerous, these investigations have 
predominately focused on public firms and are acknowledged to suffer from 
measurement and methodological issues. This thesis therefore aims to identify, and 
subsequently test, how financing preferences driven by non-economic, emotionally-
based objectives can have consequences for the size and performance of small and 
medium-sized family enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
general are known to have difficulty accessing finance, but the extent to which family 
owners’ preferences might further limit the firm’s use of finance, and in turn its size, 
remains largely unexplored to date.   
 
Based on the popular non-parametric technique known as Data Envelopment Analysis, 
we calculate the theoretically founded performance measure of productive efficiency. 
This is made possible by a large panel data set derived from Australian SMEs. Using a 
sample of 3450 firms across 3 years, we further conduct econometric comparisons 
between family and non-family firms in order to quantify the effect of family ownership 
on financing preferences, firm size and efficiency. Unlike other studies which have 
treated firm size as an exogenous control variable, we consider how firm size is an 
outcome of what the current literature calls socio-emotional wealth preservation.  
 
Relative to their non-family counterparts, we find that family SMEs rely more heavily 
on internally sourced finance, are significantly smaller and as a result face measurable 
efficiency consequences. These findings enable a better understanding of the dilemmas 
faced by family business owners when making the apparent trade-off between non-
economic and economic objectives. In the context of the challenges specific to SME 
financing, this thesis yields new insights into how, why and to what extent family 
ownership affects firm performance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Family firms are economically significant and different 
 
Family ownership, no matter the criteria used for its definition
1
, is arguably the most 
prevalent form of ownership in the world. According to reported stylised facts in the 
family business literature, family businesses are widespread and represent a substantial 
portion of economic activity in both developed and developing economies alike (La 
Porta et al. 1999). On their own, such claims would not be especially interesting were it 
not for the abundance of anecdotal and empirical evidence that family firms are 
significantly different from other organizations. Many of these apparent differences are 
founded on the notion that, as opposed to their non-family counterparts, family owners 
give priority to objectives other than profit, leading to specific behavioural and 
performance outcomes.   
 
In their influential review of this literature, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) argue that these 
non-economic objectives, which they label as socio-emotional wealth (SEW), in fact 
play a pivotal role in the managerial choices made by family firms. Through these 
choices the authors infer that the SEW considerations related to family ownership will 
change behaviour and ultimately impact firm performance. Figure 1 illustrates the 
connections presented in their central argument
2
, which is consistent with a behavioural 
theory of the firm, that is, ownership will influence behaviour, which in turn will 
determine firm performance. 
 
 
                                                 
 
1
 The actual prevalence of family ownership around the world depends heavily on how one 
defines a ‘family firm’. We discuss this issue in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
 
2
 For brevity, Figure 1 assumes that family ownership and SEW preservation are one in the 
same. With that said, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) argue that numerous contingency variables will 
moderate the relationship between family ownership and SEW preservation.  
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Specifically, they examine how family firms differ from nonfamily firms along five 
broad categories of behaviour, namely organizational choices concerning 1) 
management processes, 2) firm strategies, 3) corporate governance, 4) stakeholder 
relations and 5) business venturing. The authors also identify how firm size, among 
other important control variables, will moderate the importance of the family’s SEW as 
the primary frame of reference in the management of the firm
3
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
 Figure 1 is loosely based on the diagram labelled “Figure 1 Family Firm Research from a 
Socioemotional Wealth Preservation Perspective” on pg. 657 in their article entitled “The Bind 
that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms” (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011).  
 
Noticeably missing among the behaviours listed, are inferences into how the pursuit of 
SEW objectives might in turn influence the various financing decisions of family 
owners. This is especially interesting in the context of broader challenges that all SMEs 
face in accessing finance.  
 
Further, despite the well-established links between owners’ financing preferences and 
firm size in the economic and finance literature (Carpenter and Petersen 2002), as well 
as the numerous descriptive links between family ownership and a smaller firm size, 
surprisingly very little research has investigated how firm size may be a direct outcome, 
rather than an antecedent or moderator, of family owners’ ability and willingness to 
                                                 
 
3
 Due to lower levels of psychological ownership and a greater reliance on bureaucratic 
controls, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) explain that “as the family firm grows in size, the use of 
socioemotional wealth preservation as a primary reference point for guiding managerial 
choices tends to decrease” pg. 687. 
Firm Size 
Family 
Ownership 
Firm 
Performance 
Behaviour 
Figure 1: Links between ownership and performance
a
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maintain SEW. One of the reasons for this is that most comparisons between family and 
non-family firms focus on performance, rather than size, differentials. However, as we 
will demonstrate in this thesis, there is a more immediate relationship between firm size 
and performance.  
 
With this research gap in mind, this thesis utilises the concept of SEW to explain why 
family SMEs make the financing choices they do and in turn how those financing 
choices may lead simultaneously to both firm size and performance outcomes. We 
specifically explore and test whether a preference towards internal finance impacts the 
quantum of finance raised, leading to a potential size constraint related to family 
ownership, which in turn may have both measurable scale and technical efficiency 
consequences.  
 
By quantifying these effects, we can take one step closer to what Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2011) refer to as the ‘Holy Grail’ in family business research; that is accurately 
measuring the impact of family owners’ SEW maximising behaviour on firm 
performance. As the metaphor suggests, this task has proven to be challenging to date. 
 
1.2 The challenge of measuring the impact of family ownership 
 
Over the past two decades, those studies which have investigated, and attempted to 
quantify, the various ways that family ownership might affect firm performance have 
yielded ambiguous predictions and mixed results (Carney et al. 2010). In fact, to this 
day there is no consensus among family business researchers on whether family 
ownership has a net positive, negative, or any effect on performance.  
 
Granted, different definitions of a family firm, different time periods, different measures 
of performance, different methodologies and data sets partly explain the variation. 
However, notwithstanding said technical issues, the many nuances of family firm 
behaviour, combined with the very idiosyncratic desires of family owners, means that 
reaching a clear consensus on how family owners impact firm performance is extremely 
difficult. What is generally agreed upon is that, when family owners have been found to 
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significantly impact firm performance, they do so in both positive and negative ways 
(Habbershon et al. 2003). 
 
What is less established however, are methods of analysis which can disentangle the 
simultaneous positive and negative performance outcomes associated with family firm 
behaviours. Echoing this point, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) claim that many aspects 
related to the desire to preserve SEW carry both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ connotations in terms 
of consequences for firm performance. They go on to state that “In the end, both 
positives and negatives probably coexist in family firms, and it would be difficult to 
determine which predominates when it comes to performance results” pg. 691. As a 
result, it is possible that simultaneously occurring positive and negative effects may 
nullify each other, leading the researcher to find no significant net relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance.  
 
Additionally, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) highlight other noteworthy problems 
associated with quantifying the effect of SEW related behaviour on performance 
outcomes of the firm. For example, despite the best efforts of empirical researchers to 
rule out endogeneity bias, isolating an unbiased family ownership effect has proven to 
be difficult since performance is ultimately a variable influenced by many factors. This 
thesis addresses these methodological challenges by using a large panel data set 
consisting of Australian SMEs, robust econometric techniques to compare between 
family and non-family firms, and a performance measure which has not yet been 
utilised in a family ownership context – known as ‘productive efficiency’ (PE).  
 
As we will demonstrate in this thesis, PE is based on well-established economic theory 
and contains aspects of efficiency related to both the firm’s scale of production, or 
‘scale efficiency’, as well as efficiency related to the method with which resources are 
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organized in the production process, or ‘technical efficiency’. As such, PE is considered 
a practical and fundamental measure of a firm’s performance4. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
Based on this discussion, this thesis aims to answer the following overarching research 
question: 1) What is the effect of family ownership on firm performance? We examine 
this broad question by investigating the differences between family and non-family PE. 
Based on this measure, this thesis further intends to answer the related question: 2) How 
does family ownership affect productive efficiency? Specifically, we aim to quantify the 
family ownership effects on both scale and technical efficiency. This thesis also 
explores a particular answer to the question: 3) Why is productive efficiency affected by 
family ownership? We do this by forwarding and testing the notion that the financing 
preferences of family owners will constrain the size of the firm and thus affect the scale 
and means by which family firms produce. 
 
1.4 Organisation of this thesis 
 
To answer our stated research questions, this thesis begins with an investigation of the 
relevant economic, finance and family business literatures in Chapter 2. We use these to 
establish an argument that family SMEs will have different preferences with respect to 
financing and that such preferences might constrain the size of the firm and ultimately 
impact its performance. This argument, illustrated in Figure 2, extends the central line 
of reasoning in Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) by specifically including financing 
preferences as a behavioural outcome of family ownership. 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
4
 Productive efficiency can be considered a fundamental measure of a firm’s performance in the 
sense that it is driven by increases in output while holding inputs constant, or decreasing inputs 
while holding output constant, which in turn positively impacts financial performance variables 
like sales revenue, operating expenses and net profit.  
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We further argue that firm size and performance are related to these financing 
preferences, and therefore simultaneously impacted by family ownership. Illustrated by 
the dotted lines, we expect fundamental interrelations between these variables. SMEs in 
general are known to have difficulty accessing finance, but how family owners’ 
preferences might affect the firm’s total access to finance remains largely unexplored to 
date. The argument illustrated in Figure 2 therefore proposes important connections 
through which the SEW considerations of family owners may affect their financing 
preferences as well as the firm’s size and performance. Based on these connections, we 
formulate testable hypotheses which propose ‘family ownership effects’ (FOEs)5 on 1) 
various debt and equity financing preferences, 2) measures of firm size, and 3) 
productive efficiency.  
 
Specifically, we argue that owners of family SMEs may have financing preferences that 
could limit the magnitude of physical capital available to the firm. In terms of 
performance, a physical capital, or size, constraint specific to family firms may in turn 
manifest itself as an inefficient or suboptimal production scale and technology. This 
thesis therefore contributes to the work of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) by identifying 
how financing preferences are also potentially influenced by the SEW considerations of 
                                                 
 
5
 FOEs are defined as the measured difference between family and non-family owned firms, 
which are found in multiple ways throughout this thesis. A positive (or negative) FOE thus 
indicates that the variable in question is greater (or lower) for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
Figure 2: Links between ownership, financing, firm size and performance  
Family 
Ownership 
Financing 
Preferences 
Firm 
Performance 
Firm Size 
(1) (2) (3) 
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family owners, and then examining how these preferences might translate into size and 
performance outcomes for family firms. 
 
Of the more influential family firm studies relating to performance, most have focused 
solely on large publicly traded firms, however, based on the notion that SEW 
maximizing behaviour may be most prevalent in small unlisted firms, the results of 
these studies may not be generalizable to the broad population of family firms, most of 
which will never be publicly traded. The data we employ in this thesis enable us to 
identify family owned SMEs and therefore provide a rare opportunity to use a large, 
national, legally enforced, and longitudinal survey to test our hypotheses. Such scope 
and rigour will add to the external validity and robustness of our empirical findings and 
allow us to overcome the well-known generalization problems associated with family 
business samples of limited geographic or industry scope (Handler 1989). 
 
In Chapter 3 we describe this data source, the ‘Business Longitudinal Survey’ (BLS), 
and define how these data are used to construct variables pertaining to family 
ownership, firm size and financing preferences.  Differentiating by ownership type, we 
further conduct a preliminary descriptive analysis and present key statistics on the FOEs 
pertaining to the composition of finance and firm size. Among other significant 
differences, we show that family firms on average hold more internally sourced debt 
and equity finance and are smaller in size relative to non-family firms. We also show 
that a greater reliance on internally sourced finance is correlated with various measures 
of a smaller firm, which supports the thesis arguments proposed in Chapter 2.  
 
To quantify a FOE on firm performance, we draw upon the well-established economic 
theory of productive efficiency (Farrell 1957), which has seen some application in the 
SME literature, but has been largely overlooked in the family business literature. Based 
on this theoretical foundation, which is described in detail in Chapter 4, PE is a 
performance measure which can simultaneously extract information about the 
coexisting performance effects of family ownership.  The measure specifically enables 
us to distinguish the efficiency impact of a firm’s size separately from the efficiency 
impact of its internal resource allocation. By decomposing PE in this way, we are 
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further able to empirically isolate the simultaneous FOEs on both components. This 
decomposition is accomplished by using a Data Envelopment Analysis methodology 
(DEA), a popular non-parametric methodology in economics (Charnes et al. 1979). 
 
DEA consequently tackles the problems associated with quantifying interrelated 
outcome measures and is noted by many in the management and entrepreneurship 
disciplines as a superior, but underutilised, approach to traditional parametric 
alternatives which measure performance (Richard et al. 2009). The method also reduces 
measurement error and improves the construct validity of the performance measure used 
in this thesis, which also addresses the “urgent need” to improve the rigor of measures 
used in empirical family business research (Pearson and Lumpkin 2011). Yet despite the 
inherent advantages of the DEA approach, as well as the rapid and continuous growth in 
its use across multiple disciplines over the past 30 plus years, this thesis is the first study 
to utilise a DEA method as a basis to compare various efficiency differentials across 
family and non-family owned SMEs. As a result, we also consider the application of 
DEA to be a major contribution of this thesis. 
 
We use DEA to calculate scale and technical efficiency scores for each firm in the BLS 
sample. Consistent with the previous chapter, differentiating by ownership type, we also 
conduct a preliminary descriptive analysis and present key statistics on the FOEs 
pertaining to various measures of efficiency. Among other significant differences, we 
show that family firms on average exhibit greater inefficiencies related to a suboptimal 
scale of production, which implies that the average size of family firms is constrained. 
 
Since the BLS data are longitudinal, we are able to utilize both the cross-sectional and 
time-series dimensions to test our hypotheses related to the magnitude, direction and 
significance level of the FOEs on financing preferences, firm size and efficiency. These 
data therefore improve our econometric estimates by enabling us to effectively control 
for time and firm heterogeneity. Encouraged by the preliminary results from Chapters 3 
and 4, we specify the econometric tests used to test our thesis argument in Chapter 5. 
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Based on these specifications, we then perform robust empirical comparisons across 
family and non-family firms. In particular, we conduct panel regressions which control 
for individual firm heterogeneity and quantify the FOE using several techniques, such 
as the fixed effects, random effects, and hybrid models. By this approach, and 
controlling for important covariates, we establish that family ownership is significantly 
related to a preference for internally sourced debt and equity finance, a smaller firm, and 
inefficiencies associated with a suboptimal scale of production. We also establish that 
financing preferences, firm size and efficiency are inherently interrelated; thus our 
investigation into the FOEs takes into account the underlying simultaneity pertaining to 
these relationships. 
 
Given their generalizability, our results ultimately yield important insights into the 
trade-off that family owners face between SEW maximising behaviour and best practice 
from an economic standpoint. The results presented in this thesis therefore have 
important implications for family business researchers, policy makers, the providers of 
external finance and family business owners themselves. In Chapter 6 we discuss these 
implications along with the overall meaning of our findings, highlight the limitations of 
the thesis, suggest avenues for future research, and conclude the thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and 
Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Chapter introduction 
 
In this chapter we review the literature which pertains to how family ownership may 
ultimately affect the performance of small and medium sized family enterprises. It is 
well known that small firms in general have difficulties accessing finance, but the 
literature which examines how family ownership may mitigate or enhance these 
difficulties remains largely dispersed and anecdotal in nature. Furthermore, the studies 
that do draw upon theory do so in an ad hoc manner and do not consider a holistic view 
of the family firm’s financing decisions. With this gap in mind, by drawing upon the 
overarching paradigm of SEW and the various behaviours by family owners which 
result from the preservation of such wealth, this chapter develops an argument on how 
these relatively unique tendencies may manifest themselves in the financing preferences 
of family owners and ultimately the size and performance outcomes of family firms. 
 
Specifically, this chapter argues that there are well-established simultaneous 
relationships between financing, firm size and performance. Further, we argue that the 
tendency of family owners to pursue SEW objectives will influence their financing 
decisions. These decisions will have a bearing on the size of the firm, which will 
ultimately be reflected in the firm’s efficiency. This line of reasoning, outlined in Figure 
3 is consistent with the central argument in Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), except we 
acknowledge that firm size itself is also a function of ownership (Penrose 1959). By 
understanding these links, this thesis extends the work of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) and 
offers to bridge the current knowledge gap on how family ownership impacts firm 
performance.  
 
The framework illustrated in Figure 3 highlights important, but fundamentally 
unexplored, channels through which the SEW considerations of family owners may 
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affect their financing preferences as well as the firm’s size and performance. In this 
chapter, we respectively operationalize these concepts as the composition of finance, 
scale of production, and efficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Illustrated by the dotted lines, we further expect fundamental interrelations between 
these variables. The basis of this framework is further developed in this chapter, which 
is organised as follows.  
 
In Section 2 we explore the distinctive challenges related to the financing of SMEs. 
Section 3 then briefly discusses the literature pertaining to the nature of family firms 
and how they are considered to be a distinct class of SMEs in that family owners have a 
strong desire to pursue non-economic or SEW objectives. We then go on to Section 4 
which outlines, and formulates testable hypotheses on, the connection between family 
 Proposed Relationship Operationalization Testable Hypotheses 
(1) 
Family ownership will affect 
financing preferences. 
Composition of debt and 
equity financing 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 
(2) 
Family ownership will affect 
firm size. 
Scale of production  Hypotheses 5 to 7 
(3) 
Family ownership will affect 
firm performance. 
Efficiency Hypotheses 8 to 10 
Figure 3: Channels through which family ownership impacts the firm  
Family 
Ownership 
Composition 
of Finance 
 
Proportion of debt 
and equity by source 
 
Efficiency 
 
Technical and scale 
efficiency, capital 
intensity 
Scale of 
Production 
 
Total capital, labour, 
and output 
(1) (2) (3) 
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ownership and the composition of debt and equity financing by associating the SME 
financing literature with existing family business literature. The discussion then 
proceeds to Section 5 where we explore, and formulate further hypotheses on, how 
family ownership might constrain the firm’s scale, and Section 6 discusses how such 
constraints may ultimately affect the firm’s efficiency. Section 7 summarises the 
chapter. 
 
2.2 The distinctive challenges of SME finance 
 
Given their economic importance
6
, the issue of financing SMEs has played a central 
role in the economic, finance and managerial literature for decades (see for example 
MacMillan Committee 1931; Butters and Lintner 1945). During this period, many have 
argued that SMEs in particular have non-trivial difficulties in obtaining financing, either 
through debt or equity, leading to what is commonly referred to as an ‘SME financing 
gap’. Although there is no generally accepted definition of this gap, the term refers to 
the sizeable share of economically significant SMEs that cannot obtain financing from 
banks, capital markets or other suppliers of finance (Organisation For Economic Co-
operation And Development 2006;2007)
 7
.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the distinctive challenges that SMEs face in raising 
financial capital are rooted in themes of asymmetric information and agency costs 
(Leland and Pyle 1977; Barnea et al. 1981; Pettit 1985; Binks et al. 1992), the risk 
aversion of both the provider and recipient of finance (Knight 1965; Kihlstrom and 
Laffont 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), the desire of owners to maintain control of the 
firm (Cressy 1995; Chittenden et al. 1996; Berggren et al. 2000), and structural 
                                                 
 
6
 Although there are numerous accounts of the economic importance of SMEs, a notable study 
by Ayyagari et al. (2007) reports that, depending on the country, the SMEs sector is responsible 
for a significantly large share of formal and informal employment as well as a large contribution 
to GDP in most developed and developing economies. For example, in Australia, where this 
study’s data is sourced, the SMEs sector’s share of formal employment is greater than 50 
percent and its contribution to total GDP is found to be 23 percent (Ayyagari et al. 2007).  
      
7
 In an effort to determine the worldwide prevalence of an SME financing gap and to explore 
policies which foster an improved flow of financing to SMEs, the Organisation For Economic 
Co-operation And Development (2006;2007) published two books on the subject. 
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deficiencies in the broader market for finance
8
. Adding further complexity to the matter 
is the fact that these theoretical issues may be influenced by forces relating to both the 
supply of and the demand for financing.  
 
On the supply side, asymmetric information between the recipient and provider of 
finance can be problematic for the functioning of credit markets (Leland and Pyle 
1977).  Perhaps the most prominent contribution on an SME financing gap in this regard 
stems from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who identify credit rationing by banks as a main 
impediment to SMEs wishing to access credit
9
.  Since small business entrepreneurs 
possess inside information about their own projects for which they seek funding, it is 
difficult for financial institutions to evaluate the risks of such projects, leading to credit 
rationing (Jaffee and Russell 1976; Leland and Pyle 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
Worsening the asymmetric information problem, monitoring SME borrowers may be 
more difficult since they typically do not hold publicly visible contracts with 
stakeholders, or have audited financial statements that can be shared with providers of 
external finance, nor do they issue equity which is continuously priced in public 
markets (Berger and Udell 1998).  
 
Information asymmetry and the obscure line between the firm and the entrepreneur 
observed in many SMEs (Man et al. 2002) also gives rise to potential agency problems. 
For example, once financing is received, the entrepreneur may be motivated to 
undertake excessively risky projects, since the entrepreneur, or agent, will reap the 
                                                 
 
8
 Supply and demand issues leading to an SME financing gap will be exacerbated in countries 
with low levels of economic and institutional development (Beck et al. 2004). For the purpose 
of this thesis, we only discuss the potential for an SME gap in those nations where there is a 
functioning legal, institutional and regulatory framework; the structure of the financial system is 
intact; and the domestic savings investment balance is sufficient to allow for financial 
intermediation between borrowers and lenders. Thus, hereafter we will not discuss the structural 
deficiencies in the broader market for finance and focus exclusively on the informational 
problems as well as the risk/control preferences of borrowers and lenders as reasons for an SME 
financing gap.   
 
9
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) identify credit rationing to occur if 1) among identical loan 
applicants, some receive credit  while others do not, or 2) there are identifiable groups in the 
population that are unable to obtain credit at any price. These undesirable outcomes are 
modelled as an equilibrium phenomenon where asymmetric information between borrowers and 
lenders creates the potential for adverse selection. 
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benefits of such risk taking, while the lender, or principal, prefers a less risky project 
that increases the probability that the loan will be repaid (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). This 
principal-agent problem, which is potentially present in all lending, is more serious for 
smaller firms than for larger firms
10
. Additionally, the greater the exposure to risk 
associated with information asymmetries between various external financiers and the 
entrepreneur, the higher the return on capital demanded by each source (Cassar 2004).   
 
In addition to increased evaluation, monitoring, and credit risks, the SME sector is 
characterised by greater fluctuations in profitability and growth. SMEs also generally 
have considerably lower survival rates than larger firms (Evans 1987a;b; Storey and 
Thompson 1995; Cressy 1996b). A higher risk profile, coupled with limited credit 
histories and collateralizable assets also lead to a higher likelihood of credit rationing, 
and a decrease in the supply of debt financing available overall for SMEs (Levenson 
and Willard 2000). Considering that banks are the single most important source of 
external credit to SMEs (Meyer 1998), credit rationing by banks has long been 
acknowledged as a main contributor to an SME financing gap.  
 
For similar reasons, other sources of finance, such as equity, are also limited for SMEs. 
For example, according to Binks et al. (1992) the uneven distribution of information 
between external private equity providers and the firm decreases the level of trust 
between the two parties, leading to lost opportunities. The difficulties faced by small 
business owners in identifying potential sources of private equity also contribute to the 
problem (Hustedde and Pulver 1992), and, due to their smaller scale, structural 
limitations may exclude SMEs from issuing equity on publicly traded markets. 
 
Additional limitations on SME debt and equity financing may interestingly arise from 
demand side constraints. That is to say, SMEs’ preference for debt financing may be 
                                                 
 
10
 It has been argued that asymmetric information is a more serious problem in SMEs than in 
larger firms, since 1) the entrepreneur has access to better information concerning the operation 
of the business and has considerable leeway in sharing such information with outsiders; 2) the 
entrepreneur is also likely to have less training and experience in business than those in a larger 
company; and 3) the entrepreneur may have incentives to remain opaque to outsiders, which 
would cause difficulties for any outside provider of finance to accurately assess the associated 
lending risks (Organisation For Economic Co-operation And Development 2006;2007).  
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lower relative to larger firms (Kotey 1999). For example, the demand for SME debt 
may be dampened, as the fear of having their loan application rejected may discourage 
small business owners from applying for bank credit in the first place (Freel et al. 2012). 
Further, to avoid liquidity and bankruptcy risks, SMEs have a tendency to choose levels 
of debt that do not fully exploit the firm’s economic potential (Hutchinson 1995). 
However, despite the potential for debt demand to be lower, the SME literature on the 
matter demonstrates that external debt financing is still preferred over external equity 
financing, as the former entails less monitoring and interference from outsiders than the 
latter. 
 
For example, the Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH) developed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), as suggested by the seminal work of Donaldson (1961), asserts that under 
conditions of asymmetric information, firms will prefer financing sources that minimise 
transaction costs, external interference, and ownership dilution. Accordingly, as a 
pecking order, firms prefer internal to external funds, and debt to equity if external 
funds are needed (Myers 1984). Although there is some debate as to whether the POH 
empirically holds for SMEs (see for example Frank and Goyal 2003), the overwhelming 
consensus is that SME financing decisions do in fact adhere to a preference hierarchy as 
predicted by the POH (Reid 1996; Jordan et al. 1998; Watson and Wilson 2002; 
Sánchez-Vidal and Martín-Ugedo 2005; J.S. Ramalho and da Silva 2009).  
 
In many of these studies the underlying reason for the general avoidance of raising 
equity finance is the inherent information asymmetry between the potential providers of 
equity and the owners of the firm, which results in an increase in the cost of equity 
finance, and a reduction in the attractiveness or accessibility of such financing (Cassar 
and Holmes 2003; Brav 2009); however, another major factor is the loss of control that 
raising equity finance implies. 
 
An aversion to the sale of equity to outsiders, coined as ‘control aversion’, is based on 
the theoretical notion that small businesses are run by fiercely independent owner-
managers, suspicious of outside control (Cressy 1995; Cressy et al. 1996; Cressy and 
Olofsson 1997; Berggren et al. 2000). A strong control aversion, or control motive (the 
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two terms are used interchangeably throughout this chapter) among SME owners would 
explain why the POH holds for SMEs, as the owners of such firms would prefer 
internally sourced equity, such as retained earnings, and equity from friends and family, 
more so than externally sourced equity (Berggren et al. 2000; Mueller 2008).  
 
This line of reasoning leads us to the understanding that, under certain circumstances, 
financial explanations for an SME financing gap may be more closely associated with 
the characteristics of the owner-manager's preference for investment funds rather than 
any deficiency in supply. Supporting this view, Hutchinson (1995) asserts that, where 
the objective of an owner-manager is to maintain control of the firm, a suboptimal 
capital structure decision is made in the form of reduced demand for both equity and 
debt. Such demand side constraints arise from factors internal to the firm (Cressy 
1996a; Cressy and Olofsson 1997), which implies that the personal motives and intent 
of owners matters in terms of  the magnitude and scope of financing accessible to the 
firm. 
 
In this regard, family ownership is an interesting form of ownership since family 
business owners are known to have very different objectives relative to non-family 
firms, many of which being non-economic in nature (Ward 1988; Harris et al. 1994; 
Sharma et al. 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Nelly and Rodríguez 2008; Gomez-Mejia 
et al. 2011). Considering that family run businesses are the prevalent form of business 
among OECD economies
11
, any SME financing constraints specific to family firms will 
have broader economic consequences. Next we discuss the nature of family owned 
firms, their unique objectives, and how such objectives may manifest themselves in the 
financing preferences of family firms. 
 
 
                                                 
 
11
 Burns and Whitehouse (1996) report that 85 percent of businesses in the European Union and 
90 percent of businesses in the United States are family controlled. It is also generally 
recognized that ‘family control’ is a predominant ownership structure in most developed and 
developing countries (see for example La Porta et al. 1999). 
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2.3 Family ownership and the pursuit of socio-emotional wealth 
 
Despite family business being the focus of study for many years, the persisting 
challenge facing researchers is defining what exactly a family business is
12
. In an 
attempt to clarify this issue, two broad conceptual approaches have been established in 
the literature. Following the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932), the first approach 
focuses on a structural-based classification. For example, family firms have been 
defined as those which are either owned, controlled and/or managed by a family unit. 
Such a definition allows for a wide range of ‘family firms’ as the degree of family 
ownership, control and management can differ among individual firms, and studies have 
shown that varying degrees of family involvement does empirically matter (Villalonga 
and Amit 2006; Miller et al. 2007; Sciascia and Mazzola 2008).  
 
In fact, some researchers have come to realize that the components of family 
involvement do not necessarily determine whether a firm is a family firm as the 
structural based approach does not account for the possibility of intraorganisational 
aspirations within the firm to either increase or decrease the degree of  family-based 
relatedness (Litz 1995). Thus, when attempting to narrow the definition of a family 
firm, an intention based approach can be useful. Indeed, the intangible desire of the 
family unit to transfer ownership through succession within the family is considered to 
be a unique characteristic of family firms. Handler (1994) describes the issue of 
succession as the most important issue that all family firms face; Chua et al. (2003) find 
that succession is the number one concern of family firms; and Ward (1987) goes so far 
as to define all family firms specifically as those that will be “passed on for the family’s 
next generation to manage and control” pg. 252.   
 
Regardless of the definitional approach taken, and without any consideration about the 
degree of family influence, family firms may be considered unique from other firms in 
the sense that there is an interaction between ownership, management as well as a third 
entity, the family. Gersick et al. (1997) helped to classify these interactions by 
                                                 
 
12 
In their review of more than 200 family business research articles,
 
Sharma et al. (1996) count 
21different definitions of family business that were used. 
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developing a ‘three-circle model’ which describes the family business system as three 
independent but overlapping subsystems. More recently, refined as: managers and 
employees, owners, and family (Moores 2009). Any individual can be placed in one of 
the seven sectors formed by the overlapping circles, as identified in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The three-circle model of family business  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Figure 4, it is the interaction of the family unit on the business entity and 
owners, and/or individual family members, which can bring about unique system 
conditions which impact performance outcomes (Habbershon et al. 2003). It is for these 
reasons that Anderson and Reeb (2003) contend that family owners are a unique class of 
shareholder. More specifically, there is a strong identification by family owners 
between the family and the business (Gallo and Vilaseca 1996), and family business 
owners, unlike other companies, have to satisfy the current and future needs of family 
members in addition to the needs of the business (Dreux 1990).  
 
We acknowledge that understanding family concerns and preferences are crucial for 
understanding family business behaviour (Ward 1988; Harris et al. 1994; Nelly and 
Rodríguez 2008); thus we also acknowledge that objectives other than profit may drive 
differences in behaviours between family and non-family firms. Although such non-
pecuniary considerations also exist in non-family SMEs, they can be especially strong if 
the relationship between owner and company is closer (Mueller 2008).  As a result, long 
term objectives akin to the continuity of the business, preservation of financial strength 
and maintenance of family control may receive greater precedence than immediate 
1. Only family members 
2. Only owners 
3. Only employees/managers 
4. Family owners 
5. Employee/manager owners 
6. Family employees/managers 
7. Family owners and employees/managers 
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profits or other short-term aims. The role of these non-economic factors in the 
management of the firm is thus a key distinguishing feature that separates family firms 
from other organisational forms.    
 
Recently, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) have comprehensively referred to these non-
economic objectives as the preservation of SEW. As defined by the authors, SEW refers 
to the non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family's affective needs, such as 
identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family 
dynasty. More specifically, the SEW endowment of family firms consists of a variety of 
related forms, including the ability to exercise authority, the perpetuation of family 
values through the business, the preservation of the family dynasty, the conservation of 
the family firm's social capital, the fulfilment of family obligations based on blood ties 
rather than on strict criteria of competence, and the opportunity to be altruistic to family 
members (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). 
  
Fundamental to this approach is the notion that firms make choices depending on the 
reference point of the firm’s dominant principles; hence family owners evaluate 
problems in terms of assessing how actions will affect their socio-emotional 
endowment, or more broadly speaking, their stock of affect-related value that is 
ultimately derived from their control over the firm (Berrone et al. 2012). The approach 
is also consistent with a neo-classical behavioural view of the firm
13
 and traditional 
utility theory, once one recognises that ‘utility’ may be a function of both economic and 
non-economic outcomes
14
. As the utility value derived by owners from either of these 
outcomes vary, so too will utility maximising actions (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Demsetz 1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985).   
 
                                                 
 
13
 The behavioural view is based on the notion that bounded-rationality under uncertainty will 
yield ‘satisficing’ decision-making instead of an optimal solution (Simon 1955; Cyert et al. 
1959; Cyert and March 1963). 
 
14
 For example, ‘affective decision-making’ is a theory of choice, which generalizes expected 
utility theory by positing the existence of two cognitive processes – the rational and the 
emotional process (Bracha and Brown 2009). 
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Among family business researchers, the appeal of an overarching paradigm that can 
encompass the many documented characteristics and behaviours of family businesses is 
understandable
15
, and recent publications in the literature clearly demonstrate that the 
concept of SEW has gained considerable momentum in the last few years (see for 
example Berrone et al. 2010; Stockmans et al. 2010; Zellweger and Dehlen 2011; Cruz 
et al. 2012).   
 
Noticeably missing in the literature however, is how the pursuit of various SEW 
objectives might in turn influence the financing preferences of family owners, especially 
in the context of the previously mentioned challenges specific to SME financing. These 
challenges pertain to both family and non-family owned SMEs alike; however, as the 
theoretical basis for an SME financing gap relates to issues of asymmetric information, 
agency and transaction costs, as well as risk and control aversion, we expect that the 
behaviours associated with the maintenance of SEW might affect these financing 
challenges, particularly for family firms.  
 
For example, using a socio-emotional reference point, family SMEs, relative to their 
non-family counterparts, are likely to have a more pronounced priority on maintaining 
family control. As extracting SEW benefits from the firm necessitates a high level of 
owner sovereignty, a fundamental condition to the maintenance of SEW is for family 
owners to retain control of the firm. Thus, in family firms, owners are expected to have 
a much stronger control motive than those in non-family firms. This and other family 
firm behaviour related to the preservation of SEW, such as an aversion to certain risk 
taking activities, an emphasis on the firm’s reputation, and a long-term perspective on 
relationships and performance may in turn influence the information asymmetry, risk, 
and agency issues between would-be financiers and the firm.  
 
As a result family owners may heavily favour, or have relatively better access to, certain 
sources of finance, while other sources may be precluded entirely. Such behaviours, 
which serve to maximise SEW objectives rather than the firm’s profit, may not only 
                                                 
 
15
 See Moores (2009) for a discussion on the current state of the study of family business as a 
standalone discipline and paths to further develop a theory of the business family domain. 
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impact the firm’s overall access to finance (Haynes et al. 1999), but also the scale and 
technology of its production process (Barbera and Moores 2013), and ultimately its 
performance (Sacristán-Navarro et al. 2011).  
 
The notion that family ownership will influence various financing preferences is not 
necessarily new; however, the various literatures on the matter are mostly fragmented 
into investigations on specific anecdotal tendencies of family owners. Despite the 
apparent links, research to date has yet to integrate this body of literature as a means to 
explore how SEW objectives relate to the overall financing preferences of family firms. 
Even less research has been devoted to such matters for SMEs in particular, and given 
that the strong control motive associated with SEW might be a behavioural factor in 
both family and non-family SMEs (Mueller 2008), it is interesting to identify whether 
family firms, as a distinct sub-set of SMEs presumed to exhibit an even stronger control 
motive, are systematically subject to different financing, size, and performance 
outcomes.   
 
From a SEW vantage point, in the following sections we associate the fragmented 
family business literature regarding the distinct behaviour displayed by family owners 
with the literature on the availability and use of both debt and equity SME financing. As 
a result, hypotheses relating to these proposed differences are formulated. Subsequent to 
this, we explore how the maintenance of SEW may affect firm size and performance, 
and develop additional testable hypotheses based on the economic efficiency literature 
pertaining to these issues.     
 
2.4 Family ownership and the composition of debt and equity financing 
 
In this section we review the literature pertaining to the access of debt and equity 
finance of family firms, and develop hypotheses based on a SEW vantage point. Since 
we acknowledge that family owners’ SEW objectives will affect the strategic behaviour 
of those owners, the overarching theoretical framework can be linked to the basic neo-
classical understanding of firm behaviour. That is, ownership will affect the conduct of 
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the firm, which in turn will affect its performance (Simon 1955; Cyert et al. 1959; Cyert 
and March 1963; Bain 1968). 
 
Following this logic, the conduct of the family firm, specifically their financing 
preferences, can be linked with various SEW objectives. In the following sections, we 
operationalize financing preferences by observing the composition of finance by debt 
and equity source. Further, the theoretical implications of most, if not all, of the family 
business literature cited can be connected to a strong desire by family owners to retain 
control of the firm. This intent is consistent with SEW maximizing behaviour since 
controlling ownership allows the family to pursue such non-economic goals with 
minimal outside interference.  
 
As the concept of SEW preservation and a strong control motive are closely linked 
(Berrone et al. 2012), this section is dedicated to exploring the literature and developing 
hypotheses on how family SEW objectives, and the preservation of the sovereignty that 
is required to pursue them, might impact both the debt (Section 4.1) and equity (Section 
4.2) financing composition of the firm. Specifically, both the composition of debt and 
equity as well as the quantum of finance available to or undertaken by the family firm is 
expected to be sensitive to family owners’ desire to pursue various non-economic SEW 
objectives. In subsequent sections, we explore how such conduct may manifest itself in 
both size and performance outcomes for the family firm.   
 
 Family ownership and debt financing 2.4.1
 
Since SMEs do not have access to public debt markets, they typically rely on financial 
intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, as a primary source of debt finance 
(Petersen and Rajan 1994). Credit rationing by banks, as described previously, therefore 
poses a large problem in terms of constraining the supply of SME finance, including 
family owned firms; however, based on the family business literature, the asymmetric 
information problems which trigger credit rationing may be mitigated by family 
ownership.  
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For example, Berger and Udell (1995) suggest that the relationship between lender and 
borrower is an important mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problems 
associated with financing small enterprises
16
. In this regard, it has been suggested that 
family firms favour long-term win-win relationships over transactions-links with 
providers of capital and other stakeholders (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005). Since 
bank financing often involves a long-term relationship, and since upholding the 
identity/reputation of the family firm, which often carries their name, is considered to be 
a SEW objective of family owners, the long-term governance structure of family firms 
may be better suited to accommodate a closer relationship with their bank, leading to 
greater access to credit (Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Chua et al. 2011).  
 
Another potential alleviation of the credit rationing problem is the use of collateral in 
the credit contract (Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Hence, if 
personal commitments are prerequisites for bank financing, the wealth of small business 
owners will play a key role in successfully obtaining credit (Avery et al. 1998; Colombo 
and Grilli 2007). Again, family ownership may help in this regard since the extent of 
debt collateralisation is increased via the use of pooled personal family assets to secure 
bank loans (Steijvers et al. 2010), and such pooling is less likely to occur outside of 
family owned firms.  
 
Finally, due to their long-term orientation (Lumpkin and Brigham 2011), based on the 
SEW objective of perpetuating the family dynasty, priorities such as the long-term 
survival and reputation of the firm receive a great deal of attention by family owners. 
Since ensuring the continuity of the firm pertains to SEW, these priorities have been 
said to lead to an overall culture of commitment in family firms (Zahra et al. 2008). 
Commitment to the firm is further enhanced by the fact that family owners have a 
majority of their wealth tied into the equity of the firm and therefore prefer more 
conservative investment strategies since they bear all the risk (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
                                                 
 
16
 So called ‘relationship lending’ may mitigate the common asymmetric information problems 
facing lenders since screening and monitoring functions are facilitated when there is a closer 
relationship between lender and borrower. For an overview of the relationship lending literature, 
see Boot (2000).   
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For this reason, it has been suggested that the typical agency problems between lender 
and borrower will be mitigated by family ownership (Chrisman et al. 2004).Long-term 
objectives combined with a greater commitment signal to lenders that family firms 
intend to repay their loans, reducing agency risks and increasing the likelihood of credit 
application approval (Blumberg and Letterie 2008). 
  
The discussion thus far leads us to believe that, as far as the supply of debt financing is 
concerned, family ownership can mitigate the causes of credit rationing by banks. 
Previous findings have supported this belief, but it has yet to be tested directly. For 
example by examining family firms’ propensity to take discounts on trade credit17, 
Bopaiah (1998) suggested that family firms have better access to bank credit. More 
directly, if family firms in fact had better access to bank credit, all things being equal, 
we would expect family SMEs to utilise more debt financing from banks relative to 
their non-family counterparts, which can be tested under the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Bank debt, as a proportion of total debt, is greater for family firms 
relative to non-family firms.  
 
It is well known that SMEs which cannot secure bank credit often resort to trade credit
18
 
(Biais and Gollier 1997; Petersen and Rajan 1997); thus, if Hypothesis 1a is confirmed, 
it follows that we would also expect family firms to utilise relatively less trade credit 
than their non-family peers, this can be tested under the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Trade credit, as a proportion of total debt, is lower for family firms 
relative to non-family firms.  
 
                                                 
 
17
 In the context of family firms, Bopaiah (1998) used the methodology of Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) which postulated that firms which take advantage of trade credit discounts, i.e. trade 
creditors usually offer a nominal discount if the debt is repaid in a relatively short time frame, 
use bank credit to do so and thus have better access to finance from banks. 
 
18
 Trade credit, to some extent, alleviates the asymmetric information problem faced by credit 
rationing banks since suppliers may be better positioned to evaluate and control the credit risk 
of their buyers (Petersen and Rajan 1997).  
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Other, less orthodox, sources of debt financing may include loans from related or 
unrelated individuals and businesses (Harvey and Evans 1995). Successfully accessing 
such sources of debt finance can be related to what other researchers have called 
organizational ‘social capital’, which refers to goodwill and resources a firm amasses 
because of its connections and relationships with others (Arregle et al. 2007). For 
example, SME financing arrangements have been shown to be based first from social 
capital aspects between the borrower and lender, which in turn evolve to the 
organizational level as the relationship develops (Brush et al. 2002; Freear et al. 2002). 
In the case of SMEs, relations between the firm and its stakeholders are expected to 
reflect personal relationships to a much higher degree than in larger firms where such 
relationships are more likely to be formalised.  
 
In this regard, family SMEs may be disadvantaged since, as a result of their tendency to 
focus on building interpersonal networks with internal contacts within the family, they 
may fail to cultivate external networks with more diverse stakeholders outside of the 
family (Salvato and Melin 2008). This implies that, although the depth of family SME 
networks may be quite deep, their breadth may be limited.  
 
The notion that family firms have narrower external networks has lead researchers like 
Rosessl (2005) to hypothesise that family businesses tend to be less willing to enter into 
cooperative arrangements with outsiders, as many characteristics of family businesses 
have a hindering effect on such cooperation. On the supply side, Dawson (2011) finds 
that external private equity professionals are more likely to invest in firms in which 
family presence is reduced after the financing deal, and suggests that they associate the 
intertwinement of family and business with negative qualities, such as emotions, 
conflict, and misunderstandings. In other words, external sources of debt financing are 
often not well known by family firms, and their networks are poorly structured, making 
access to them difficult.  
 
Further the aforementioned pecking order hypothesis developed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) proposes that when firms have information that outside investors do not have, 
firms will prefer internal over external sources of finance. This approach can be 
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explained by a desire to minimize the transaction costs of raising finance, which 
becomes especially important in the context of SME finance (Chittenden et al. 1996). 
Considering a pecking order, Romano et al. (2001) have found that small family 
businesses in particular tend to rely heavily on family loans, rather than loans from 
outsiders as a source of finance. Consistent with SEW maximising behaviour, these 
preferences protect the family’s influence over the management and operation of the 
firm.  
 
However, from a financing perspective, lower social capital with outsiders would hinder 
the family firm’s ability to access these sources and limit it, to some extent, to internal 
sources of debt finance. This coupled with a strong control motive and resulting 
preference for internal loans from family implies that family firms will utilise more 
internal rather than external sources of debt finance. This can be tested under the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Loans from internal sources, as a proportion of total debt, are greater 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Loans from external sources, as a proportion of total debt, are lower 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
Since firm’s can obtain finance by issuing both debt and equity, differences in debt 
composition alone cannot reveal the full extent of the influence that a SEW reference 
point might have on family owners’ financing preferences. Thus, just as family owner 
preferences are expected to influence the firm’s composition of debt, they are also 
expected to influence the firm’s composition of equity. The reasons for these 
expectations, and subsequent hypotheses development, are presented in the next sub-
section. 
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 Family ownership and equity financing 2.4.2
 
As SMEs typically do not reach the required scale to issue shares on organised equity 
markets, they tend to rely heavily on private equity
19
 and retained earnings. For SMEs, 
financing preferences consistent with a pecking order theory have empirically been 
shown to hold (Cassar and Holmes 2003). That is, the most commonly utilised sources 
of SME private equity are raised from internal resources, such as the principal owner 
themselves (including retained earnings), followed by their family and friends (Berger 
and Udell 1998). Lower on the order of preferred equity sources is equity raised from 
external resources, such as external private equity investors, venture capitalists, 
unrelated individuals and eventually organised equity markets (Myers and Majluf 
1984). Similar to the case of debt financing, family ownership and a SEW reference 
point is also expected to influence the utilisation of these sources of equity financing. 
 
On a positive note, as per the family business literature, patient capital is a valuable 
asset for family firms (Sirmon and Hitt 2003). Patient capital, a potential benefit of 
SEW preservation, refers to the equity holder’s ability to focus on long-term, rather than 
immediate, returns. Family owners are thus not as focused on short-term results as 
nonfamily firms. For example, the presence of family owners, with their increased time 
horizon
20
, may reduce the riskiness of an investment and hence the risk-equivalent cost 
of equity capital (Zellweger 2007). However, it is important to consider that a reduction 
of investment risk might also relate solely to internal, rather than external, equity 
providers. A tendency for internal equity providers to be more ‘patient’ could in turn 
translate to a greater availability of equity from such sources.  
    
Further, due to an intermingling of business and family finances in family owned 
businesses, there are potentially more sources of internal working owner equity for 
                                                 
 
19
 Broadly speaking, private equity refers to equity securities that are not registered and not 
publicly traded on an exchange. Thus private equity can be sourced from both internal and 
external sources. 
 
20
 Zellweger (2007) argues that family firms display a longer time horizon than most of their 
nonfamily counterparts, since family firms display a longer CEO tenure and strive for long-term 
independence and succession within the family. 
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family firms than in non-family firms. Sirmon and Hitt (2003) refer to this advantage as 
survivability capital, another potential benefit of SEW preservation, which  represents 
the pooled personal resources that family members are willing to loan, contribute, or 
share for the benefit of the family business (Dreux 1990; Haynes et al. 1999).  
 
Although it is understood that SMEs in general will rely heavily on such sources of 
equity, greater patient and survivability capital, along with the tendency to build a 
strong equity base over time through the retention of profits (Poutziouris 2001), would 
suggest that family firms may access internal equity, such as equity from working 
owners and retained earnings, more so than non-family SMEs. To test this, we 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Internal equity from working owners, as a proportion of total equity, 
is greater for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
In addition to the reasons already discussed, and since we are curious about the 
composition of equity finance, we may also find Hypothesis 3 to be true due to the 
notion that family owners’ first financing objective is not to lose control of the business 
(Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar 2007). Thus, if the family firm were to raise 
external equity, it would be from related sources such as other non-working family 
members and friends, rather than unrelated individuals or businesses. Thus, on the 
negative side, family firms have limited sources of external financial capital because 
they avoid sharing equity with nonfamily members (Sirmon and Hitt 2003). 
 
Although family ownership may reduce the asymmetric information problems 
associated with internal equity holders, asymmetric information between current family 
owners and prospective external investors may be enhanced due to the family firm’s 
strong preference to maintain control (Schulze et al. 2003). Adherence to a pecking 
order of financing sources in itself would imply that family owners have information 
that outside investors do not, and in turn this would raise the transaction costs of 
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external equity financing. The notion that family firms are more opaque
21
 further 
enhances this information asymmetry problem (Anderson et al. 2009; Bianco et al. 
2012). Evidence of this has been presented in the literature. For example, using different 
approaches, Mahérault (2000;2004), Poutziouris (2001), and Lopez-Gracia and 
Sanchez-Andujar (2007) all have found that the financial development of family firms 
in regards to equity is governed by a ‘keep it in the family’ tradition.  
 
Together, these characteristics suggest that family SMEs tend to have a more limited 
external equity financing base, but a wider base of internally generated equity, 
excluding equity from working owners, which has been tested for separately in 
Hypothesis 3. This can be tested under the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Equity from internal sources other than working owners, as a 
proportion of total equity, is greater for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Equity from external sources, as a proportion of total equity, is lower 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
Despite our expectations that there will be differences in the composition of debt and 
equity finance, we acknowledge that family ownership may also negatively impact the 
quantum of finance overall.  For example, an over-reliance on internal or related sources 
of debt and equity may limit the total amount of finance the family firm can raise in the 
first place due to the likelihood that such sources are less endowed, in terms of capacity 
to finance, than external ones. While less endowed sources of debt and equity might 
limit the total amount of equity financing available to family firms, a strong control 
motive might also limit the total amount of equity that family firms are willing to issue 
externally. 
 
                                                 
 
21
 Anderson et al. (2009), by developing an index to gauge relative opaqueness, argue that 
information about firm activities is significantly less transparent in the presence of founder or 
‘heir ownership’.  
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The notion that access to financial resources is limited for small family-owned 
businesses is somewhat established (De Visscher et al. 1995; Harvey and Evans 1995; 
Coleman and Carsky 1999); however thus far we have attempted to link the numerous, 
but disconnected, existing family business financing literature with the relatively new 
overarching concept of SEW preservation. This connection, along with the results of 
our aforementioned hypotheses, will contribute to our overall understanding of how the 
pursuit of non-economic goals can impact the performance of family firms. 
 
Referring back to Figure 3, to link SEW objectives to performance however, we first 
investigate how financing, firm size and performance are linked. Given these 
interrelationships, in the next sections we investigate how the SEW inspired financing 
compositions hypothesised here can lead to specific outcomes for family businesses, 
such as a size constraint, and in turn how a constraint on scale would impact the family 
firm’s efficiency.  
 
2.5 Family ownership and firm size 
 
It is well known that firm size is highly related to the physical capital, or total assets, of 
the firm (Smyth et al. 1975; Shalit and Sankar 1977). Since, other things being equal, a 
firm with fewer assets will generate lower sales revenue and require less employees 
overall, the number of employees as well as total sales revenue, all proxy measures for 
firm size, are ultimately related to total assets. Thus, as per the accounting identity, 
owners’ access, or lack thereof, to viable sources of debt and equity finance for the 
purpose of acquiring assets will naturally have a great influence on a firm’s size. 
 
The notion that varying financing preferences of owners will in turn impact firm size is 
not new in the economic and finance literature. In fact, there is a long-standing theory 
that growth and thus, from a static point of view, the size of most small firms is 
constrained by the available quantity of internally generated finance. Noticing that most 
small firms finance their growth almost exclusively through retained earnings, Butters 
and Lintner (1945) conclude that small firms, even those with promising growth 
opportunities, find it difficult to raise outside capital on reasonably favourable terms. 
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Less capital in turn implies diminished capital investment, and ultimately lower growth 
(Fazzari et al. 1988). Carpenter and Petersen (2002) defined this phenomenon as the 
‘internal finance theory of growth’ and go on to suggest that small firms in particular 
will have growth constraints due to a large wedge between the cost of internal and 
external finance. Empirically, Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) have confirmed the link 
between access to finance and firm size by finding that smaller and young firms’ growth 
are more limited in terms of the cash flow available, which signals greater financing 
constraints for these firms. 
 
This literature clearly highlights that the availability and cost of finance is an important 
factor affecting the ability of a business to grow. It is important to note however that, 
although access to finance by itself will not cause a small business to grow, the inability 
to obtain or the restricted availability of, finance can definitely prevent or hinder growth 
(Binks 1996). From this understanding, we can link the availability of finance, and thus 
the size of the firm, to the various motives of firm owners.  
 
In fact, the family firm behaviour proposed in the previous section has been 
theoretically linked to firm size in seminal economic works. For example, Kihlstrom 
and Laffont  (1979), based on the work of Knight  (1965), model how less risk averse 
entrepreneurs run larger firms. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) explain how an inverse 
relationship between firm size and concentration of ownership, based on a trade-off 
between ‘shirking costs’ and a ‘risk neutral effect’22, is consistent with stockholder 
wealth, or utility maximizing behaviour. Williamson (1967) combined an organizational 
theory and economic modelling approach to show how the expansion of firm size 
inevitably brings about some loss of control. Lucas (1978) argues that the distribution of 
managerial ability determines the distribution of firm size.  Along these lines, Penrose 
                                                 
 
22
 Since a given degree of control generally requires a smaller share of the firm the larger is the 
firm, the greater diffuseness of ownership occurring in larger firms distributes any risk 
associated with a given degree of ownership across many shareholders. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) refer to this as the ‘risk-neutral’ effect of size on ownership. 
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(1959) describes how difficulties in obtaining capital is a main factor in preventing the 
expansion of small firms
23
.  
 
More recently, Cressy (1995) postulates that “independence of control is maintained at 
the expense of growth”. In another paper, by Cressy (1996b), the so-called ‘target 
income hypothesis’ proposes that the objective of the entrepreneur is to produce an 
independent source of income to replace income from previous employment, thus SMEs 
may grow to the level required to achieve the lifestyle the managers were previously 
accustomed to, but often no further. Chittenden et al. (1996) observe how an over-
reliance on internally available funds, in the case of unlisted small firms, is likely to be 
a major constraint on firm size. Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) show that reduced 
access to formal sources of external finance causes smaller firms to face larger growth 
constraints. While Orser et al. (2000) describe how small firms are lacking in financial 
expertise, which limits their availability to external finance sources. 
 
Based on this literature, firms which are constrained in terms of access to external 
finance have been found to be smaller and more likely to be owned by their founders 
than those firms that successfully applied for external finance (Levenson and Willard 
2000). This is an interesting implication in the context of family businesses. For 
instance, considering our discussion in the previous section on how family owners, 
driven by SEW objectives, might influence the utilisation of various sources of debt and 
equity financing, family firm size in turn is also expected to be affected by these 
financing preferences. 
 
                                                 
 
23
 Interestingly, Penrose (1959) outlines how small firms often rely on a division of labour 
between the founder, referred to as the inventor or production manager, and a ‘businessman’, 
who can instil confidence in investors, and overcome the difficulties in raising capital. She goes 
on to suggest that a shortage of capital for small firms, and thus an inability to grow, is the result 
of a failure of such firms to successfully achieve this division of labour. In this regard, we can 
argue that an emphasis on SEW objectives by family owners may drive a strong preference to 
retain family members in key managerial roles, which in turn may hinder the family SMEs 
ability to divide labour in the manner Penrose describes. Thus, if the family does not have such 
a ‘businessman’ already employed in the family firm, they may find capital difficult to obtain, 
and in turn remain small. 
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A strong control motive, the avoidance of risk, and preferences for internal sources of 
financing, or as we have suggested more broadly, an emphasis on SEW objectives by 
family owners may result in non-trivial limits on how much debt and equity financing 
can be raised in total. Lower levels of financing available will result in less physical 
capital
24
 the firm can feasibly acquire. Thus, Despite the expectation that there will be 
variations in the proportions of different sources of debt and equity due to ownership 
structure, we acknowledge that the SEW objectives of family owners may also 
negatively impact the general quantum of finance, and thus the total assets held by the 
firm.  
 
For example, notwithstanding the potential for higher transaction costs already 
mentioned, family firms may demand less from external sources of debt since family 
owners wish to avoid being monitored by outside creditors (Schulze et al. 2001). As 
internal sources of finance, like family and friends, are likely to be less endowed, in 
terms of their capacity to provide finance, than external sources, such preferences may 
lead to less debt financing available overall for family firms. 
  
Moreover, according to a model developed by Cressy (1995), there is a consequent 
trade-off between bank borrowing and control of the firm
25
. Utilising this model he 
finds that, if owner control aversion is strong enough, the firm’s optimum will involve 
borrowing less than the amount that maximises profits. Using a similar line of 
reasoning, McConaughy and Mishra (1999) argue that increased leverage is associated 
with a higher probability of the loss of family control, leading to less use of debt in 
family firms.  
 
                                                 
 
24
 Here we refer to physical capital as the value of the assets held by the firm. As per the 
accounting identity, the value of total assets is calculated as the sum of the values of total debt 
and total equity.  
 
25
 Cressy (1995) argues that although loan capital can be productive and increase the firm's 
revenue, the ‘interference’ by the lender into the affairs of the firm brings the business under the 
control of the bank. Although it is the more common perception of control, the vehicle of this 
interference need not take the form of an equity stake in the business. 
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 34 
 
In addition to the avoidance of monitoring from external creditors and loss of control, 
family owners may prefer less debt financing  due to the fact that inside equity holders 
of family firms typically have undiversified portfolios and the intent to pass the firm on 
to their descendants, and are thus less willing to subject the firm to the future cash flow 
risks that result from financing via debt (Agrawal and Nagarajan 1990; McMahon and 
Stanger 1995; Zahra 2005). Schulze et al. (2003) further highlight how family firms are 
vulnerable to conflict and thus avoid the added risk that debt financing implies. Based 
on this, from an SEW standpoint Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) suggest that, when family 
harmony is at stake, the demand for debt may be subdued.  
 
Such risk avoidance is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who observed that 
large, undiversified shareholders may force the firm to seek low risk projects and avoid 
high risk activities. Ward (1988) outlines how this risk aversion can limit the strategic 
aggressiveness of family firms, and Morck et al. (2000) also recognise the distaste for 
risk displayed by family owned firms arguing that they may be excessively risk averse.  
 
Manifestations of lower debt demand have consistently been observed in that family 
firms have been found to be significantly less leveraged than non-family firms (Dreux 
1990; Gallo and Vilaseca 1996; Anderson et al. 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006).  
Thus, if it is true that family firms demand less debt financing relative to their non-
family peers, we may observe less debt being held overall in family firms, which can be 
tested under the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The quantum of total debt is lower for family firms relative to 
comparable non-family firms. 
 
Since assets can be financed via debt or equity, less family firm debt overall does not 
necessarily imply a smaller firm. To understand the full extent of any potential 
financing constraint for family firms, we first investigate how family ownership may 
impact the decision to use equity financing as a means to raise capital.  
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As already mentioned, one of the central themes in the family business literature, and 
one of the main points of distinction between family and non-family firms, is the intent 
of  family owners to keep ownership, and thus control, within the family across several 
generations (Chrisman et al. 1999). This intent is consistent with SEW maximizing 
behaviour since controlling ownership allows the family to pursue such non-economic 
goals with little outside interference. In this regard, the dilution of ownership that 
raising equity finance entails in turn clearly poses a greater control risk than debt 
financing. Therefore, firms controlled by a major shareholder, as is the case with family 
firms, will be reluctant to use equity financing when doing so causes the controlling 
shareholder to risk losing control (Stulz 1988; Amihud et al. 1990).  
 
As we have already stated, such control motives have been found to influence the 
financing decisions of family firms. For example, Croci et al. (2011) provide empirical 
evidence for the control motive by finding that equity issues are considerably lower in 
publicly listed family-controlled firms than in non-family firms. To test this in the 
context of SMEs, we formulate the following hypothesis. 
   
Hypothesis 6:  The quantum of total equity is lower for family firms relative to 
comparable non-family firms. 
 
If, due to their specific financing preferences, family firms have lower values of both 
equity and debt, then such preferences could lead to a physical capital constraint. 
 
Descriptively, numerous family business studies have provided incidental evidence that 
family firms are in fact relatively smaller than their non-family peers. In turn, these 
studies merely account for some measure of a firm’s scale as a means to control for any 
potential size effect in their analysis. Notable examples include Coleman and Carsky 
(1999), who describe family-owned businesses as significantly smaller than non-family 
businesses in terms of sales, assets, and total employees. Bertrand (2006) who, when 
looking into the strategic choices of family firms, observed that family firms tended to 
be smaller, more self-employed, and less reliant on external finance. Romano et al. 
(2001) find that the use of internal family loans is significantly associated with small 
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family businesses. Kets de Vries (1993) incidentally mentions how less access to 
financial markets may curtail family firms’ growth. While Górriz and Fumás (1996) 
find that family firms have limitations on their portfolio diversification due to, among 
other characteristics, their smaller size.  
 
A more direct relationship between firm size and the concept of SEW preservation in 
particular has only briefly been discussed in the literature. For example, Gomez-Mejia 
(2011) contends that firm size will moderate the family firm’s ability to pursue SEW 
objectives since, as firms grow in size, they culturally display a greater ‘distance’ 
between the organization’s identity and the founding family’s identity; thus, “as the 
family firm grows in size, the use of SEW as a primary reference point for guiding 
managerial choices tends to decrease” pg. 687. 
 
However, despite the well-established links between owners’ financing preferences and 
firm size in the economic literature, as well as the descriptive links between family 
ownership and a smaller firm size, surprisingly very little research has investigated how 
firm size may be a direct outcome, rather than an antecedent or moderator of family 
owners’ ability and willingness to maintain SEW. One of the reasons for this is that 
most comparisons between family and non-family firms focus on performance, rather 
than size, differentials.  
 
One exception is Bach (2010) who argues that, large private benefits lead to a smaller 
firm size via a fear of control loss which directly reduces risk taking as well as the 
recourse to external finance. Specifically, his model predicts that, past a certain scale, 
“family firms may hit the constraint that their dynastic benefits should be preserved, 
while regular firms at the same stage may go on growing according to the evolution of 
their productivity” pg. 4. As a result, he finds that family firms choose a lower level of 
production, and, regarding his sample of private and listed French firms, family firms 
are on average 30 percent smaller in terms of sales.  
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This discussion leads us to the expectation that, in their pursuit of SEW objectives and 
resulting financial preferences, family SMEs will also be smaller in size
26
 than their 
otherwise equivalent non-family peers, which can be tested under the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  Other things being equal, family firms are smaller than non-family 
firms. 
 
Based on the argument posed thus far, it is apparent that not only will a smaller firm 
size foster the necessary conditions for owners to better pursue SEW objectives, i.e. 
firm size moderates the ability to pursue the preservation of SEW, but what is also 
revealed from our discussion is how the financing behaviours associated with the 
preservation of SEW can lead to a smaller firm size, i.e. firm size is an outcome of SEW 
preservation. Gomez-Mejia (2011) has briefly discussed the potential for the former, but 
the latter channel, through which SEW objectives can affect firm outcomes, still 
remains largely unexplored.  
 
The notion that family owners, via their tendency to pursue SEW objectives, may 
prevent the firm from growing larger, leading to a smaller scale of production is 
interesting in itself; however, what is potentially more interesting is how these 
tendencies can lead to certain performance outcomes for family firms. Based on this 
curiosity, we wish to identify how a constraint on their scale could be a source of 
inefficiency for family firms. By doing so, we are identifying an unexplored, but 
important channel through which SEW objectives and subsequent financing decisions 
affect the family firm’s performance. These issues are discussed in the next section. 
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 In Chapter 3, we measure firm size by multiple measures of a firm’s scale of production, 
namely the total amount of capital and labour inputs, and output. 
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2.6 Family ownership and firm efficiency 
 
To date, only a modest amount of analysis has been dedicated towards determining the 
specific effects of family ownership on a firm’s efficiency, as seen in Table 1. However, 
there is apparently some confusion surrounding the definition of efficiency, which in 
turn has led to inadequate measures and analysis of firm efficiency. A review of this 
literature reveals that a significant relationship between family involvement and a firm’s 
productivity, which is related, but not equivalent to, efficiency, has empirically been 
found, yet there is little theoretical justification for such a relationship.   
 
As a result, there is no consensus as to the direction of this relationship. Again, these 
analyses suffer from many of the methodological issues we have discussed in the 
previous chapter
27
. However, the inconsistencies demonstrated in the literature lead us 
to question the validity of comparing productivity measures which do not consider any 
potential differences in the overall ‘productive efficiency’ (PE), in the neo-classical 
sense, between family and non-family firms
28
. As we will explain in Chapter 4, PE is 
comprised of both ‘scale efficiency’ (SE) and ‘technical efficiency’29 (TE) (Banker 
1984; Banker et al. 1984). 
 
                                                 
 
27
 A few studies listed in Table 1 have concentrated on the partial productivity of family firms in 
that they focus on the ratio of output to a single input factor, usually labour; however partial 
analysis only provides a general indication of total factor productivity, as it fails to consider 
trade-offs between other input factors. 
 
28
 Performance at a firm level can be measured either by productivity or efficiency.  
Productivity is defined as the ratio of outputs over inputs. This ratio yields a relative 
measurement of performance that may be applied to any factor of production. The ratio can be 
calculated for a single input and output or by aggregating multiple inputs and outputs, as in 
Table 1. Since it is a relative measurement, external benchmarks are needed to interpret the 
productivity ratio. Moreover, there are many alternative productivity ratios and choosing from 
among them is somewhat arbitrary. All of these measurement limitations are overcome by the 
efficiency concept, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
29
 TE therefore refers to a net measure of the firm’s efficient use of resources, such as capital 
and labour inputs, after the effect of any scale efficiencies have been considered. In the 
economic literature, this is commonly referred to as ‘pure’ TE. To avoid any confusion among 
the terms, this thesis refers to what Farrell (1957) originally called ‘technical efficiency’ as 
‘productive efficiency’, and ‘pure technical efficiency’ simply as ‘technical efficiency’. 
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Table 1: Previous investigations into the effects of family involvement on firm 
Author(s) 
Study Time 
Period(s) 
Data Source & Sample Size Measure of Productivity & Methodology Findings 
Kirchhoff and 
Kirchhoff (1987) 
1978-1982 
‘University of Minnesota Data 
Base’ data on 702 small 
businesses located in Minnesota, 
Ohio, Oregon and Washington. 
Partial measure of productivity comparing sales 
per employee between family firms which use 
paid and unpaid family labour. 
Positive and significant correlation between 
productivity and the use of family labour, both paid 
and unpaid. 
McConaughy,     
Walker, Henderson, 
and  Mishra (1998) 
1986-1988 
COMPUSTAT data on 219 
publicly traded firms. 
Partial measures of productivity such as sales per 
employee and total asset turnover. Matched-pairs 
method to compare family and non-family firms. 
Founding family- as well as descendant-controlled 
firms are more efficient than non-family firms. 
Younger founder controlled firms are more efficient 
than older ones. 
Wall (1998) 1994 
Firm level survey data on 506 
privately held companies in 
Western New York. 
Cobb-Douglas production function using industry 
as a proxy for capital intensity and including an 
intercept dummy variable for family business. 
Factor elasticities are assumed to be equal for 
both family and non-family firms. 
From a ‘macro’ perspective, family firms contribute 
less per firm in the examined regional economy than 
non-family firms. This is based on a lower level of 
sales generated by family firms. 
Bosworth and 
Loundes (2002) 
1994-1995  
1997-1998 
Australian Bureau of Statistics’ 
‘Business Longitudinal Survey’ 
of 4354 small and medium-sized 
Australian firms. 
Cobb-Douglas production function controlling 
for technology, human resources and 
organizational characteristics, including family 
ownership. Factor elasticities are assumed to be 
equal for both family and non-family firms. 
Focusing on the interaction of ‘discretionary’ 
investments, innovation, productivity and profitability, 
family firms are incidentally found to be significantly 
less productive than non-family firms. 
Barth, Gulbrandsen, 
and Schønea (2005)  
1996 
Firm level survey data among 
438 firms associated with the 
‘Confederation of Norwegian 
Business and Industry’. 
Cobb-Douglas production function including 
intercept dummy variables for family owned as 
well as family managed firms. Factor elasticities 
are assumed to be equal for both family and non-
family firms. 
Family owned firms are less productive than non-
family firms. This productivity gap can be explained 
by management regime in that family owned and 
managed firms are significantly less productive. 
Martikainen, 
Nikkinen, and 
Vähämaa (2009) 
1992-1999 
S&P 500 firm data on 159 
manufacturing firms. Source list 
originally compiled and 
classified by Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). 
Cobb-Douglas production function including an 
intercept dummy variable for family business. 
Factor elasticities are tested for invariance and 
found to be equal for both family and non-family 
firm 
Production technologies between family and non-
family firms are found to be the same; however, based 
on a positive and significant intercept dummy 
variable, family firms are found to be more efficient in 
their production than comparable non-family firms. 
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Given this breakdown, another major gap in the family business literature is the lack of 
consideration for the specific effect of family ownership on firm size, and potentially 
how a resulting suboptimal scale of production itself might relate to family firm 
efficiency.  
 
The term ‘suboptimal scale’ describes a condition in which the production capacity of 
some firms is too small, or even too large to be efficient (Weiss 1964). Specifically, for 
those suboptimal firms which are too small, economies of scale are achievable if the 
firm were to increase its production scale, and for those suboptimal firms which are too 
large, a diminishing marginal product means that efficiency gains are achievable if the 
firm were to decrease its production scale (Stigler 1958). If achieved, such efficiencies 
would serve to minimise the long run average cost of production, or in other words an 
optimally scaled firm would be producing at its so-called ‘minimum efficient scale of 
production’ (Saving 1961; Weiss 1964; Purvis 1976; Weiss 1979). However, optimal 
scale need not relate to production costs alone, as the theory of economies of scale is the 
theory of the relationship between the scale of use of a properly chosen combination of 
all productive services and the rate of output of the firm (Stigler 1958).  
 
Based on the notion of an efficient size of firm, Stigler (1958) argues that the optimal 
scale of production is one that “meets any and all problems the entrepreneur actually 
faces: strained labour relations, rapid innovation, government regulation, unstable 
foreign markets, and what not. This is, of course, the decisive meaning of efficiency 
from the viewpoint of the enterprise” pg. 56. Thus, the optimum firm size is one where 
the scale of production maximises the firm’s output efficiency, in terms of overcoming 
the various challenges posed by its economic environment
30
. 
 
Along these lines, the evolutionary models of learning-by-doing introduced by 
Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) suggest that firms may initially enter an 
industry at a suboptimal scale in order to obtain the opportunity to learn and 
subsequently expand if successful; however, given our discussion in the previous 
                                                 
 
30
 In line with this definition, Saving (1961) describes an optimum firm size as the size which 
has minimum average costs of production in the light of its total economic environment. 
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sections, if the firm is facing constraints in terms of their access to finance, regardless of 
their potential capabilities, it may not be able to expand in size, and remain confined to 
a suboptimal scale of production. For example, it has been suggested that in most 
industries, the great majority of SMEs are in fact operating at a suboptimal level of 
production (Phillips and Kirchhoff 1989; Audretsch 1991; Geroski 1995). Such a 
statistic may very well be due to the previously discussed challenges of SME financing, 
which might serve to impose a suboptimal scale upon all SMEs. However, given their 
tendency towards the preservation of SEW, this discussion has very interesting 
implications for family businesses. 
 
In conjunction with the previous section on how family ownership may bring about a 
smaller firm, the discussion thus far leads us to believe that family SMEs may 
particularly be susceptible to the potential inefficiencies related to a suboptimal scale of 
production. This can be tested under the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 8:  Family firms will exhibit lower scale efficiency relative to their non-
family counterparts.     
 
In addition to differences in SE, a potential size constraint on family owned firms may 
also manifest itself in other aspects of PE. For instance, the family firm’s production 
process31, and thus the resulting TE of production, i.e. how inputs are arranged to 
produce output, is likely to be influenced by any potential deficiency of physical capital 
available to the firm.  
 
TE, as defined by the seminal work of Farrell (1957), refers to the firm’s success in 
producing a given output from the smallest possible set of inputs; thus it denotes the 
efficiency of industrial organization in terms of resource use. From this perspective, and 
                                                 
 
31
 The means by which firms maintain, renew, and replace goods and services in the economy 
can be called the production process.  To produce, a firm must purchase and allocate the 
necessary input resources, such as land, labour and physical capital (or lower order goods), and 
then transform them into outputs, or goods and services demanded by, and in turn sold to, 
consumers (or higher order goods); thus the transformation of a good from lower to higher order 
is what is meant by production. It has been broadly argued that all economic activity, which is 
not consumption, is production (Barnett and Block 2005). 
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given our previous discussion on how family ownership may limit the amount of capital 
available to the firm, choice of inputs, or more specifically the capital to labour mix 
utilised in the production processes of family owned SMEs are also expected to be 
different relative to their non-family counterparts. 
 
For example, as a result of their reluctance to relinquish control of the firm via the 
issuance of external finance, family SMEs may ultimately prefer labour over capital 
inputs, even when the latter may result in superior production efficiency outcomes. 
Incidental evidence related to the tendency of family firms to exhibit a more labour-
intensive production process, relative to their industry peers, has previously been shown 
in the literature (Górriz and Fumás 1996; Górriz and Fumás 2005; Barbera and Moores 
2013), but how such input choices might impact the firm’s TE have to date remained 
unexplored. This is mainly due to the fact that the vast majority of previous 
investigations into family firm performance have not appropriately handled the 
endogenous choice of firm size and production scale. 
 
In terms of any direct relationship between a firm’s size and the capital intensity of its 
production, the economic literature on the matter has consistently shown a positive 
relationship
32
. For example, Holthausen (1976) theoretically showed that, under the 
hypothesis of decreasing ‘absolute risk aversion’, an increase in firm size will also 
increase the firm’s capital to labour ratio. Ghosal (1991) empirically reinforced this 
theory by finding a significant and positive relationship between the firm’s capital to 
labour ratio and its size. The intuition behind these findings is that capital intensive 
firms, and those employing advanced technologies, have higher growth rates, eventually 
leading to a larger firm (Doms et al. 1995). Consistent with this intuition, this thesis has 
argued how smaller firms may have non-trivial difficulties in financing their physical 
capital, which also implies that such firms would employ more labour intensive 
technologies as an alternative means to produce.  
                                                 
 
32
 As observed by Marx (1976), firm size gets larger as the technical division of labour becomes 
more minute and as divisible labour is replaced by large-scale indivisible machines. Since 
production technologies with large economies of scale tend to be very capital-intensive and 
large capital outlays are usually required to exploit the economies of scale, the cross-industry 
variation in firm size will be related to capital-intensity. 
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If, as a result of behaviours associated with SEW objectives, family owned SMEs 
acquire less capital than their non-family industry peers, then we would expect this to be 
reflected in a lower capital to labour ratio in family firm production. This can be tested 
under the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 9:  Family firms will exhibit lower capital to labour ratios relative to 
their non-family counterparts.     
 
A likely preference towards more labour intensive production itself would not 
necessarily deem family SMEs as technically inefficient, since an optimal capital to 
labour ratio used in production, would largely depend on, among other things, the good 
or service being produced; however, within a given industry, if family SMEs employ 
too much labour or not enough capital, then such resource allocations may result in a 
suboptimal production technology, which would in turn have measurable technical 
efficiency (TE) consequences.   
 
For example, lower than optimal capital to labour ratios for family firms under capital 
constraints would imply that the costs of generating a dollar of revenue are higher for 
family, compared to unconstrained non-family, firms. From a TE reference point, such a 
scenario would imply that family firms require more input to produce one unit of 
output, which, compared to their non-family equivalents, would result in technical 
inefficiencies.  
 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that, due to their constrained size, small firms, 
in general, might undertake actions that make them more technically efficient than large 
firms. Such a notion would help to explain how SMEs are able to endure market 
uncertainties, capital constraints, and other challenges mentioned in this chapter.  For 
example, by estimating a Cobb-Douglas (1928) production function, Dhawan (2001) 
finds evidence to support the view that their leaner organizational structure allows small 
firms to take strategic actions as to exploit emerging market opportunities and to create 
a niche market position for themselves. Consistent with this explanation, Carlsson 
(1989) describes how, in part due to their labour intensive production, small firms are 
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more flexible, which makes them better organized to respond to a changing market 
structure, which might shift production away from standardized mass-produced goods 
and towards stylized and personalized products. Based on this stream of literature, 
SMEs may achieve greater efficiencies than larger firms, but potentially at the cost of 
increasing their riskiness
33
. 
 
Across the SME population however, whether potentially capital constrained family 
owned firms can overcome scale inefficiencies by producing in a more technically 
efficient manner remains untested. This is mainly due to the fact that the vast majority 
of previous investigations comparing family and non-family efficiency (see Table 1) 
have utilised a Cobb-Douglas production function framework, which has the inherent 
assumption of constant returns to scale built into its functional form. Thus, while a total 
factor productivity measure is superior to partial measures of productivity, if scale 
efficiency varies across ownership structure, as has been suggested in this thesis, then 
cross-ownership estimates of total factor productivity may be flawed
34
. With that said, 
Górriz and Fumás (1996; 2005) model and, using a sample of 150 publicly traded 
family and non-family Spanish firms, empirically find that family firms might overcome 
capital constraints by being more ‘efficient’ from a total factor productivity standpoint.      
 
Given their focus on non-economic objectives, Barbera and Moores (2013) offer a 
potential explanation for how family firms may be subject to different production 
technologies. They suggest that family firms are able to achieve greater TE during 
production by showing that the labour employed by family firms can potentially 
contribute more to production output relative to the labour employed by comparable 
non-family firms. More specifically, it is argued that family labour is less costly (Jensen 
                                                 
 
33
 Scherer (1991) has also noted that managers of small firms take higher risks making them 
more open to adoption of innovations, and Acs and Audretsch (1991) reinforce this by showing 
that small firms outperform large firms when it comes to their innovation rate.  
 
34
 In the log transformed Cobb-Douglas production function, the value of the constant 
coefficient, more commonly known as Total Factor Productivity, is independent of labour and 
capital. This assumption has been made to ignore the qualitative effects of any force for which 
there is no quantitative data. The coefficient is thus made a ‘catch-all’ for the effects of such 
forces (Cobb and Douglas 1928).  
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and Meckling 1976), more committed (Ward 1988), and more flexible (Goffee and 
Scase 1985) than their non-family counterparts, which implies that family firms have a 
competitive advantage in labour resources (Habbershon and Williams 1999).   
 
Based on this discussion, the literature offers little indication of whether family firms 
exhibit a higher, lower or the same TE as their non-family counterparts, especially once 
scale variations have been accounted for. However, to test Górriz and Fumás’s (1996; 
2005) model, our final hypothesis can be stated as 
 
Hypothesis 10:  Controlling for production scale, family firms will exhibit greater 
technical efficiency relative to their non-family counterparts.     
 
Based on our discussion in Chapter 1, testing Hypotheses 8 and 10 will necessitate a 
measure of efficiency which can isolate SE separately from TE. To do so would address 
the problems mentioned in Chapter 1 regarding simultaneously occurring positive and 
negative family ownership effects on performance, while avoiding the inherent 
endogeneity issues associated with the relationship between financing preferences, firm 
size and efficiency. This measure, along with an in-depth discussion on the theoretical 
concept of efficiency, is further explored in Chapter 4.  
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have explored the well-established reasons behind the unique 
challenges that SMEs face in terms of access to finance and linked them to the relatively 
new literature regarding family owners’ tendency to pursue SEW objectives.  
 
From this integration, we expect that family owners’ pursuit of SEW objectives will 
have an effect on both the composition and quantum of debt and equity which is raised 
by family firms. Furthermore, based on the economic and finance literature on the size 
distribution of firms, we have explored how such preferences may lead to a potential 
size constraint specifically related to family ownership. In turn, family firms which are 
constrained in size may also face both scale and technical efficiency consequences. By 
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connecting these separate bodies of literature, we have identified an important but 
overlooked channel through which the pursuit of SEW objectives by family owners 
might affect firm performance. 
 
Also based on our discussion in this chapter, and for the purpose of verifying our 
expectations, we have developed testable hypothesis relating to the potential 
relationships between firm ownership, financing preferences, firm size, and 
performance. In this chapter, we have expressed these themes as the composition of 
finance, production scale, and efficiency. For the reader’s convenience, these 
hypotheses are summarized by theme in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 also illustrates the associations we have made in this chapter and clearly 
highlights the expected relationships pertaining to our overarching research questions, 
i.e. 1) the tendency of family owners to pursue SEW objectives via the financing 
preferences of the firm, 2) the resulting size implications which such decisions may 
have, and 3) how a reduced scale may manifest itself in the overall performance of the 
firm. Testing these hypotheses will require some quantification of concepts such as the 
firm’s financing composition, production scale, efficiency, as well as family ownership 
itself. In the next chapter, we discuss the data set which we will use to do this. 
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Table 2: Proposed hypotheses by theme 
 
Financing preferences 
Hypothesis 1a: 
Bank debt, as a proportion of total debt, is greater for family firms 
relative to non-family firms.  
Hypothesis 1b: 
Trade credit, as a proportion of total debt, is lower for family firms 
relative to non-family firms.  
Hypothesis 2a: 
Loans from internal sources, as a proportion of total debt, are greater 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 2b: 
Loans from external sources, as a proportion of total debt, are lower 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Equity from working owners, as a proportion of total equity, is greater 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 4a: 
Equity from internal sources other than working owners, as a 
proportion of total equity, is greater for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
Hypothesis 4b: 
Equity from external sources, as a proportion of total equity, is lower 
for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Firm size 
Hypothesis 5: 
The quantum of total debt is lower for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
Hypothesis 6: 
The quantum of total equity is lower for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
Hypothesis 7: 
Other things being equal, family firms are smaller than non-family 
firms. 
Firm performance 
Hypothesis 8: 
Family firms will exhibit lower scale efficiency relative to their non-
family counterparts.  
Hypothesis 9: 
Family firms will exhibit lower capital to labour ratios relative to their 
non-family counterparts.     
Hypothesis 10: 
Controlling for production scale, family firms will exhibit greater 
technical efficiency relative to their non-family counterparts.     
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Chapter 3. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
 
The arguments presented in in Chapter 2 linked the SEW objectives of family owners to 
the preference for internally sourced finance, a constrained firm size, and ultimately the 
efficiency of the firm. Testing these hypotheses will require some quantification of 
concepts such as owners’ financing preferences, firm size, as well as family ownership 
itself. The calculation of efficiency, which we describe in detail in the next chapter, will 
also require data pertaining to the production inputs and output of both family and non-
family firms. In this chapter we describe our data source, the ‘Business Longitudinal 
Survey’ (BLS), and explain how it will be used in this thesis. 
 
Equipped with this data we further conduct a preliminary statistical analyses pertaining 
to our hypotheses related to the composition of debt and equity financing, firm size, and 
the relationship between them. Differentiating by ownership type, we tabulate key 
statistics across time and for the entire period; conduct a basic statistical analysis on the 
average differences between family and non-family firms, referred to herein as the 
‘family ownership effect’ (FOE); and consider covariates such as the age of the firm as 
well as the industry in which the firm is operating.  
 
We begin with Section 2 which describes the BLS and identifies the truncated sub-
sample used in this thesis. Section 3 then highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the 
BLS data with respect to testing the hypotheses proposed in this thesis. Section 4 
explains in detail the construction of the variables we will use in our analysis and in our 
efficiency measure, including any adjustments that were made. We then move on to our 
preliminary analysis in Section 5 which present key statistics on the composition of both 
debt and equity finance, firm size, and the correlation between them. Section 6 
summarises our preliminary findings with relation to our hypotheses, and Section 7 
concludes.  
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3.2 The Business Longitudinal Survey (BLS) 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ ‘Business Longitudinal Survey’ (BLS) was 
designed to provide information on the growth and performance of privately held 
Australian-based SMEs, i.e. firms with less than 200 employees, and was the first 
official longitudinal survey of businesses in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2000). The BLS is the longitudinal component of several waves of the ‘Business 
Growth and Performance Survey’. As such, the structure of the data includes both a 
cross-sectional component and a longitudinal aspect for the years 1994-95 to 1997-98 
inclusive
35
.  
 
The scope of the BLS encompasses almost all employing industries in Australia
36
 and 
contains detailed firm-level information concerning micro-economic, behavioural and 
structural characteristics of more than 9000 SMEs
37
. As SMEs represent the majority of 
firms in the Australian  economy
38
, the BLS has the potential to inform many areas of 
                                                 
 
35
 The BLS samples were drawn from the ABS Business Register, with 8745 business units 
being selected for inclusion in the 1994–95 survey. For the 1995–96 survey, 4948 of the original 
selections for the 1994–95 survey were selected, and this was supplemented by 572 new 
business units added to the ABS Business Register during 1995–96. The sample for the 1996–
97 survey included 4541 businesses which were previously sampled, and an additional sample 
of 529 new businesses from the 1995–96 interrogation of the Business Register, and 551 new 
businesses from the 1996–97 interrogation of the Business Register. 
 
36
 The BLS does not include non-employing businesses, Government enterprises, or businesses 
classified to the following ANZSIC industries: Agriculture, forestry and fishing (ANZSIC 
division A), Electricity, gas and water supply (ANZSIC division D), Communication services 
(ANZSIC division J), Government administration and defence (ANZSIC division M), 
Education (ANZSIC division N), Health and community services (ANZSIC division O), Other 
services (ANZSIC subdivision 96), Private households employing staff (ANZSIC subdivision 
97), and Libraries, museums, and parks and gardens (ANZSIC groups 921, 922 and 923) 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000). 
 
37
 The information collected in the BLS was sought under the authority of the Census and 
Statistics Act 1905, so that the provision of appropriate responses to the mailed questionnaires 
could be legally enforced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The BLS therefore exhibits  
response rates and accuracy well beyond conventional research standards (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2000). 
 
38
 In Australia, 97 percent of all private sector businesses are SMEs according to generally 
accepted definitions (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001).  
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research, including industrial relations, business, finance and economics (Hawke 2000; 
Pink and Jamieson 2000).  
 
With that said, our analysis required some narrowing of the data for various reasons. For 
example, only those firms which reported positive values for our measures of output 
and inputs were included. Furthermore, to test our results over time, and to eliminate 
any selection or attrition bias, this study is exclusively focused on those firms which 
participated in all years of the study. Consequently, firms which did not participate in 
all waves of the BLS, from 1994 to 1998, were excluded
39
. Further, as some questions 
regarding the composition of finance became consistent only after the first wave of the 
survey, the 1994 to 1995 period was dropped from the sample
40
. This treatment has 
reduced our sample to 3450 firms per year for three years, which in a panel framework 
brings our total number of observations to 10,350. The numbers and distribution of 
firms in this sub-sample, classified by industry
41
 and year, can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Although the same firms are analysed in each year, their industry classification may 
change from one year to the next. This results in a slight variation in the total number of 
firms in each industry over time. Despite this, on average, manufacturing firms, as an 
overarching sector, represent approximately 40 percent of all firms sampled, followed 
                                                 
 
39
 Another justification for balancing the panel was the desire to avoid data which may be 
contaminated by statistical bias due to potentially unreliable information provided during the 
final year prior to bankruptcy (see for example Ohlson 1980; Lawrence 1983). 
 
40
 We have also conducted the analysis presented in this chapter with our size and efficiency 
measures by including the dropped period. Doing so does not alter our findings in any 
significant way. 
    
41
 Each business in the BLS has been coded to the 4 digit level of the Australian and New 
Zealand Standard Industrial Classifications (ANZSIC). The first two characters, which values 
range form 01-11, relate to the 11 ANZSIC Divisions and the second two characters relate to the 
ANZZSIC Sub-division, 2 digit, code. For businesses employing less than 100 people, the data 
are available at the Sub-division 2 digit level, and for those employing more than 100 people, 
industry detail has been collapsed to just the Division level. 
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Table 3: BLS Sub-sample by year and industry 
 
ANZSIC & Industry Category 
Firms in 
1995-96 sub-
sample 
Firms in 
1996-97 
sub-sample 
Firms in 
1997-98 sub-
sample 
Average 
proportions 
by industry 
from 96-98 
Average 
number of 
family firms 
from 96-98 
Average 
proportion of 
family firms 
from 96-98 
100 Mining 26 26 27 0.76% 6.33 24.03% 
  Manufacturing        
 
    
200 between 100 & 200 employees 92 97 90 2.70% 26.33 28.35% 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  140 134 136 3.96% 71.00 51.97% 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing  107 109 111 3.16% 63.00 57.81% 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  67 68 68 1.96% 41.67 61.58% 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  103 102 97 2.92% 61.00 60.62% 
225 Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product Manufacturing  169 164 164 4.80% 71.33 43.06% 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  60 60 57 1.71% 38.33 64.97% 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  185 186 188 5.40% 105.00 56.35% 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  347 348 345 10.05% 177.33 51.15% 
229 Other Manufacturing  131 128 129 3.75% 80.00 61.86% 
  Construction        
 
    
300 between 100 & 200 employees 5 7 9 0.20% 4.67 67.94% 
341 General Construction  65 65 64 1.87% 43.33 67.01% 
342 Construction Trade Services  126 125 124 3.62% 90.67 72.53% 
  Wholesale Trade        
 
    
400 between 100 & 200 employees 30 27 38 0.92% 11.33 35.74% 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  132 132 129 3.80% 74.67 57.00% 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  226 230 228 6.61% 103.33 45.33% 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  182 182 179 5.25% 106.33 58.75% 
  Retail Trade        
 
    
500 between 100 & 200 employees 21 20 22 0.61% 9.67 46.18% 
551 Food Retailing  77 79 80 2.28% 56.33 71.62% 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  125 125 124 3.61% 71.33 57.22% 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  136 136 133 3.91% 78.33 58.03% 
  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants        
 
    
600 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 4 0.10% 1.67 50.00% 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  119 120 121 3.48% 57.33 47.78% 
700 Transport and Storage  126 125 125 3.63% 70.67 56.38% 
  
Chapter 3: Data and Preliminary Analysis 52 
 
  Finance and Insurance        
 
    
800 between 100 & 200 employees 2 1 1 0.04% 0.00 0.00% 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  71 73 75 2.12% 34.67 47.71% 
  Property and Business Services        
 
    
900 between 100 & 200 employees 19 26 23 0.66% 3.33 14.74% 
977 Property Services  105 105 107 3.06% 50.00 47.32% 
978 Business Services  322 316 320 9.26% 95.67 29.96% 
  Cultural and Recreational Services        
 
    
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 6 3 5 0.14% 0.00 0.00% 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  36 37 37 1.06% 8.00 21.82% 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  3 3 3 0.09% 0.00 0.00% 
1093 Sport and Recreation  17 19 17 0.51% 8.00 45.41% 
  Personal and Other Services        
 
    
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 1 1 1 0.03% 1.00 100.00% 
1195 Personal Services  68 68 69 1.98% 36.00 52.69% 
Total 
 
3450 3450 3450 100% 1758 50.95% 
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by nearly a 17 percent representation of wholesale trade firms and a 13 percent 
representation of property and business service firms; whereas less than one percent of 
our sample is represented by mining firms, which is understandable considering we are 
focusing on SMEs. It is also important to note that the sector proportions drawn from 
our sub-sample are not significantly different from those drawn from the unabridged 
BLS sample
42
.   
 
Most importantly, given the context of this thesis, the BLS includes information on 
whether each firm is considered to be family owned, as defined in Section 4 of this 
chapter. Of the 3450 firms, 1,758, or 51 percent, were classified as family firms. Deeper 
Statistical analysis of our sub-sample is further provided in Section 5. Prior to this, the 
next sections discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the BLS data for our purposes, 
and outline how the data are used to operationalize the concepts of interest in this thesis. 
 
3.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the BLS 
 
One of the greatest strengths of the BLS is the ability of the researcher to classify firms 
as family or non-family owned. Despite the prevalence of family firms in the small 
businesses sector, the vast majority of previous family business studies have utilised 
data only on larger publicly traded firms (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). This is 
undoubtedly due the relative ease of being able distinguishing family from non-family 
firms via publicly available data regarding the ownership and control of the firm. For 
example, the degree of equity ownership by the family, or the presence of family 
members on the board of directors or in top-level management are key factors typically 
used to distinguish family firms from ‘non-family’ firms (see for example Villalonga 
and Amit 2006).  
  
                                                 
 
42
 In the unabridged sample, manufacturing firms, represent approximately 37 percent of all 
firms sampled, followed by nearly a 16 percent representation of wholesale trade firms and a 14 
percent representation of property and business service firms; whereas mining firms represented 
1.2 percent of all firms. Further, almost exactly as found in our sub-sample, family firms 
represent approximately 51 percent of the unabridged BLS sample. 
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Small businesses in general are a difficult group to access for research purposes. There 
is an inherent difficulty in identifying family firms among SMEs, because information 
on equity holdings or names of board members and key managers are not publicly 
available, or are intentionally withheld. Further, while it is true that family firms can 
come in all shapes and sizes, most of them are in fact SMEs
43
, which means that one of 
the greatest obstacles for family business researchers is the difficulty in identifying and 
defining family SMEs (Daily and Dollinger 1993). 
 
As we have already stated, in addition to key firm-level characteristics, the BLS is 
relatively useful in that it includes information on whether the observed firm is 
considered by respondents to be family owned. This is important in the context of this 
thesis since 1) The financing, size, and efficiency relationships proposed in Chapter 2 
are expected to be more compelling among SMEs
44
, 2) SMEs usually do not have the 
option of issuing additional equity to the public, and 3) most family firms are SMEs. 
Further to this, the few family business research studies which examine SMEs typically 
rely on data derived from much smaller samples, via surveys or firm-level case studies. 
The national breadth of the BLS allows us to empirically test our hypotheses in a much 
more robust manner as well as overcome the generalization problems associated with 
samples of limited geographic or industry scope.  
 
With that said, the breadth offered by the BLS to some extent comes at the expense of 
depth, as our definition of a family firm has been reduced to a single dummy variable. 
Although we recognise that family ownership is ideally measured as a continuous 
variable, the survey does not allow us to measure family ownership beyond a present or 
absent characteristic. Further, although we are consistent with most, if not all, of the few 
                                                 
 
43
 In a recent report, the Commonwealth of Australia (2013) conveys that, among family 
businesses, 64 percent employ less than 20 employees; 32 percent are medium sized firms 
employing between 20 and  199 employees; and 4 percent are large businesses, employing 200 
or more employees. 
 
44
 Although our proposed relationships between SEW, financing and firm performance may 
very well be present in larger, publicly traded family firms, they will most likely be confounded 
by a broader market discipline mechanism, including ‘outside’ ownership and management, 
which may compel publicly traded family firms to be more prepared to recognise a broader 
range of funding options. 
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SEW studies to date which have presumed so, family ownership itself is not necessarily 
an ideal proxy for a larger SEW endowment. However, as the supposed dimensions of 
SEW, outlined in a more recent study by Berrone et al. (2012), are inherently 
qualitative, generic surveys such as the BLS are not particularly suited to capture the 
finer emotional idiosyncrasies within and across family owned firms. Even so, we 
recognise that such limitations will most likely be present in any large quantitative data 
set and take consolation in the fact that, by the sheer number of observations contained 
in the BLS, classifying family firms as a single group will still allow us to perform very 
robust empirical comparisons across family and non-family firms. 
 
Another apparent limitation is that, as with the vast majority of prior studies, the BLS 
does not offer any direct data on output or inputs as far as production efficiency is 
concerned. As a result, we define proxy output-input measures using the data available 
in the BLS. With that said we do not take any liberties beyond what has already been 
established in the extant literature and whenever possible relate our operationalization 
of key concepts to previous studies.  
 
3.4 Definition of variables 
 
3.5 Family ownership 
 
In order to conduct comparisons between family and non-family owned firms, we first 
need to identify family ownership. As discussed in Chapter 2, a family firm can be 
defined using both a structure and an essence based approach. The BLS data offer 
valuable information in this regard since the following ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions were 
asked to all businesses which participated in the survey. We label these as questions 1 
and 2. 
 
1. Do you consider the business to be a family business?  
 
2. If yes, why do you consider this a family business? Family member are: 
 
a. Working directors or proprietors.  
b. Employed in the business.  
c. Not working, but contribute to decisions.  
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d. Business acquired from parents.  
e. Close working relationship between management and staff.  
f. Other.  
 
Based on these questions, a family firm is broadly defined by those respondents who 
answered ‘yes’ to question 1. Furthermore, considering one’s business as a family firm 
could be due to one or more of the reasons listed under question 2. It seems that this list 
includes the structural definition of a family firm, captured in options a to c, other 
features indicative of family ownership such as multigenerational continuity, captured 
in option d, as well as cultural and relational aspects, captured in option e. 
Notwithstanding that nearly 95 percent of all family firms at least selected a, it is 
important to note that the options listed under question 2 are not mutually exclusive and 
thus identifying different ‘types’ of family firms using these options is not practical45; 
thus, for the purpose of our analysis we only consider the overarching question 1 to 
identify firms as family owned. 
 
Since the BLS restricts our measure of family ownership to a binary variable, we cannot 
determine the degree of family ownership, nor do we have any way of measuring the 
SEW endowment of the firm. As per the majority of SEW studies to date, we therefore 
make the assumption that SEW is a latent construct synonymous with family ownership. 
Hence, given the limitations of the BLS data, our proxy for a greater SEW endowment 
in this thesis is the time invariant measure of family ownership itself
46
. 
 
 
                                                 
 
45
 Of all family firms responding to question 2, 34.91 percent selected a only; 27.45 percent 
selected both a and b; 11.79 percent selected a, b and e; 4.39 percent selected a and e; 3.18 
percent selected a, b, d and e; and 3.18 percent selected a, b and e. Based on this, and out of 64 
possible permutations, nearly 95 percent of all family firms at least selected a, which is 
understandable since we would expect small and medium-sized family firms to have a more 
operational classification; however, not excluding these, approximately 37 percent also selected 
d and e, which are associated with multigenerational continuity and cultural aspects of the firm. 
 
46
 Since participants of the BLS were asked question 1 once in 1995, family ownership is 
assumed to remain constant over the observed three year period. Despite this limitation, it is still 
within the conventional logic that the ownership type of the firm, i.e. family or non-family, is 
not expected to significantly change across a relatively short time frame, as the average CEO 
tenure at family-run businesses is said to range between 15 and 25 years (Breton-Miller et al. 
2004). 
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 Composition of debt and equity by source 3.5.1
 
This thesis proposes that the various SEW considerations of family owners will compel 
certain preferences for debt and equity finance. We test this by comparing the 
composition of debt and equity financing held by family and non-family firms. The 
BLS data are very useful in this regard as the following questions were asked of all 
participants in each wave of the survey. For our purposes, we will refer to these as 
questions 3 and 4. 
 
3. Please indicate the percentage breakdown of liabilities according to each source… 
 
a. Trade and other creditors 
b. Banks and other financial creditors 
c. Loans from a parent company 
d. Loans from individuals involved in the business or their families 
e. Loans from other individuals 
f. Loans from unrelated businesses 
g. Provisions  
h. Other 
 
4. Please indicate the percentage breakdown of equity according to each source… 
 
a. Working owners 
b. Non-working owners – family members 
c. Non-working owners – non-family members 
d. Parent company 
e. Venture or development capitalists 
f. Other unrelated businesses 
g. Employees (excluding directors) 
h. Other (including shareholders) 
 
Since the responses to both of the above questions are already recorded in percentages, 
no further manipulation is required to measure the composition of finance. However, 
some judgement will still be required as far as determining which of the listed sources 
in questions 3 and 4 are considered internal or external. It is important to note here that 
we are not interested in short- versus long-term debt and equity but rather whether the 
funds were obtained from internal or external sources. We also acknowledge that some 
of the debt and equity sources listed in questions 3 and 4 are more frequently accessed 
by SMEs and refer to these as conventional sources, while other, less utilised, sources 
typically account for a lower proportion of finance in general. 
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Starting with the sources of debt listed in question 3, although inherently external, debt 
sources a and b are considered separately and not allocated an internal or external 
classification. We instead refer to these as conventional debt sources since, as we show 
in Section 5, on average both family and non-family SMEs obtain approximately three 
quarters of their debt from banks and trade creditors combined
47
. As far as other, less 
utilised sources of debt are concerned, debt source d is classified as internal and debt 
sources e and f are classified as external. We do not classify the remaining debt sources 
since for various reasons they are not as easily identified as purely internal or external
48
.  
 
Moving on to the sources of equity listed in question 4, although we consider equity 
from working owners to be internal, most SMEs primarily rely on this source of equity. 
As a result source a is considered separately. Equity sourced from working owners is 
considered the most conventional source of equity for SMEs, as on average nearly two 
thirds of all equity is comprised of working owners’ equity for both family and non-
family SMEs. Of the alternative equity sources, equity source b is classified as internal 
and equity sources c, e and f are classified as external. Again, we do not classify the 
remaining equity sources as they are not as easily identified as purely internal or 
                                                 
 
47
 It is also important to note that bank credit, while being more likely to exhibit longer maturity 
horizons, can vary widely in term. On the other hand, we can expect trade credit to be 
predominately short term i.e. typically 30 days. With that said, we do not have information on 
the length of maturities related to the debt proportions listed in question 3. Moreover, the focus 
of our analysis is not on the family/non-family differentials with respect to debt term, but rather 
on the proportion differentials between conventional and other, internal or external, debt 
sources.   
 
48
 Provisions are a balance sheet item representing funds set aside by a company to pay for 
estimated expenses that are anticipated to occur in the future such as wages or taxes payable. As 
a liability under most accounting standards, provisions are included in the total debt of the firm, 
yet they are not representative of any actual financing activities affecting cash flow. Further, as 
per the argument proposed in this thesis, loans from a parent company, while seeming internal, 
imply more formalised monitoring conditions and are less likely to have the limitations on 
quantum that we argue are associated with ‘internal’ sources of financing and firm size.  With 
that said, based on the data presented in the appendix to this chapter, it is implied that the vast 
majority of SMEs in our sample are not structured as a subsidiary to a parent company. 
Specifically, on average approximately 10 and 13 percent of all firms indicated that their 
proportion of debt and equity obtained from a parent company was respectively greater than 
zero. Of these, debt and equity sourced from a parent firm on average represented 4 and 14 
percent respectively. With that said, when we include debt and equity sourced from a parent 
company in the financing mix, our main results do not significantly change (see Appendix A.1). 
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external
49
. Given this treatment, Table 4 summarises the classifications of debt and 
equity financing compositions which will be used in this thesis
50
. 
 
Table 4: Definitions of debt and equity financing compositions 
 
Debt classifications Proportion of total debt sourced from… 
Bank credit Banks and other financial creditors 
Trade credit Trade and other creditors 
Internal debt Individuals involved in the business or their families 
External debt Other individuals and unrelated businesses 
 
Equity classifications 
 
Proportion of total equity sourced from… 
Working owners Working owners 
Internal equity  Related non-working owners i.e. family members 
External equity 
Unrelated non-working owners i.e. non-family members, 
venture or development capitalists, and other unrelated 
businesses 
 
Further to question 4, we also employ the following ‘yes’ or ‘no’ BLS questions, 
numbered as 5, 6 and 7, which provide information on the source as well as the 
quantum of equity finance raised during the survey periods. 
 
  
                                                 
 
49 
Similar to the case of equity sourced from a parent company, equity sourced from employees 
and ‘other’ shareholders on average represent just 1 and 8 percent of total equity. With that said, 
when we include equity sourced from employees and ‘other’ shareholders in the financing mix, 
our main results do not significantly change (see Appendix A.1). 
 
50
 As a result of the exclusion of some sources of total debt and equity, and to avoid any values 
being biased by our omitted proportions, we reweight the proportions provided in questions 3 
and 4 according to Table 4 so that their sums equate to 1. Debt proportions were reweighted as 
per xi*Total liabilities/∑xi*Total liabilities, where x represents the proportion of the i
th
 debt 
source. Equity proportions were reweighted as per yj*Total equity/∑yj*Total equity, where y 
represents the proportion of the j
th
 equity source. By this measure it is possible that the 
denominator can equate to zero, i.e. all debt and/or equity has been obtained from sources 
excluded from Table 4, in which case a zero was assigned. In subsequent sections we also 
conduct preliminary data analysis on the unaltered proportions and find that our main results do 
not change in any significant way. See Tables A1 through to A9 presented in Appendix A.1. 
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5. Was equity finance obtained during the financial year?  
 
6. If yes, did you obtain finance from: 
 
a. Family.  
b. Acquaintances or business colleagues.  
c. People you did not previously know.  
d. Unrelated businesses.  
e. Parent company.  
f. Other related businesses.  
g. Employees.  
h. Banks.  
i. Other financial institutions.  
j. Venture or development capitalists.  
k. Existing shareholders.  
 
7. If yes, what was the value of equity finance raised? 
 
a. Up to $20,000.  
b. $20,001 to $50,000.  
c. $50,001 to $100,000.  
d. $100,001 to $500,000.  
e. $500,001 to 1,000,000.  
f. Over $1,000,000.  
 
Although we cannot utilise questions 5, 6 and 7 in our full regression analysis, since on 
average, across the three years of our sub-sample, only 6 percent of all firms answered 
‘yes’ to question 5, the responses do provide some evidence on differences in sources of 
financing and are further investigated in Section 3.6.1.2 of this chapter.  
 
 Firm Size 3.5.2
 
Although a comparison of the financing composition of family and non-family firms 
offers a glimpse into their different financing preferences, it does not provide any 
information on the potential size differentials across these groups. These are however 
related, as a firm’s size can be directly associated to the quantum of finance being held 
at any given moment, which is in turn ultimately linked to the scale of its operations.  
Quantum of finance can simply be measured by the total dollar value of all liabilities 
and equity on the observed firm i’s balance sheet in time period t which is provided by 
the BLS data. these values are directly related to the scale of operations in the sense that 
total liabilities and total equity combined equate to total assets, a well-known measure 
of firm size (Smyth et al. 1975; Shalit and Sankar 1977). For the purpose of our 
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efficiency calculations described in the next section, this thesis also considers total 
assets as ‘capital’, an input in the production process.  
 
Another production input of importance, and an alternate measure of firm size, is 
‘labour’ (see for example Cabral and Mata 2003). As labour and capital are inputs in the 
production process, ‘output’, usually measured by total sales revenue, is subsequently 
another measure of firm size. However, rather than sales, we employ a more refined 
measure of output in this thesis called ‘value added’(Arrow 1974). Value added 
incorporates sales as well as changes in the inventory of final goods to also account for 
production output that was not sold during the period. Thus in this thesis we have 
multiple measures of firm size related to the firm’s scale of production, namely output, 
labour and capital. In addition to proxies of firm size, these are also standardised 
measures of output and input
51
 to be used in our PE measurements. The definitions of 
these variables are described below.   
 
3.5.2.1 Output 
 
Considering that the BLS does not offer data on ‘output’ per se, value added is 
constructed and used as a proxy for total output. To do this we follow Kenneth Arrow’s 
(1974) generally accepted ‘real value added’ measure which is constructed by taking 
sales plus the change in inventories less purchases of intermediate inputs and other 
operating expenses. 
 
(1)                                                               
                                     
 
Measured in Australian dollars, the first term in (1), total sales revenue, captures all 
output produced by firm i in time period t which was subsequently sold. All unsold 
output for the same time period is captured in the second term, change in inventory, 
                                                 
 
51
 As the Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing sectors of the Australian economy have been 
excluded from the BLS, ‘land’ is omitted as a stand-alone factor of production in our efficiency 
measure. With that said, land is inherently included in our proxy measure for capital input under 
the classification of property, plant and equipment.  
  
Chapter 3: Data and Preliminary Analysis 62 
 
which is found as inventory at the end of the financial year less inventory at the 
beginning of the financial year. Any intermediate goods included in inventory are 
removed from our measure as these are not yet considered as output. 
 
The value added ‘index’ allows us to analyse those firms which do not necessarily have 
a tangible output, such as the case of services rendered. Furthermore, the value added 
index has been found to accurately measure the dependent variable in the production 
function that explains value added in terms of the tangible and intangible primary 
factors, like labour and capital, and as such the function is independent of non-primary 
inputs (see Sato 1976). 
 
3.5.2.2 Labour input 
 
As the number of labour hours worked is not provided by the BLS, the number of full-
time equivalent (FTE) workers employed in the firm is used as a measure of labour 
input. This figure is found via the sum of full-time workers and full-time equivalent 
part-time workers. 
  
(2)                                                                      
 
Full-time equivalent part-time workers are found via the product of the number of part-
time employees for each individual firm and an annual full-time equivalent ratio, ρ. The 
equivalent ratio is the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ estimate of average hours worked 
by part-time non-managerial employees per week in time t compared to full-time 
employees for all firms
52
. Since our sampled firms utilise both part- and full-time 
labour, the transformation of number of workers to FTE workers is essential in order to 
obtain a standardised, comparable measure of labour.  
 
                                                 
 
52
 The equivalent ratio is simply calculated as average part-time hours per week divided by 
average full-time hours per week for all non-managerial employees. This information is sourced 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ ‘Employee Earnings and Hours, Australia’ report, as 
well as the previously known ‘Earnings and Hours of Employees, Distribution and 
Composition, Australia’ report. 
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3.5.2.3 Capital input 
 
The difficulty in measuring capital and then applying such a measurement in a 
production function framework has been the cause of much controversy over the years. 
As per common practice, we measure capital as the value of all assets in the firm’s 
possession.  
 
(3)                                                                    
 
The BLS offers data on the net value of total assets, so depreciation is factored into the 
measurement. We allow for heterogeneity in capital type by controlling for firm 
industry, age and other covariates in our analysis. These control variables are discussed 
next. 
 
 Control variables 3.5.3
 
Independent of ownership type, a firm’s production technology will depend on the 
industry in which it operates. In addition, we need to control for industry as the 
occurrence of family ownership is not evenly distributed across all industries (see Table 
3). To control for heterogeneity across industry we include industry dummies using the 
37 Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classifications (ANZSIC). These 
codes and their corresponding industries are listed in Table 3. 
 
A firm’s measured efficiency may also depend on its age. Thus, further heterogeneity 
across the life cycles of different firms is also controlled for by including a firm age 
variable into our specification. As stated in Chapter 2, the evolutionary models of 
learning-by-doing introduced by Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) 
suggest that SMEs may initially enter an industry at a suboptimal scale in order to 
obtain the opportunity to learn and subsequently expand if successful. While we do not 
have the age of each firm in terms of years, the following five age brackets are defined 
by the BLS 
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1. Less than 2 years old 
2. 2 years to less than 5 years old 
3. 5 years to less than 10 years old 
4. 10 years to less than 20 years old 
5. 20 years or more 
 
Other variables of interest are capital structure and capital intensity. A firm’s capital 
intensity will depend on its industry, as the input mix used in the production process 
will depend on the technology of the output being produced. This applies to all firms, 
but capital intensity may also be affected by ownership type as previously discussed. 
We measure capital intensity as 
 
(4)                                               
              
     
. 
 
The overall indebtedness of the firm can also have a bearing on the availability of 
certain sources of finance. Further, the degree to which the firm is leveraged may 
impact the cost of finance and in turn the composition of debt and equity (see for 
example Titman and Wessels 1988). To account for this in our analysis, we use the debt 
ratio to measure the existing leverage in the firm’s capital structure, defined as 
 
(5)                                  
                   
              
 
 
Although the impact of existing capital structure on financing considerations are 
expected to be more profound in larger, publicly traded firms which have better access 
to organised debt and equity markets, as the cost of equity in small privately held firms 
can be difficult to determine, financial leverage is an important indicator of the cost of 
debt and equity finance (Cotner and Fletcher 2000). 
 
3.6 Descriptive statistics and preliminary data analysis 
 
In the following sections we investigate family and non-family descriptive statistics in 
the composition of debt and equity finance (Sections 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 respectively), 
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the relationship between financing composition and firm size (Section 3.6.2), and firm 
size itself (Section 3.6.3).  
 
 The composition of family and non-family finance 3.6.1
 
In Chapter 2, we argued that family ownership will influence the financing composition 
of the firm. In the following sub-sections, we report the findings of our preliminary data 
analysis with respect to the financing composition differentials between family and non-
family firms. In order to simplify our commentary, we first focus on debt financing, 
then equity, and finally offer a summary based on aggregate figures. 
 
3.6.1.1 Debt composition 
  
As a starting point, we present Table 5 which shows the descriptive debt composition 
statistics for family and non-family firms for each year of our sample period. Since the 
BLS sample is comprised entirely of SMEs, it is not surprising that we observe the 
majority, approximately three-quarters, of total debt consists of bank and trade credit for 
both family (Panel B) and non-family firms (Panel C); however, when comparing the 
specific proportions, we find that family firm debt sourced from bank credit represents a 
slightly larger proportion of total debt than family debt sourced from trade credit. This 
is contrasted to the non-family situation where there is a marked preference for trade 
credit. This result is consistent across all time periods and is true for all distribution 
measures listed.  
 
Despite the differences in the proportions of bank and trade credit across ownership 
structure, the combined level of these two conventional sources of debt is similar for 
both family and non-family SMEs. What is perhaps more interesting are the family/non-
family proportion differentials across the remaining one-quarter of debt obtained from 
other less utilised debt sources
53
.  
 
                                                 
 
53
 The percentile columns in Table 5 clearly demonstrate how unconventional it actually is for 
SMEs to access debt finance from sources other than bank and/or trade credit. 
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For example, moving to our measure of internal debt finance, family firms hold nearly 
double the proportion of debt obtained from internal sources than do non-family firms. 
Specifically, family firms on average and across all time periods source nearly 15 
percent of their total debt from individuals involved in the business or their families. 
Compared to the non-family case of just 8 percent, the difference is quite large and 
stable across all time periods.  
 
As far as external debt financing is concerned, the results shown in Table 5 are less 
consistent. Although the proportion of family firm debt obtained from external sources 
is generally smaller than non-family firms, the difference is not very large, nor is it 
consistently negative across all time periods. With that said, it is important to remember 
that the debt proportions presented in Table 5 are averaged across all firms without 
controlling for potential covariates such as industry, firm size, or firm age. 
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Table 5: Descriptive annual debt composition statistics for family and non -family firms by year 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 3450/year) Panel B: Family Firms (N = 1758/year) Panel C: Non-Family Firms (N = 1692/year) 
Variable (year) 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Bank Credit (96) 0.0000 0.3264 0.2200 0.6094 0.0000 0.3808 0.3428 0.6701 0.0000 0.2699 0.0723 0.5400 
Bank Credit (97) 0.0000 0.3244 0.2069 0.6300 0.0000 0.3675 0.3114 0.6786 0.0000 0.2796 0.0800 0.5611 
Bank Credit (98) 0.0000 0.2975 0.1421 0.5928 0.0000 0.3312 0.2312 0.6364 0.0000 0.2625 0.0402 0.5323 
Bank Credit (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.3161 0.2000 0.6082 0.0000 0.3598 0.3000 0.6600 0.0000 0.2707 0.0637 0.5455 
Trade Credit (96) 0.0974 0.4444 0.3483 0.8416 0.0630 0.3543 0.2514 0.5600 0.1421 0.5381 0.5000 1.0000 
Trade Credit (97) 0.1000 0.4605 0.3704 0.9333 0.0619 0.3822 0.2733 0.6551 0.1412 0.5419 0.5205 1.0000 
Trade Credit (98) 0.1283 0.5086 0.4444 1.0000 0.1000 0.4403 0.3333 0.8554 0.2000 0.5795 0.6250 1.0000 
Trade Credit (96-98)
a
 0.1000 0.4712 0.3871 0.9589 0.0771 0.3923 0.2857 0.6770 0.1588 0.5532 0.5455 1.0000 
Internal Debt (96) 0.0000 0.1271 0.0000 0.1061 0.0000 0.1675 0.0000 0.2312 0.0000 0.0851 0.0000 0.0000 
Internal Debt (97) 0.0000 0.1138 0.0000 0.0714 0.0000 0.1418 0.0000 0.1642 0.0000 0.0847 0.0000 0.0000 
Internal Debt (98) 0.0000 0.1059 0.0000 0.0524 0.0000 0.1349 0.0000 0.1366 0.0000 0.0757 0.0000 0.0000 
Internal Debt (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.1156 0.0000 0.0800 0.0000 0.1481 0.0000 0.1765 0.0000 0.0818 0.0000 0.0000 
External Debt (96) 0.0000 0.0256 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0229 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0283 0.0000 0.0000 
External Debt (97) 0.0000 0.0225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0226 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0223 0.0000 0.0000 
External Debt (98) 0.0000 0.0220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0233 0.0000 0.0000 
External Debt (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0233 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0221 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0246 0.0000 0.0000 
a
 Total sample across 1996 to 1998 consists of 10350 firms of which 5274 are family and 5076 are non-family.  
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In view of this, we further present Table 6 and Table 7, which show the significance 
levels of the mean FOEs between the proportions of debt financing obtained from our 
sources of interest across industry and age respectively. Throughout this chapter, FOEs 
are simply calculated by xff – xnf, where x is the average value of the variable of interest 
and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. A positive FOE indicates 
that, relative to non-family firms, family firms exhibit a greater average value and a 
negative FOE indicates a lower average value for family firms. The significance levels 
of the FOEs are also reported using a standard two-tailed t-test with unequal 
variances
54
. 
 
Beginning with the proportion of debt sourced from bank credit, Table 6 shows that, 
when significantly different, the FOE is positive in 89 precent of the cases
55
. This effect 
is also positive and significant in all but the youngest of firms, as seen in Table 7, and 
increases as firms age. Moving to the next column in Table 6, the FOE derived from the 
proportions of debt financed from trade credit is also consistently negative and 
significant in 27 industries. Further, as shown in Table 7, this effect is consistently 
negative and significant across all age groups.  
 
With respect to debt sourced from internal sources, family firms are on average found to 
hold a significantly greater proportion of internal debt than their non-family industry 
peers in 20 of 32 industries. Table 7 demonstrates that this positive FOE is significant in 
all but the youngest of firms. Moving on to the FOE with respect to the proportion of 
debt sourced from external sources, the results across industry are mixed, as we find 
significant effects in only 8 industries, half of which are positive and half are negative. 
 
 
                                                 
 
54
 Variance inequality in each industry was confirmed using an F-test. Where variances were 
found to be equal among family and non-family samples in any given industry, the t-statistic 
was adjusted accordingly.   
 
55
 Although 37 industries are identified in our BLS sample, 5 have not been considered due to 
the inability to compare differences across ownership i.e. industries where there was either an 
absence of family or non-family firms are not considered. 
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Table 6: Family ownership effects on debt composition by industry (1996 -1998) 
 
 
ANZSIC & Industry Category 
N Family 
Non-
Family 
Bank 
Credit FOE 
Trade 
Credit FOE 
Internal 
Debt FOE 
External 
Debt FOE 
100 Mining 79 19 60 0.2164** -0.2950*** 0.0987 -0.0613** 
  Manufacturing                
200 between 100 & 200 employees 279 79 200 0.0652 -0.1657*** 0.0744*** 0.0030 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  410 213 197 0.1007*** -0.1348*** 0.0454** -0.0184* 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing  327 189 138 0.0502 -0.1544*** 0.1091*** -0.0051 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  203 125 78 0.0107 -0.1466*** 0.0590* 0.0226 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  302 183 119 0.0580 -0.2159*** 0.1282*** -0.0208 
225 Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product Manufacturing  497 214 283 0.0993*** -0.2044*** 0.0737*** 0.0177 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  177 115 62 0.2146*** -0.2160*** 0.0201 -0.0014 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  559 315 244 0.1178*** -0.2162*** 0.0735*** 0.0119* 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  1040 532 508 0.1064*** -0.1635*** 0.1064*** -0.0036 
229 Other Manufacturing  388 240 148 0.0711** -0.0818** 0.0037 -0.0108 
  Construction                
300 between 100 & 200 employees 21 14 7 -0.1680* 0.2464** -0.0808* 0.0025 
341 General Construction  194 130 64 0.1104* -0.1272** -0.0272 -0.0086 
342 Construction Trade Services  375 272 103 0.0857** -0.0816* 0.0569** 0.0011 
  Wholesale Trade                
400 between 100 & 200 employees 95 34 61 0.0675 -0.1739*** 0.0132 0.0050 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  393 224 169 -0.0083 -0.1143*** 0.0886*** 0.0069 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  684 310 374 0.0927*** -0.2092*** 0.1121*** 0.0005 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  543 319 224 0.0647** -0.1203*** 0.0505*** -0.0219** 
  Retail Trade                
500 between 100 & 200 employees 63 29 34 -0.1936** 0.0891 0.0765*** 0.0179 
551 Food Retailing  236 169 67 -0.0366 -0.1111* 0.0671** 0.0276** 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  374 214 160 0.1401*** -0.2010*** 0.0280 0.0097 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  405 235 170 0.0684* -0.0825** 0.0059 -0.0144 
  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants                
600 between 100 & 200 employees 10 5 5 -0.2232 -0.0910 0.2131** 0.1011* 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  360 172 188 0.1061** -0.1409*** 0.0700*** -0.0118 
700 Transport and Storage  376 212 164 0.2159*** -0.2619*** 0.0705*** -0.0180 
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  Finance and Insurance                
800 between 100 & 200 employees 4 0 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  218 104 114 0.3079*** -0.2273*** 0.0696** -0.0007 
  Property and Business Services                
900 between 100 & 200 employees 68 10 58 0.2256 -0.2018 0.0496 -0.0217* 
977 Property Services  317 150 167 -0.0160 -0.1798*** 0.1415*** 0.0481** 
978 Business Services  958 287 671 0.0135 -0.1650*** 0.0931*** -0.0100 
  Cultural and Recreational Services                
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 14 0 14 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  110 24 86 0.1719** -0.2007** 0.0939 -0.0322* 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  9 0 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1093 Sport and Recreation  53 24 29 0.1605 -0.0828 0.0720 -0.0464 
  Personal and Other Services                
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1195 Personal Services  205 108 97 0.0878 -0.1167** -0.0075 0.0090 
 
Debt composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various debt sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
Table 7: Family ownership effects on debt composition by age (1996 -1998) 
Age Range (bracket) N Family Non-Family 
Proportion of 
family firms 
Bank Credit 
FOE 
Trade Credit 
FOE 
Internal Debt 
FOE 
External Debt 
FOE 
Less than 2 years (1) 126 38 88 30.16% 0.07 -0.24*** 0.07 0.03 
2 to less than 5 years (2) 1111 495 616 44.55% 0.05** -0.17*** 0.08*** -0.01 
5 to less than 10 years (3) 2867 1339 1528 46.70% 0.07*** -0.16*** 0.07*** 0.00 
10 to less than 20 years (4) 3428 1755 1673 51.20% 0.10*** -0.16*** 0.05*** 0.00 
20 years or more (5) 2818 1647 1171 58.45% 0.11*** -0.18*** 0.09*** -0.01* 
 
Debt composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various debt sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Table 7 also confirms that across age we find no significant difference in the proportion 
of debt sourced from external sources between family and non-family firms except for 
older firms where the FOE is significantly negative. 
 
The data thus far show that the average composition of family firm debt is significantly 
different from that of non-family firms, especially with respect to internal debt. In the 
next section, we investigate if this apparent preference for internal financing holds when 
considering the composition of equity.  
 
3.6.1.2 Equity composition 
 
Table 8 shows the descriptive equity composition statistics for family and non-family 
firms for each year of our sample period. Due to the fact our sample firms are SMEs, it 
is not surprising that equity from working owners is the most prevalent source of equity 
finance for both family (Panel B) and non-family SMEs (Panel C). In fact, Table 8 
shows that 75 percent of all firms in our sample obtain 100 percent of their equity from 
working owners. With that said, when comparing means we find that, as expected, 
family firms obtain a much larger proportion of their total equity from working owners 
than do non-family firms. This differential is consistent across all time periods and on 
average nearly 25 percentage points. Similar to the composition of debt, Table 8 also 
demonstrates that, on average and consistent across all periods, family firms obtain a 
greater proportion of equity from what we classify as internal sources and less from 
external sources than do non-family firms. 
   
Table 9 and Table 10 further report the FOE for our equity proportions across industry 
and firm age. When controlling for industry, Table 9 confirms that equity sourced from 
working owners is a much more common source of equity finance for family firms, as 
the FOE is found to be positive and significant in 25 of 32 industries. Across age 
brackets the FOE related to equity obtained from working owners is also consistently 
significant and positive and is largest in older firms.  
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With respect to internal equity sources other than equity from working owners, the FOE 
is positive and significant in 15 of 32 industries and significantly positive in all but the 
youngest of firms. It is also important to note that this effect is negative and significant 
in just one industry, namely General Construction. As expected, the proportion of equity 
obtained from external sources is significantly lower for family firms. Specifically, in 
nearly half of all industries we find a significant and negative FOE with respect to 
equity obtained from external sources. As per Table 10 these results also hold across 
firms of all ages. 
 
Table 11 demonstrates that there is no significant difference between the number of 
family and non-family firms which obtained equity finance while the BLS data was 
being collected, yet the sources from which such equity was obtained were very 
different. Not surprisingly family firms accessed equity from family much more than 
did non-family firms. Of those firms which did issue new equity, around 60 percent of 
family firms did so through family as opposed to just 17 percent of non-family firms. 
Non-family firms also tended to issue equity to people they did not previously know 
and existing shareholders outside the family significantly more frequently than family 
firms. 
 
Although we will closely examine the link between internally sourced finance and firm 
size in the next section, Table 11 shows that family firm equity issues are much lower in 
value than those of non-family firms. Specifically, family firm equity issues were 
approximately $200,000 lower on average. As there were too few firms issuing equity 
during the collection of the BLS, we do not control for covariates, however with this 
caveat in mind, we can infer from Table 11 that when issuing new equity family firms 
avoid external sources and raise less equity capital than do non-family firms. This 
further reinforces the family differentials found in our equity composition comparison 
and alludes to the link between the source of financing and firm size. 
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Table 8: Descriptive annual equity composition statistics for family and non -family firms by year  
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 3450/year) Panel B: Family Firms (N = 1758/year) Panel C: Non-Family Firms (N = 1692/year) 
Variable (year) 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Working Owners (96) 0.0000 0.6518 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.7687 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5302 0.9000 1.0000 
Working Owners (97) 0.0000 0.6683 1.0000 1.0000 0.6700 0.7891 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5427 1.0000 1.0000 
Working Owners (98) 0.0000 0.6469 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.7591 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5303 0.9800 1.0000 
Working Owners (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.6556 1.0000 1.0000 0.5325 0.7723 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5344 0.9900 1.0000 
Internal Equity (96) 0.0000 0.0550 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0746 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0347 0.0000 0.0000 
Internal Equity (97) 0.0000 0.0634 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0847 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0414 0.0000 0.0000 
Internal Equity (98) 0.0000 0.0588 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0752 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0418 0.0000 0.0000 
Internal Equity (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0591 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0782 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0393 0.0000 0.0000 
External Equity (96) 0.0000 0.0492 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0259 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0734 0.0000 0.0000 
External Equity (97) 0.0000 0.0483 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0198 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0779 0.0000 0.0000 
External Equity (98) 0.0000 0.0444 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0224 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0673 0.0000 0.0000 
External Equity (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0473 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0227 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0729 0.0000 0.0000 
a
 Total sample across 1996 to 1998 consists of 10350 firms of which 5274 are family and 5076 are non-family.  
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Table 9: Family ownership effects on equity composition by industry (1996 -1998) 
 
ANZSIC & Industry Category N Family 
Non-
Family 
Working Owners 
FOE 
Internal Equity 
FOE 
External Equity 
FOE 
100 Mining 79 19 60 0.5271*** 0.1137* -0.0320 
  Manufacturing              
200 between 100 & 200 employees 279 79 200 0.2536*** 0.1979*** -0.0264 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  410 213 197 0.2312*** 0.0751*** -0.0980*** 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing  327 189 138 0.2324*** 0.0163 -0.0686** 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  203 125 78 0.0021 0.0706** -0.0932*** 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  302 183 119 0.2785*** 0.0283 -0.0220 
225 Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product Manufacturing  497 214 283 0.3477*** 0.0746*** -0.0514** 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  177 115 62 0.5017*** -0.0528 -0.1140*** 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  559 315 244 0.1370*** 0.0535*** -0.0160 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  1040 532 508 0.2376*** 0.0374*** -0.0679*** 
229 Other Manufacturing  388 240 148 0.0959** 0.0232 -0.0295* 
  Construction              
300 between 100 & 200 employees 21 14 7 -0.1814 0.1671* -0.2715 
341 General Construction  194 130 64 0.1020 -0.0921** -0.0387 
342 Construction Trade Services  375 272 103 0.1196** 0.0294 -0.0638*** 
  Wholesale Trade              
400 between 100 & 200 employees 95 34 61 0.5675*** 0.0271 -0.0271 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  393 224 169 0.2205*** 0.0992*** -0.0588** 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  684 310 374 0.4307*** 0.0294** -0.0435*** 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  543 319 224 0.2797*** 0.0273* -0.0410** 
  Retail Trade              
500 between 100 & 200 employees 63 29 34 0.2884*** 0.0590 -0.0583 
551 Food Retailing  236 169 67 0.0304 0.0576*** -0.0636 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  374 214 160 0.1096*** -0.0091 -0.0048 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  405 235 170 0.0693 -0.0286 -0.0616*** 
  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants              
600 between 100 & 200 employees 10 5 5 0.4000 n/a n/a 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  360 172 188 0.4536*** 0.0452** -0.0484* 
700 Transport and Storage  376 212 164 0.2171*** 0.0540*** -0.0808*** 
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  Finance and Insurance              
800 between 100 & 200 employees 4 0 4 n/a n/a n/a 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  218 104 114 0.1777*** 0.0192 -0.0174 
  Property and Business Services              
900 between 100 & 200 employees 68 10 58 0.3745*** 0.1428 n/a 
977 Property Services  317 150 167 0.1601*** 0.0559** -0.1251*** 
978 Business Services  958 287 671 0.0900*** 0.0184 -0.0426*** 
  Cultural and Recreational Services              
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 14 0 14 n/a n/a n/a 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  110 24 86 0.4593*** -0.0174 -0.0223 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  9 0 9 n/a n/a n/a 
1093 Sport and Recreation  53 24 29 0.6003*** -0.0101 -0.0601 
  Personal and Other Services              
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
1195 Personal Services  205 108 97 0.0914 0.0314 -0.0320 
 
Equity composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various equity sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
Table 10: Family ownership effects on equity composition by age (1996 -1998) 
Age Range (bracket) N Family Non-Family Proportion of family firms Working Owners FOE Internal Equity FOE External Equity FOE 
Less than 2 years (1) 126 38 88 30.16% 0.19** -0.01 -0.09** 
2 to less than 5 years (2) 1111 495 616 44.55% 0.25*** 0.02* -0.07*** 
5 to less than 10 years (3) 2867 1339 1528 46.70% 0.19*** 0.02*** -0.05*** 
10 to less than 20 years (4) 3428 1755 1673 51.20% 0.24*** 0.02*** -0.05*** 
20 years or more (5) 2818 1647 1171 58.45% 0.32*** 0.09*** -0.04*** 
 
Equity composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various equity sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Table 11: Annual new equity issues by equity source and quantum 
  1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 
  Family 
Non-
family FOE
a
 Family 
Non-
family FOE
a
 Family 
Non-
family FOE
a
 
Number of firms is sample 1758 1692 66 1758 1692 66 1758 1692 66 
Number of firms which obtained equity finance during 
the financial year 173 158 15 94 87 7 61 80 -19 
Proportion which obtained equity finance 0.098 0.093 0.005 0.053 0.051 0.002 0.035 0.047 -0.013 
Average value of equity finance (by range)
b
 3.33 3.90 -0.57*** 3.21 3.99 -0.78 3.41 4.05 -0.64 
Average proxy value of equity finance (000)
c
 372.04  568.37  
-
196.33*** 367.24  571.82  -204.58** 372.79  561.77  -188.99** 
 
  
 
    
 
    
  Source of Finance
d
    
 
    
 
    
  Family 0.602 0.171 0.430*** 0.653 0.229 0.425*** 0.562 0.146 0.416*** 
Acquaintances or business colleagues 0.061 0.099 -0.038 0.020 0.057 -0.037 0.041 0.083 -0.042 
People you did not previously know 0.005 0.033 -0.028* 0.000 0.029 -0.029 0.014 0.052 -0.038 
Venture or development capitalists & other unrelated 
businesses 0.010 0.033 -0.023 0.020 0.038 -0.018 0.027 0.010 0.017 
Parent company & other related businesses 0.077 0.155 -0.078** 0.139 0.181 -0.042 0.178 0.250 -0.072 
Banks & other financial institutions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Existing shareholders (outside of family) 0.245 0.508 -0.263*** 0.168 0.419 -0.251*** 0.151 0.365 -0.214*** 
Other (including employees) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 -0.048** 0.027 0.094 -0.066* 
Sum 1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
 
a
 FOE is found by xff-xff, where x are listed variables and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. 
b
 As the 'distance' between each successive range of annual equity values are not equal there is some discrepancy between value by range and proxy value.  
c Proxy mean value of annual equity finance is calculated as ∑fx/∑f, where f and x are the frequency and mean value in any given range respectively. 
d
 Sources are represented in proportions. i.e. of all firms which obtained finance during the calendar year, x proportion did so by source y.  
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 Aggregate financing composition and the link to firm size 3.6.2
 
Based on the above information we summarise our comparison of debt and equity 
financing across firm ownership by presenting Table 12 and Figure 5 which displays a 
single aggregate, averaged across industry and time, of the financing composition 
differences between family and non-family firms. When these aggregates are considered 
our previous results still hold, that is, relative to non-family firms, family firms are 
shown to hold a significantly greater proportion of debt obtained from bank credit and 
internal sources and less from trade credit. Consistent with the data reported in Section 
3.6.1, there is no significant difference between the aggregate family and non-family 
external debt proportions.  
 
With respect to aggregate equity composition, family firms are shown to hold a 
significantly greater proportion of equity obtained from working owners and internal 
sources and less from external sources. We have already shown that these differentials 
hold across time, industry and age. As per our discussion in Chapter 2, we argue that 
firms which prefer to generate a greater proportion of their finance from internal sources 
will also be more likely to obtain a lower quantum of finance, which may lead to a 
smaller firm size. As a result, the size of the firm will also be fundamentally linked to 
the preferred sources of both debt and equity finances by family owners. To investigate 
this further, Table 13 and Table 14 present the correlations between various measures of 
firm size and the sources of debt and equity respectively for all firms. 
 
Beginning with Table 13, we can see that there is a positive and highly significant 
relationship between the quantum of total debt held by the firm and its size. This 
relationship is strongest with the total value of capital, which is to be expected as we 
measure capital as the value of total assets, but is also quite strong with other size 
measures such as output and labour.  
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Figure 5: Average aggregate family and non-family finance composition by debt and equity source
a  
 Family                                                  Non-Family 
Debt 
finance 
  
Equity 
finance 
  
a 
Aggregate finance compositions are averaged first by industry, then by ownership.  
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Table 12: Average aggregate family and non-family finance composition by debt and equity source  
Source of debt finance: FF NF FF-NF % z-stat 
Bank credit 0.372 0.298 0.074 20.002 (8.054)*** 
Trade Credit 0.395 0.537 -0.142 -35.956 (-14.635)*** 
Internal Debt  0.133 0.069 0.064 48.039 (10.885)*** 
External Debt  0.022 0.023 -0.001 -3.117 (-0.238) 
Source of equity finance: FF NF FF-NF % z-stat 
Working owners 0.759 0.512 0.247 32.534 (26.974)*** 
Internal Equity 0.084 0.042 0.042 50.161 (8.868)*** 
External Equity  0.022 0.078 -0.056 -247.325 (-12.985)*** 
 
Aggregate mean finance compositions are averaged first by industry, then by ownership. As Explained in Section 3.5.1 our reweighted debt and equity 
categories have increased the number of firms which are considered to have 0 debt or equity; thus the sum of the mean proportions for debt and equity are less 
than the sum of the unaltered proportions reported in Table A7 of Appendix A.1.   
 
  
  
Chapter 3: Data and Preliminary Analysis 80 
 
Table 13: Pearson’s correlations between share of debt finance and firm size (1996 -1998) 
 
 
Size Variables Share of debt finance (proportion) 
 
Output Labour Capital Total debt Bank credit Trade credit Internal debt External debt 
Output 
1.000               
-               
Labour 
0.568 1.000             
(70.174)*** -             
Capital 
0.697 0.304 1.000           
(99.002)*** (32.425)*** -           
Total debt 
0.624 0.295 0.835 1.000         
(81.286)*** (31.384)*** (154.301)*** -         
Share of Bank credit 
-0.015 -0.011 0.022 0.030 1.000       
(-1.479) (-1.148) (2.253)** (3.012)*** -       
Share of trade credit 
0.133 0.190 0.042 0.036 -0.565 1.000     
(13.685)*** (19.660)*** (4.250)*** (3.673)*** (-69.613)*** -     
Share of Internal debt 
-0.108 -0.143 -0.058 -0.058 -0.192 -0.356 1.000   
(-11.044)*** (-14.723)*** (-5.877)*** (-5.890)*** (-19.927)*** (-38.779)*** -   
Share of external debt 
-0.019 -0.036 0.001 0.006 -0.086 -0.138 -0.046 1.000 
(-1.963)** (-3.624)*** (0.141) (0.591) (-8.793)*** (-14.128)*** (-4.707)*** - 
 
T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Table 14: Pearson’s correlations between share of equity finance and firm size (1996-1998) 
 
        
 
Size Variables Share of equity finance (proportion) 
 
Output Labour Capital 
Total 
equity 
Working 
owner’s equity 
Internal equity External equity 
Output 
1.000             
-             
Labour 
0.568 1.000           
(70.174)*** -           
Capital 
0.697 0.304 1.000         
(99.002)*** (32.425)*** -         
Total equity 
0.552 0.218 0.853 1.000       
(67.309)*** (22.715)*** (166.341)*** -       
Share of working 
owner’s equity 
-0.226 -0.253 -0.120 -0.066 1.000     
(-23.569)*** (-26.621)*** (-12.313)*** (-6.752)*** -     
Share of internal 
equity 
-0.022 0.014 -0.014 -0.009 -0.243 1.000   
(-2.235)** (1.449) (-1.428) (-0.891) (-25.450)*** -   
Share of external 
equity 
0.018 0.041 0.002 -0.001 -0.308 -0.062 1.000 
(1.878)* (4.129)*** (0.219) (-0.052) (-32.988)*** (-6.344)*** - 
 
T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Focusing on the quantum of total debt, we find there is a negative and significant 
relationship between the proportion of internal debt and total debt itself. In fact, we find 
that the proportion of internally sourced debt finance is negatively correlated and highly 
significant across all our measures of firm size, which reinforces our argument proposed 
in Chapter 2, i.e. a higher proportion of internal debt is synonymous with a lower 
quantity of debt and a smaller firm. Paradoxically, there is also a negative correlation 
between external debt and some, but not all, of our measures for firm size although the 
correlations themselves are much weaker. With that said, there is no significant 
correlation between the proportion of debt sourced from external sources and the 
quantum of total debt, although the coefficient itself is positive.  
 
Moving on to Table 14, we can see that total equity is significant and positively 
correlated with all our measures of firm size. Focusing on the total equity column, there 
is a significant and negative relationship with the proportion of equity sourced from 
working owners. In fact, we find that the proportion of equity sourced from working 
owners is negatively correlated and highly significant across all our measures of firm 
size. Not including working owners, the proportion of internal equity is also negatively 
correlated and significant with output. 
  
As far as externally sourced equity finance is concerned, although the proportion of 
external equity is not significantly correlated with capital or total equity, it is significant 
and positively correlated to firm size with respect to output and labour. These results 
also reinforce the arguments proposed in this thesis and demonstrate, albeit imperfectly, 
the links between the composition of finance, the quantum of debt and equity, and firm 
size. To explore this matter further, in the next section we investigate whether family 
firms, given their distinctive financing composition, are also systematically smaller 
relative to their non-family counterparts. 
 
  Family ownership and firm size 3.6.3
 
To recap our basic analysis of the data thus far, family firms have been found to obtain a 
significantly greater proportion of both their debt and equity finance from internal 
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sources. We have also shown that a greater reliance on internally generated finance in 
general is associated with a lower quantum of debt and equity and a smaller firm. Thus, 
it stands to reason that family firms will hold less debt and equity finance and therefore 
will also be smaller in size relative to their non-family counterparts. In this section we 
further explore the BLS data with respect to this argument.  
 
As a starting point, we compare summary statistics for both family and non-family firms 
across multiple measures of firm size, namely output, labour and capital inputs, as well 
as the total quantum of debt and equity. Table 15 presents these comparisons across all 
periods in our sample. Regardless of the size measure or time period, family firms are 
consistently smaller in size. That is, relative to their non-family counterparts, family 
firms are observed to produce less output, employ less labour and capital, and hold less 
debt and equity on their balance sheets. The specific values are compelling as non-
family firms, on average, produce 134 percent more output, employ 51 percent more 
labour, own 168 percent more capital, and respectively hold 207 and 116 percent more 
debt and equity compared to family firms. 
 
To determine if the results shown in Table 15 hold when covariates are considered, 
Table 16 and Table 17 give the value and significance levels of the FOEs with respect 
to firm size and the quantum of financing across industry and age respectively. 
Remarkably, Table 16 shows that no matter the industry or measure of firm size, family 
firms are nearly always found to be significantly smaller relative to their non-family 
industry peers. Table 17 reinforces this finding across various age categories as well.  
 
These results give some credence to the argument that family firm size is potentially 
constrained. As we discussed in Chapter 2, a constrained firm size may imply a 
suboptimal scale of production, which will have a bearing on efficiency. We investigate 
this further in the next chapter. 
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Table 15: Descriptive annual firm size statistics for family and non -family firms by year 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 3450/year) Panel B: Family Firms (N = 1758/year) Panel C: Non-Family Firms (N = 1692/year) 
Variable (year)
a
 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Output (96) 263.00 2767.80 918.00 2860.00 200.00 1652.26 635.50 1982.00 377.00 3926.86 1341.00 4225.50 
Output (97) 266.00 2869.29 955.00 2932.00 206.25 1754.99 665.00 2056.75 379.50 4027.06 1354.50 4219.00 
Output (98) 275.00 3013.76 971.00 3105.25 202.25 1813.88 688.00 2127.00 416.00 4260.44 1418.50 4484.25 
Output (96-98)
b
 269.00 2883.62 948.00 2957.00 202.00 1740.37 666.50 2066.75 391.50 4071.45 1375.50 4298.75 
Labour (96) 4.70 26.18 12.85 35.24 4.00 20.77 10.00 27.96 6.00 31.81 17.43 45.10 
Labour (97) 4.70 26.24 13.00 35.43 4.00 20.99 10.00 28.53 6.00 31.70 17.52 44.87 
Labour (98) 4.60 27.26 13.00 37.85 3.99 21.89 9.92 29.69 6.00 32.84 18.00 45.57 
Labour (96-98)
b
 4.70 26.56 13.00 36.00 4.00 21.21 10.00 28.70 6.00 32.12 17.66 45.00 
Capital (96) 194.25 4864.11 775.00 3339.50 160.25 2574.14 577.00 2034.50 250.50 7243.41 1148.00 5131.50 
Capital (97) 205.00 5144.86 831.50 3439.75 158.00 2801.50 592.50 2133.00 272.00 7579.63 1193.50 5458.50 
Capital (98) 211.25 5305.11 853.50 3547.50 164.00 3041.38 622.50 2252.50 274.50 7657.15 1259.50 5747.00 
Capital (96-98)
b
 204.00 5104.70 820.00 3437.25 161.00 2805.67 594.00 2135.50 263.75 7493.40 1208.50 5405.75 
Total Debt (96) 123.00 3013.23 487.50 1925.75 99.25 1460.52 371.50 1325.50 161.50 4626.51 677.00 2857.00 
Total Debt (97) 118.00 3272.29 525.00 2035.50 97.00 1592.62 379.50 1398.50 154.75 5017.47 720.00 3260.75 
Total Debt (98) 120.00 3223.50 520.50 2074.00 95.25 1674.12 389.00 1411.25 158.25 4833.32 731.50 3280.25 
Total Debt (96-98)
b
 120.00 3169.67 509.00 2021.75 97.00 1575.75 381.00 1368.75 156.75 4825.77 709.50 3133.25 
Total Equity (96) 10.00 1922.75 157.50 971.75 5.25 1173.99 111.00 591.25 18.00 2700.71 232.50 1599.00 
Total Equity (97) 10.00 1874.12 153.00 967.75 7.00 1211.57 111.50 657.50 16.00 2562.51 223.00 1585.50 
Total Equity (98) 9.00 2083.23 163.00 1036.00 6.00 1367.37 121.00 708.00 13.00 2827.01 233.00 1643.00 
Total Equity (96-98)
a
 10.00 1960.03 157.50 991.00 6.00 1250.98 115.00 651.00 16.00 2696.75 229.00 1607.25 
 
a
 Output, Capital, Total Debt, and Total Equity measured in 000. Labour measured in number of FTE workers.  
b 
Total sample across 1996 to 1998 consists of 10350 firms of which 5274 are family and 5076 are non-family. 
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Table 16: Family ownership effects on firm size by industry (1996 -1998) 
 
 ANZSIC & Industry Category N Family Non-
Family 
Output FOE 
(000) 
Labour 
FOE 
Capital FOE 
(000) 
Total Debt 
FOE (000) 
Total Equity 
FOE (000) 
100 Mining 79 19 60 -25175.74*** -48.10*** -57278.64*** -37594.93*** -19319.61** 
  Manufacturing                  
200 between 100 & 200 employees 279 79 200 -4819.63*** -10.77*** -12292.69*** -5143.43*** -7492.97*** 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  410 213 197 -1241.76*** -6.12** -3156.24*** -1828.36*** -1374.06*** 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather 
Manufacturing  
327 189 138 -1711.75*** -10.55*** -4788.13*** -3583.80*** -1143.24*** 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  203 125 78 -1595.50 -0.91 -658.86 -71.90 -598.92 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  302 183 119 -1787.49*** -12.83*** -2440.07*** -1206.73*** -1229.69*** 
225 Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated 
Product Manufacturing  
497 214 283 -2570.52*** -10.99*** -5663.56*** -3500.82*** -2150.87*** 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  177 115 62 -806.98* -4.86 -1344.22* -48.86 -1231.67** 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  559 315 244 -701.75*** -1.39 -2006.27*** -1293.14** -738.37*** 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  1040 532 508 -762.87*** -4.44*** -1347.29*** -1034.67*** -319.30** 
229 Other Manufacturing  388 240 148 -216.64 0.77 -422.69** -100.24 -325.13** 
  Construction                  
300 between 100 & 200 employees 21 14 7 -7545.86 4.03 19369.00** -1145.00 20530.07** 
341 General Construction  194 130 64 -900.64 -6.52** -482.49 -489.99 2.82 
342 Construction Trade Services  375 272 103 -13.63 -3.25 7.41 -77.14 85.37* 
  Wholesale Trade                  
400 between 100 & 200 employees 95 34 61 -9820.81*** -2.21 -19210.66*** -11833.63*** -7130.72*** 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  393 224 169 -1436.11*** -2.13 -3343.14*** -2463.60*** -851.19** 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  684 310 374 -2650.66*** -9.76*** -7553.56*** -6896.19*** -740.79 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  543 319 224 -1469.44*** -8.84*** -2694.82*** -1901.11*** -791.94*** 
  Retail Trade                  
500 between 100 & 200 employees 63 29 34 -1139.31 -6.11 -8528.59** -7945.78** -556.01 
551 Food Retailing  236 169 67 -154.57 -1.61 242.56 239.91 1.73 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  374 214 160 -695.50*** -3.23* -237.85 -153.42 -84.04 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  405 235 170 -584.69** -3.98* -1124.76** -959.19*** -166.40 
  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants                  
600 between 100 & 200 employees 10 5 5 -6068.00*** -58.41** -1841.20*** -1313.00 -527.60 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  360 172 188 -719.48*** -4.63*** -1131.99*** -58.06 -1073.79*** 
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700 Transport and Storage  376 212 164 -3313.83*** -15.35*** -10551.55* -6192.64* -4526.67** 
  Finance and Insurance                  
800 between 100 & 200 employees 4 0 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  218 104 114 -3099.29*** -16.38*** -6433.64*** -3689.47*** -2779.46*** 
  Property and Business Services                  
900 between 100 & 200 employees 68 10 58 5232.35 -32.83** 243460.65 44181.78 207070.44* 
977 Property Services  317 150 167 -2035.88** -3.83** -12132.94** -4840.91 -7236.22** 
978 Business Services  958 287 671 -1574.24*** -10.29*** -667.28 -1217.75** 543.01 
  Cultural and Recreational Services                  
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 14 0 14 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  110 24 86 -1729.67 -0.46 -7649.46** -4830.41* -2770.03** 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  9 0 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1093 Sport and Recreation  53 24 29 -122.55 -11.74*** -391.89 178.69 -565.69*** 
  Personal and Other Services                  
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1195 Personal Services  205 108 97 586.43** 2.79 168.79 335.28* -166.19 
Size FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various size measures compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. T-
tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
Table 17: Family ownership effects on firm size by age (1996-1998) 
Age Range (bracket) N Family 
Non-
Family 
% of 
family 
firms 
Output FOE 
(000) 
Labour FOE 
(FTE) 
Capital FOE 
(000) 
Total Debt FOE 
(000) 
Total Equity 
FOE (000) 
Less than 2 years (1) 126 38 88 30.16% -2553.88*** -19.92*** -4963.65*** -2834.93*** -2133.33*** 
2 to less than 5 years (2) 1111 495 616 44.55% -2434.46*** -12.80*** -6184.62*** -4256.05*** -2041.70*** 
5 to less than 10 years (3) 2867 1339 1528 46.70% -1966.88*** -10.35*** -3381.47*** -1802.60*** -1591.72*** 
10 to less than 20 years (4) 3428 1755 1673 51.20% -2600.52*** -12.54*** -5082.91*** -3501.26*** -1553.08* 
20 years or more (5) 2818 1647 1171 58.45% -2899.00*** -13.90*** -5916.37*** -4756.16*** -1159.95** 
Size FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various size measures compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. T-
tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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3.7 Summary of preliminary findings 
 
Based on the preliminary data analysis conducted in this chapter, we are in a position to 
comment on many of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. In fact, we can state that 
most of our hypotheses pertaining to financing preferences and firm size are reinforced 
by the observed characteristics present in the data thus far. 
 
Specifically, relative to their non-family counterparts, family firms hold a significantly 
larger proportion of debt obtained from banks and less from trade creditors, supporting 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b respectively. In line with Hypothesis 2a is the observation that 
family firms hold a significantly larger proportion of debt obtained from internal 
sources. For example, family firms on average hold more than double the proportion of 
debt sourced from individuals involved in the business or their families than do non-
family firms. With that said, contrary to our expectations expressed in Hypothesis 2b, 
we have also observed that a preference for internal debt does not necessarily imply that 
family firms hold a lower proportion of debt obtained from what we have strictly 
defined as external sources. However, a larger proportion of internally sourced debt 
does automatically imply a lower proportion of debt obtained from other components of 
total debt (see Appendix A.1).  
 
With respect to equity financing, family firms hold a significantly larger proportion of 
equity obtained from working owners and other internal sources, which is in line 
Hypothesis 3 and 4a respectively. For example, compared to non-family firms, family 
firms hold more than double the proportion of their equity sourced from the family of 
non-working owners. On the other hand, consistent with Hypothesis 4b, the proportion 
of external equity held by family firms is significantly lower relative to non-family 
firms. For example, on average family firms hold approximately half the proportion of 
equity sourced from unrelated non-working owners, unrelated businesses, and venture 
capitalists. 
 
Consistent with the composition of equity financing results, we also show that when 
issuing new equity, family firms prefer internal sources and raise significantly less 
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equity financing on average than do non-family firms. With that said, our data show that 
a greater proportion of debt and equity financing obtained from internal sources is 
significantly correlated with a lower quantum of total debt and equity as well as with a 
smaller firm size in general. As a result it is not surprising that, regardless of the 
measure, family firms are consistently found to be significantly smaller than their non-
family counterparts, which is consistent with Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7. Specifically, family 
firms employ fewer workers, possess less capital, and consequently produce less output 
than non-family firms on average.  
 
3.8 Chapter summary 
 
Given the focus of this thesis, the BLS is a fitting data set. Specifically, the ability to 
identify family owned SMEs provides us with the rare opportunity to use a large, 
national, legally enforced, and longitudinal survey to test our hypotheses. Such scope 
and rigour will add to the external validity and robustness of our empirical findings. 
With that said, the BLS is also an established and reliable data source proving useful in 
multiple SME studies spanning various topics (see for example McMahon 2001; 
Watson 2002; Watson and Robinson 2003; Cassar 2004; McMahon 2004; Barbera and 
Moores 2013). 
 
In this Chapter we have described the BLS in detail, specified our truncated sub-sample, 
and defined the variables used in this thesis. These variables and their definitions are 
summarised in Table 18. Using these variables, we presented descriptive statistics and 
performed preliminary data analysis on the composition of finance and size differences 
between family and non-family firms. Notwithstanding that more robust regression 
analysis will be conducted in Chapter 5, by controlling for multiple covariates and 
utilising preliminary statistical tests, we have highlighted that there are significant 
differences between family and non-family firms. 
 
In addition to demonstrating the importance of accounting for variables like industry 
and age, we have also shown that financing composition and firm size are interrelated. It 
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will be important to consider this reciprocal relationship as a potential source of 
endogeneity when designing our hypotheses tests in Chapter 5.  
 
Table 18: Operationalization of BLS proxy variables 
 
Concept Operationalization Proxy Variable
a
 
Family 
ownership 
Structure and essence 
based definition 
Do you consider the business to be a family 
business? Yes = 1; No = 0 
Financing 
preferences 
Composition of debt and 
equity finance 
Debt by sourceit/Total liabilitiesit 
Equity by sourceit/Total equityit 
Firm size Scale of production Capitalit = Total assetsit = Total liabilitiesit + Total 
                  equityit  
Labourit = FTEit = Full-time employeesit + Part- 
                 time employeesit  * Equivalent ratiot. 
Outputit = Value Addedit = Salesit + Closing 
                 inventoryit – Opening inventoryit –  
                 Purchasesit 
Performance Efficiency
b
 Productive efficiencyit = Technical efficiencyit *  
                                        Scale efficiencyit 
Capital 
intensity 
Capital to labour ratio (K/L)it = Capitalit/Labourit 
Capital 
structure 
Leverage ratio Leverageit = Total liabilitiesit/Total assetsit 
Life cycle Age range (1) Less than 2 years; (2) 2 to less than 5 years; (3) 
5 to less than 10 years; (4) 10 to less than 20 years; 
(5) 20 years or more. 
Economic 
sector  
Industry dummy 37 Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classifications (ANZSIC). 
a i denotes an individual firm in time period t. 
b Productive efficiency and the exact calculation of Technical and Scale efficiency are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
As per our discussion in Chapter 2, the potential for family firm size to be constrained 
given rise to questions about the technical and scale efficiency of family firm 
production. As a result, we also expect a significant FOE with respect to efficiency. In 
the next chapter we draw upon the variables defined in this chapter to calculate and 
further compare the measure of efficiency used in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4. Measuring Efficiency and 
Preliminary Analysis 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we have shown that family firms have a tendency to utilise a 
greater proportion of internal finance and are smaller in size relative to comparable non-
family firms. Throughout this thesis we have argued that such tendencies may lead to 
performance outcomes. Specifically, the concepts proposed in Chapter 2 linked the 
SEW objectives of family owners to the preference for internally sourced finance, a 
constrained firm size, and ultimately the efficiency of the firm. Although a small firm 
size alone does not necessarily deem the family firm an inefficient one, we can infer that 
a constrained family firm is one that is sub-optimally small. By this we mean that, if 
larger, the firm would be more efficient in terms of scale.  
 
Another repercussion of a capital constraint on family owned firms is that the firm’s 
choice of inputs, or more specifically the capital to labour mix utilised in the production 
processes may also be suboptimal. Again, suboptimal in the sense that if more capital 
intensive techniques were employed, the firm would reap efficiency benefits in terms of 
resource use. Potentially offsetting this problem, it is also possible that, due to their 
constrained size, family SMEs might undertake actions that make them more efficient in 
terms of their resource use. 
  
With these complexities in mind, to test the efficiency related hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 2, we require a performance measure that can disentangle the simultaneous 
impact of a FOE on both the productive scale as well as the technical efficiency of the 
firm, and in a way which avoids the endogeneity problems commonly associated with 
the task. In this chapter we present a well-established, theoretically founded measure of 
productive efficiency (PE), which has largely been overlooked in the family business 
literature. We also explain how this measure enables us to observe the efficiency impact 
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of a suboptimal firm size separately from ‘pure’ technical efficiency in the firm’s 
internal resource use. For these reasons, PE is well suited to undertake the complexities 
mentioned above and adds rigor to the performance measure used in this thesis. 
 
In Section 2 we discuss the measure of efficiency and why it is particularly well suited 
to test the framework proposed in the previous chapter. Section 3 defines PE and 
outlines how it may be decomposed into both scale efficiency (SE) and technical 
efficiency (TE). Section 4 briefly discusses the methods which can be used to estimate 
the efficient frontier itself and describes the theoretical foundations of our chosen 
frontier estimation method, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Using this method, we 
then present descriptive statistics and conduct preliminary data analysis on family firm 
efficiency differentials in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes these preliminary findings, 
and Section 7 summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Measurement of the efficiency construct 
 
On a micro level, efficiency is a success indicator and a performance measure by which 
firms can be evaluated and compared. In a competitive environment, not unlike the kind 
most SMEs typically encounter, productive efficiency can even be a necessary condition 
for firm survival (Lovell 1993); thus, this thesis is concerned with measuring the 
performance of both family and non-family SMEs which convert inputs, such as 
physical capital and labour, into outputs, such as goods and services. The broad concept 
of efficiency is thus used to characterize the economical utilization of resources. 
Farrell’s (1957) seminal measure of PE conforms to this definition, and as such is a 
fundamental measure of a firm’s performance56.  
 
In simple terms, efficiency can be measured in two equivalent ways depending on the 
orientation. An output oriented measure gauges a firm’s success in producing as large as 
                                                 
 
56
 Efficiency can be considered a fundamental measure of a firm’s performance in the sense that 
efficiency is driven by increases in output while holding inputs constant, or decreasing inputs 
while holding output constant, which in turn positively impacts financial performance variables 
like sales revenue, operating expenses and net profit. 
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possible an output from a given set of inputs, or alternatively, and more relevant to the 
purpose of this thesis, the equivalent input oriented efficiency measure gauges a firm’s 
success in producing a given output from the smallest possible set of inputs.  
 
To investigate the impact of family ownership on the efficiency of the firm, we focus on 
an input oriented measure of efficiency since we assume that the SMEs in our sample 
have specific orders to fill, or in other words the ‘choice’ of output quantity is 
somewhat imposed on the firm. Therefore, the primary decision variable for 
management would be input quantities, i.e. how much labour and capital to employ. It is 
also worth noting that it has been shown that the choice of orientation will have only 
minor influences upon the efficiency scores obtained (see for example Coelli and 
Perelman 1999). 
 
PE is preferred as a performance measure in this thesis as it is founded on well-
established economic theory, and most importantly, it is comprised of both a SE and TE 
component, which can be decomposed as to allow the researcher to test the antecedents 
of both components separately. In Chapter 5 we perform these tests with an attention to 
whether the firm is family owned. PE is therefore a very useful performance measure 
when making comparisons between family and non-family firms, since, as per our 
discussion in Chapter 2, SEW inspired financing choices by family owners are expected 
to constrain firm size, which in and of itself will have efficiency consequences. Such 
efficiencies are considered distinct from any potential pure TE differences in resource 
use across family and non-family owned firms. In the following sections we elaborate 
on this in a more precise manner.  
 
4.3 Productive efficiency 
 
When discussing the performance of firms it is common to refer to them as being more 
or less ‘efficient’ or more or less ‘productive’. Although these two terms are commonly 
used interchangeably and interrelated, they are in fact not the same. Understanding the 
relationship between productivity and efficiency will bring us closer to understanding 
how PE is measured. 
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The average productivity of a firm, which we will simply call productivity, can be 
measured by the ratio of its output to input, and can be stated as 
 
(1)               
 
 
 
 
Where Y is a measure of actual outputs and X actual inputs. If the firm is using multiple 
inputs to produce multiple outputs, both the numerator and denominator in (1) must be 
aggregated in some economically meaningful way, so that the productivity measure is 
the ratio of two scalars. For example, a common firm-level productivity measure is sales 
per worker, which can be found by dividing total sales revenue by the total number of 
workers employed.  
 
PE on the other hand is the comparison between observed productivity and ‘optimal’ 
productivity, which can be stated as 
 
(2)        (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)
 
  , depending on the orientation, we have  
(2.1)               for an output oriented measure, and  
(2.2)               for an input oriented measure.  
 
Where (
 
 
)
 
 is an optimal, or best practice, level of productivity and provides a natural 
standard from which efficiency can be found. In fact, without some benchmark, 
productivity per se does not necessarily provide any useful information about firm 
performance
57
.  
 
According to this measure, efficiency is determined as the distance to the best practice 
benchmark, also known as the efficient frontier. In other words, the efficiency of a firm 
is a comparative measure of its success in actually processing inputs to achieve its 
outputs, as compared to its maximum potential for doing so, represented by the efficient 
                                                 
 
57
 In the sales per worker example, one would have to compare this year’s sales per worker with 
last year’s, or perhaps with that of the nearest competitor, to obtain any meaningful indication of 
the firm’s performance. 
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frontier. Thus, PE is a relative concept, which will take some value between 1 and 0, 1 
being perfectly efficient and indicating that the firm’s actual productivity is the same as 
the optimal level
58
. It is also worth noting that, unlike productivity, PE has the useful 
property of invariance with respect to changes in the unit of measurement. 
 
Based on the work of Debreu (1951), Farrell (1957) suggested a measure of PE that, 
from an input orientation, can be interpreted as the ratio of technically minimal to actual 
inputs, given output and the input mix. For example, Figure 7 below illustrates a one 
input, one output scenario. If known and assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), the 
OO΄ efficient frontier represents the maximum level of output attainable for a given 
level of input. These output-input combinations are accomplished by hypothetically 
efficient firms utilising best practices in their production process. The slope of the OO΄ 
line therefore equates to the productivity exhibited by these efficient firms. 
 
Figure 6: One input, one output measure of productive efficiency 
 
Input
Output
P
O
O΄
A
Q
SR
 
 
Point P represents the productivity of some inefficient firm, firm P, producing below the 
efficient frontier. Firm Ps productivity can be measured by the slope of the OP line 
                                                 
 
58
 The input-oriented technical efficiency measure denotes what proportion of the firm’s 
observed inputs are actually necessary for producing its observed output. Unless this ratio 
representing efficiency equates to 1, the firm can be said to be wasting input. 
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which is clearly less than the slope of the efficient frontier. For example, holding output 
constant, if we compare firm P to firm A, we can see that firm As productivity is Q/R 
whereas firm Ps productivity is Q/S. From this Farrell (1957) defines the PE of firm P 
as R/S since firm A produces an output of Q using R inputs, while firm P produces an 
output of Q using S inputs, which corresponds to equation (2.2). This PE score can 
therefore also be represented by the distance QA/QP
59
.  
 
The calculation of PE becomes only slightly more complicated when more than one 
input is used in the productive process. For example, Figure 7 illustrates the input 
orientation case in two dimensions where firms employ two factors of production, 
inputs 1 and 2, to produce a single unit of output. If known, the frontier SS΄ represents 
the various combinations of input1 and input2 that an efficient firm, one utilising best 
practices, might use to produce a single unit of output. 
 
Figure 7: Two input, one output measure of productive efficiency 
S
S΄
Input1
Output
P
A
O Input2
Output
 
In the diagram, point P represents the observed inputs used by firm P to achieve one 
output unit. The ray from the origin, OP, has a slope equal to the factor proportions, or 
input mix, being used in the production process by firm P. A represents the observed 
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 Intuitively, the ratio QA/QP has the properties of an efficiency measure since it takes the 
value of 100 percent for the perfectly efficient firm, and will become indefinitely small if the 
amount of inputs becomes indefinitely large. Also, provided that OO΄ has a positive slope, a 
decrease in any input per unit of output, ceteris paribus, implies a higher PE (Farrell 1957).  
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inputs used by an efficient firm with the same factor proportions. A is more efficient 
than P since A uses the same ratio of inputs as P, but produces a single unit of output 
using only a fraction, OA/OP, as much of each input. It can also be inferred that A 
could produce OP/OA times as much output as P from the same inputs. From this 
Farrell (1957) defines the PE of firm P as OA/OP
60
, this multiple input, one output 
scenario can more generally be stated as 
 
(3)    (
 
 ̅
)  (
 
 ̅ 
), or holding output constant, as 
(3.1)           ̅   ̅   . 
 
Where  ̅ is a weighted average of all inputs used in the production process of the 
observed firm.   ̅  is the weighted average of inputs used by the observed firm’s 
efficient counterpart. It is also important to note that the two firms share the same input 
mix so that, as in Figure 7, they are both on the ray OP. It can be seen in Figure 7 that 
constant returns to scale (CRS) has been assumed by representing input 1 and 2 per unit 
of output on both axes. Although the CRS assumption allows us to represent the above 
measure of PE in two dimensions and facilitates the computation of PE, it also imposes 
the restriction that all firms are operating at their optimal scale. In reality, and 
considering our discussion in Chapter 2, this assumption may not hold for all firms, 
particularly family firms.  
 
 Decomposing the productive efficiency measure 4.3.1
 
From an input orientation, improving the PE measure in (3) would be accomplished by 
producing the same output while consuming less resources, or inputs, which is related to 
how efficiently the firm utilizes its resources. However, if not all firms are operating at 
their optimal scale, i.e. not all production technologies exhibit CRS, there will be other 
                                                 
 
60
 Similar to the previous example, the ratio OA/OP has the properties of an efficiency measure 
since it takes the value of 100 percent for the perfectly efficient firm, and will become 
indefinitely small if the amount of inputs becomes indefinitely large. Also, provided that SS΄ 
has a negative slope, an increase in any input per unit of output, ceteris paribus, implies lower 
PE.  
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efficiency related influences confounding the measure specified in (3), such as whether 
an increase in input yields a proportionately larger increase in output, or whether a 
decrease in input yields a proportionately smaller reduction in output. These influences 
are related to scale efficiency and address whether the firm is optimally sized (Golany 
and Yu 1997). The need to untangle these two sources of potential inefficiency within 
Farrell’s PE measure has long been recognised by economists working in the area of 
production efficiency (see for example Førsund and Hjalmarsson 1974; Färe and Lovell 
1978). 
 
By imposing an additional convexity constraint on the underlying frontier technology, 
which allows for variable returns to scale (VRS) to be exhibited in the efficient 
frontier
61, Farrell’s original measure can be used to compute efficiency devoid of any 
scale effects, which relate strictly to the firm’s allocation of resources. As a result, it is 
possible to decompose Farrell’s PE measure into two main components: 1) a ‘pure’ TE 
component, which refers to a net measure of the firm’s efficient use of resources, and 2) 
a SE component, which refers to the firm’s ‘distance’ from an optimal scale of 
production (Førsund and Hjalmarsson 1979; Banker et al. 1984; Førsund and 
Hjalmarsson 1987; Banker and Thrall 1992; Banker et al. 2004).  
 
The TE measure incorporates various proportionate changes in outputs and inputs in the 
efficient frontier, and is best explained using a visual illustration. In order to represent 
the difference between the CRS and VRS frontiers in two dimensions, Figure 8 
highlights a one input, one output case. If known, the efficient frontiers OO΄ and SS΄ 
represent the various input and output combinations of firms using best practices in their 
production processes which exhibit CRS and VRS respectively. 
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 Variable returns to scale (VRS) refers to increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale. A 
firm is said to exhibit increasing returns to scale (IRS) if increases in all inputs, keeping the 
input mix constant, results in a greater than proportionate increase in output. From this, 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) can be observed if increases in all inputs, keeping the input 
mix constant, results in a less than proportionate increase in output. Constant returns to scale 
(CRS) are observed when a proportionate increase in inputs results in an increase in outputs by 
exactly the same proportion. 
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Figure 8: One input, one output measure of technical efficiency with 
constant and varying returns to scale 
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In the diagram, point P represents the observed input, R, and output, Q, of firm P. Given 
an output of Q, point A represents the most efficient input levels for a hypothetical firm 
which is optimally scaled, since it exhibits CRS in its production process; thus, the PE 
of firm P can be defined as QA/QP. Compared to firm C, which is sub-optimally scaled 
since it exhibits increasing returns to scale (IRS) in its production process, TE in the use 
of inputs can be defined as QC/QP and is devoid of any scale efficiency effects
62
.  From 
these two definitions of efficiency, QA/QC measures SE, which represents the 
inefficiency due to the divergence of the actual size of P from the optimal scale
63
. An 
SE score of 1 indicates that the firm is operating at the most efficient production scale.  
These measures can be stated more generally as 
 
                                                 
 
62
 Equivalently, using an output oriented measure, the PE of P can be defined as RP/RB and TE 
can be defined as RP/RD. This implies that it is possible that firm P will be observed to exhibit 
either IRS or DRS in production depending on which orientation is used since they yield 
different projection points on the SS΄ frontier (Golany and Yu 1997). 
 
63
 The distance QA/QC measures SE itself since the firm could have achieved the same output 
with less input if the firm was producing at CRS, or in other words, if the firm was efficiently 
scaled. 
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Where x denotes the input used by the observed firm to produce a given output y, and 
      and  
 
    represent the input quantities of best practice firms which produce the 
same output as the observed firm, but lie on the CRS and VRS efficient frontiers 
respectively. Due to the convexity constraint imposed on the VRS frontier, it will 
always be the case that TE ≥ PE, which is intuitive since unlike PE, TE has had any 
potential scale inefficiency effects removed.  
 
From (4), (5) and (6) it is clear that Farrell’s technical efficiency score, PE, is the 
product of pure technical efficiency, TE, and scale efficiency, SE. More specifically, 
 
(7)          . 
 
For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, family owned firms are expected to exhibit 
greater inefficiencies related to a suboptimal scale of production compared to their non-
family counterparts. These potential scale inefficiencies are separate from any potential 
inefficiency related to resource use. By decomposing technical efficiency as per (7), we 
can isolate the impact of family ownership on both components separately, which 
enables an otherwise difficult insight into potential efficiency differentials across firm 
ownership. Further, as we have shown, any efficiency comparisons across firm 
ownership which do not account for these simultaneous scale effects will be confounded 
by firm size and thus flawed. 
 
As the measures of efficiency discussed thus far involve observing the degree to which 
the actual productivity of a firm differs from its maximum potential productivity, 
identified by the efficient frontier, great importance is placed on accurately computing 
the efficient frontier itself. Up to this point, we have assumed that the efficient frontier 
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has been known, but in actuality the efficient frontier must be identified using a sample 
of real-world data.  
 
4.4 Estimating the efficient frontier 
 
To date, previous studies have utilised either a parametric or non-parametric approach 
to estimate the efficient frontier (Førsund et al. 1980). The parametric, or stochastic 
frontier approach developed by Aigner et al. (1977) is distinguished by the assumption 
of an explicit functional form for the production technology, as described in Bauer 
(1990). The frontier is then constructed based on the OLS estimation of the unknown 
parameters of, for example, a production, cost, or profit function. On the other hand, the 
non-parametric method, coined as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) by Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rhodes (1979;1981), builds on the individual firm evaluations of Farrell 
(1957) specified in (3). In contrast to the parametric approach, DEA does not require 
any assumptions about the functional form, as the efficiency of a firm is measured 
relative to all other firms in the sample with the simple restriction that all firms lie on or 
‘below’ the efficient frontier. 
 
The chief advantage of the DEA or mathematical programming approach is that no 
explicit functional form need be imposed on the data
64
. However, Seiford and Thrall 
(1990) highlight how the DEA calculated frontier is very sensitive to extreme values, 
and thus is susceptible to the potential measurement error of input and output values. 
Although the stochastic frontier or parametric approach can handle such measurement 
error more effectively via an error term, it imposes an explicit, and possibly overly 
restrictive, functional form for technology and the distribution of the error term (Cooper 
et al. 2004). As a result, we take steps to minimise the potential effects of measurement 
error by removing those firms which have reported a value of zero for their output, 
capital or labour. We also focus on simple, yet theoretically founded measures of both 
                                                 
 
64
 The validity of any estimated stochastic production frontier as a benchmark for measuring the 
efficiency of an observed firm crucially depends on the appropriateness of the functional form 
being used. Unfortunately, the choice of the functional specification is often arbitrary and is 
usually driven by computational simplicity (Färe and Lovell 1978). 
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input and output, defined in Chapter 3 using the BLS data. Finally, we further 
acknowledge that the risk of extreme values influencing the results is mitigated by our 
relatively large sample size. 
 
Given our efforts to minimise the problems related to the DEA approach, we utilise the 
non-parametric method in this thesis as to realise the most important advantage of this 
approach, which is that we do not impose a specified production function or assume 
some probability distribution of the error terms. The basic DEA frontier estimation 
relies on a number of fairly general assumptions about the nature of the underlying 
production technology (see Appendix A.2). Using a sample of actually observed input-
output data and these assumptions, it derives a benchmark with which the actual input-
output ratio realised by a firm can be compared for the efficiency measurement. We 
illustrate this approach in the next section using a simple example. 
 
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA): A simple example 4.4.1
 
As we have discussed, technical efficiency is measured as the ratio of a firm’s actual 
productivity to the productivity of the equivalent optimal, best practice, or efficient 
firm. In most cases, such an optimal firm may not actually exist within the sample data 
set, therefore the DEA frontier itself is the linear programming calculation of a 
hypothetical efficient firm which is then used to compute the TE score of the firm being 
evaluated. This can be accomplished with a sample of firm-level input/output data. In 
this section we describe a simple method of finding both the CRS and VRS efficient 
frontiers using a one input, one output example.  
 
Suppose we observe the following input/output data for 10 firms in the same industry. 
These are listed in the first panel of Table 19 and illustrated in Figure 9. From the first 
panel of Table 19 alone we can make some basic observations about efficiency. For 
example, we can see that, as groups, firms C and B, F and E, and G, H and I, all use the 
same amount of input.  
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Table 19: Sample input/output data and efficiency scores  
Panel 1: Production data  Panel 2: Efficiency Scores 
Firm Input (x) Output (y) 
 
PE TE SE RTS 
A 3 8 
 
0.53 1.00 0.53 IRS 
B 6 20 
 
0.67 0.77 0.86 IRS 
C 6 30 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS 
D 7 14 
 
0.40 0.55 0.73 IRS 
E 8 22 
 
0.55 0.61 0.90 IRS 
F 8 32 
 
0.80 0.85 0.94 DRS 
G 10 40 
 
0.80 1.00 0.80 DRS 
H 10 30 
 
0.60 0.60 1.00 CRS 
I 10 16 
 
0.32 0.41 0.78 IRS 
J 12 24 
 
0.40 0.43 0.93 IRS 
 
With that said, we can easily determine that C is more efficient than B, F is more 
efficient than E, and G is more efficient than H and I since with the same input (x), they 
achieve a greater level of output (y). However, Table 19 and Figure 9 do not provide 
any information about the quantity of the efficiency differentials among our example 
firms, nor do they provide any information about any potential scale inefficiencies. In 
fact, as we shall see, firm C is perfectly efficient with respect to its scale and 
technology, while firm F exhibits some degree of both scale and technical inefficiency, 
and firm G is technically efficient, but exhibits scale inefficiencies. These results can 
only be derived by comparing each firm’s distance to an efficient frontier. 
 
In Figure 9 the efficient frontier can be found by constructing a non-parametric 
piecewise linear convex hull such that no observed point should lie to the left or above 
it. In our simple example we accomplish this by starting at the further most left point, 
firm A, and construct a straight line originating from A to all other firms which lie to 
the right. Note that the furthest most left firm is guaranteed to be on the frontier
65
. The 
slope of each line can then be calculated as the change in output divided by the change 
in input, or more specifically as 
 
(8)                   
                                                 
 
65
 If there are more than one firm at the furthest point to the left, then the starting point is the 
firm with the highest input of the group. 
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Where γ is the starting point (in this case firm A) and i denotes all other firms to the 
right of the starting point (in this case firms B to J). The next firm on the frontier (and 
the next starting point) is the firm where the slope of the line between it and the starting 
point is the maximum of all other lines. In Figure 9 the line between A and C has the 
largest slope compared to all other lines originating from A. Therefore firm C is the 
next starting point and the process is repeated until all firms which lie on the efficient 
frontier are identified, i.e. no other firms lie to the right and above the starting point. 
The frontier itself is the connection of all linear segments between these frontier firms, 
as seen in Figure 10. We label this the VRS efficient frontier since it allows for variable 
returns to scale, i.e. its slope varies across x.  
 
To find the CRS frontier, we further construct a ray starting from the x,y origin to all 
firms and again select the maximum slope. This will produce a second efficient frontier 
that is tangent with the VRS frontier. We label this the CRS frontier in Figure 11 since 
its slope is constant. This slope represents the change in output given a change in input 
of an optimally scaled production technology. Once we have identified the CRS and 
VRS frontiers, we can calculate PE, TE and SE as explained in Section 4.3.1. 
  
Specifically focusing on firm B, to find the CRS and VRS benchmarks, while holding 
input constant we construct a straight line from the y axis (labelled as point K in Figure 
12) to firm B’s position. The intersection of this line with the CRS and VRS frontiers 
are firm B’s hypothetical efficient counterparts exhibiting constant and variable returns 
to scale respectively.  In Figure 12 these hypothetical firms are labelled B
**
 and B
*
 
respectively. To find these points, we simply calculate the intercept (α) and slope (β) of 
both frontiers and solve for x when y is fixed using a standard straight line equation 
  
(9)         
 
Where y is output, x is input, α is the y intercept and β is the change in y divided by the 
change in x. In our example, the CRS frontier’s α = 0 and β = 5, while at the segment 
between firm A and C, the VRS frontier’s α = -14 and β = 7.33. 
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Figure 9: Input-Output coordinates  Figure 10: Efficient frontier with variable returns to scale  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Efficient frontier with constant returns to scale  Figure 12: Measuring scale and technical efficiency of firm B  
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Given these two lines, to find the input values of firm B
*
 and B
**
, we can substitute the 
fixed value of y (in this case 20) in equation (9) and solve for x. In our example the x,y 
values of firm B
*
 are [4.64, 20] and for firm B
**
 these are [4,20]. Since firm B’s 
input/output coordinates are [6,20], we can see that firm B is clearly less efficient than 
B
*
 and B
**
 as it uses more input to produce the same level of output. Specifically, we 
can calculate B’s efficiency scores as per equations (4), (5) and (6) from Section 4.3.1. 
Using these, we find 
 
(10)            
 
 
      , 
(11)           
    
 
      , and 
(12)             
 
    
      . 
 
That is, firm B’s efficiency is 67 percent of its optimally scaled and technically efficient 
counterpart B
**
 assuming CRS. Allowing for variable returns to scale, firm B’s 
efficiency is 77 percent of its technically efficient, but sub-optimally scaled
66
, 
counterpart B
*
. Specifically, if firm B
*
 was optimally scaled, then it would be able to 
produce 20 units of output with 4, rather than 4.64 units of input. This implies that firm 
B is not perfectly scaled and this inefficiency can be quantified by a scale efficiency 
score of 86 percent. By this approach we can find the PE, TE and SE scores for firms A 
to J in our example. These are reported in the second panel of Table 19.  
  
In this thesis we estimate the efficiency scores of family and non-family SMEs which 
use more than one input in their production process. As a result, the equivalent 
efficiency scores are found by the linear programming method developed by Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rhodes (1979;1981), which imposes some basic assumptions regarding the 
production technology of our sample firms. In Appendix A.2 we define these 
                                                 
 
66
 Firm B is observed to be exhibiting IRS since its technically efficient counterpart, B
*
, lies on 
the increasing returns to scale portion of the VRS frontier, i.e. between firm A and C, the VRS 
frontier’s slope is greater than the CRS frontier’s slope. A firm is observed to exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale if its efficient counterpart lies on the segment of the VRS frontier where, 
holding input fixed, the slope is less than the CRS frontier’s slope.  
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assumptions and specify the linear programming problems which are solved to find the 
efficient frontier and calculate the efficiency scores.  
 
Using the BLS proxies for input and output defined in Chapter 3, and by identifying the 
VRS and CRS frontiers in each BLS industry
67
, we obtain PE, TE and SE for each firm 
in our BLS sample. Before performing more robust empirical testing in the next chapter, 
we first conduct a preliminary analysis on these efficiency scores across family and 
non-family owned firms in the next section.  
 
4.5 Descriptive statistics and preliminary data analysis 
 
Similar to the preliminary analysis conducted in the previous chapter, we compare the 
efficiency measures detailed in this chapter to test for a FOE
68
. In the previous chapter, 
we observed significant FOEs with respect to the composition of finance and firm size. 
However, a greater reliance on internal finance and a smaller family firm alone do not 
necessarily imply a capital constraint unless suboptimal production in terms of scale and 
resource use is also demonstrated. As we have argued in this thesis, one way of 
demonstrating a suboptimal scale is to investigate whether efficiency, both technical and 
scale, is systematically different across ownership type. 
  
Accordingly, we compare the summary statistics for our three derived measures of 
efficiency discussed in this chapter, namely PE, TE, and SE. Capital intensity of 
production, or K/L, is also compared across firm ownership in this section due to the 
theoretical link between capital intensity and efficiency
69
.  
                                                 
 
67
 It is expected that the prevailing underlying production technology will be specific to the 
industry in which the firm is operating; therefore it is important to compare each firm to its 
industry specific frontier when calculating efficiency. 
 
68
 As in Chapter 3, the FOE is calculated by xff – xnf, where x is the average value of the 
efficiency variable of interest and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. A 
positive FOE indicates that, relative to non-family firms, family firms exhibit a greater average 
value and a negative FOE indicates a lower average value for family firms. 
 
69
 As the DEA measure of efficiency is based on the distance to an efficient frontier while 
holding the input mix constant, differences in the capital to labour ratio will in turn cause 
differences in the efficiency score depending on the slope of the prevailing frontier.  
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Table 20: Descriptive annual efficiency statistics for family and non -family firms by year 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 3450/year) Panel B: Family Firms (N = 1758/year) Panel C: Non-Family Firms (N = 1692/year) 
Variable (year) 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
PE (96) 0.210 0.365 0.324 0.466 0.198 0.343 0.306 0.440 0.223 0.389 0.342 0.491 
PE (97) 0.187 0.342 0.295 0.434 0.176 0.323 0.280 0.413 0.201 0.361 0.312 0.460 
PE (98) 0.207 0.358 0.310 0.449 0.199 0.341 0.304 0.431 0.217 0.376 0.321 0.470 
PE (96-98)
a
 0.201 0.355 0.310 0.452 0.190 0.336 0.296 0.429 0.213 0.375 0.325 0.477 
TE (96) 0.296 0.478 0.423 0.608 0.289 0.465 0.415 0.582 0.302 0.492 0.436 0.636 
TE (97) 0.265 0.451 0.391 0.567 0.261 0.443 0.386 0.555 0.268 0.458 0.395 0.580 
TE (98) 0.277 0.471 0.411 0.612 0.274 0.458 0.399 0.583 0.281 0.485 0.420 0.648 
TE (96-98)
a
 0.279 0.467 0.409 0.597 0.275 0.455 0.402 0.575 0.282 0.478 0.417 0.622 
SE (96) 0.652 0.783 0.885 0.977 0.595 0.757 0.847 0.970 0.713 0.811 0.910 0.982 
SE (97) 0.646 0.776 0.864 0.969 0.590 0.748 0.838 0.960 0.703 0.804 0.880 0.976 
SE (98) 0.686 0.786 0.860 0.960 0.659 0.775 0.855 0.958 0.700 0.797 0.867 0.962 
SE (96-98)
a
 0.661 0.782 0.868 0.969 0.614 0.760 0.847 0.962 0.702 0.804 0.887 0.974 
K/L (96) 29.969 133.143 60.571 125.125 28.432 96.154 55.794 104.780 32.421 171.574 72.372 152.764 
K/L (97) 31.506 147.000 65.160 131.542 29.409 105.700 58.038 110.825 34.741 189.911 73.573 162.807 
K/L (98) 31.072 171.509 65.760 135.672 29.311 116.045 58.497 115.717 33.250 229.136 76.195 163.785 
K/L (96-98)
a
 30.755 150.550 63.849 130.644 29.000 105.966 57.450 110.567 33.259 196.874 74.000 159.206 
a
 Total sample across 1996 to 1998 consists of 10350 firms of which 5274 are family and 5076 are non-family. 
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Regardless of the efficiency measure or time period, family firms consistently exhibit 
lower relative PE scores. These differences are most noticeable in the SE measure and 
less so in the TE measure. We can also see that family firms as a group consistently 
exhibit lower average K/L ratios in their production across all time periods. An 
interesting observation seen in Table 20 is the result that family firms consistently 
exhibit lower TE levels than non-family firms. Although the TE differences are 
noticeably smaller relative to the PE and SE differences, lower TE values for family 
firms is contrary to our expectations stated in Chapter 2. As with our previous results, 
Table 20 is only suggestive since average efficiencies are expected to be sensitive to the 
industry in which the firm is operating
70
. Using the entire BLS sample across three 
years, we investigate this further by comparing the average PE, TE, and SE, by industry 
for both family and non-family firms. The results, presented in order of the largest 
negative FOE first, can be seen in Figures 7, 8, and 9.  
     
Figure 13 demonstrates that in 25 of 32 industries family firms on average exhibit lower 
PE than their non-family industry peers. As far as TE is concerned, the results displayed 
in Figure 14 are similar, with family firms on average exhibiting lower mean values in 
24 out of 32 industries. Finally, in terms of SE, Figure 15 illustrates that in 26 of 32 
industries, average family firm SE is lower than the average non-family firm score. 
There does not seem to be any discernible pattern as far as industry differentials are 
concerned, although we do see some repetition across these figures in the top and 
bottom industries. We explore this further later in this section, but first we note that the 
inter-industry differences in the average efficiency across family and non-family firms 
vary widely and are not necessarily statistically significant in all industries. 
                                                 
 
70
 For example, in the previous chapter we showed that the occurrence of family ownership is 
not distributed equally across all industries. As a result, if family ownership is observed to occur 
more often in industries where say the average efficiency scores are generally lower for all 
firms (i.e. due to the nature of the industry, both family and non-family firms are on average 
situated at a greater distance from the efficient frontier relative to other industries), then any 
average differences observed in Table 20 may be a result of an industry effect rather than any 
ownership effect per se.  
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Figure 13: Average family and non-family productive efficiency by industry (1996-1998) 
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Figure 14: Average family and non-family technical efficiency by industry (1996-1998) 
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Figure 15: Average family and non-family scale efficiency by industry (1996-1998) 
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To investigate this further, Table 21 and Table 22 quantify the FOE with respect to 
efficiency and report its significance by industry and age respectively.  
 
Table 21 reports that in 10 of 32 industries there is a significant difference between 
family and non-family PE. When significant the FOE is always negative. When 
considering firm age, the FOE with respect to PE is negative and significant in all but 
the youngest of firms. When we decompose the PE FOE into TE and SE, in 13 of 32 
industries, there is a significant TE FOE, yet the effect itself is negative in 7 industries 
and positive in 5. Table 22 also shows that in the older age brackets, family firms are 
found to exhibit a significantly lower TE score, however in all other brackets, there is 
no significant difference between family and non-family firms. Contrary to our 
expectations, these mixed results show that family firms can on average be more or less, 
but are mostly equally, efficient in terms of pure resource use relative to non-family 
firms.  
 
Moving on to SE, the FOE is consistently negative and found to be statistically 
significant in 9 of 32 industries. It is also important to note here that we do not find any 
industry where there is a positive and significant FOE with respect to SE, i.e. when 
significant, family firms are always found to be less scale efficient. There are also 
negative effects across firms of all ages which supports the notion that family firms face 
size constraints, i.e. if size was not constrained, these firms would adjust their size to 
receive the efficiency benefit. Reinforcing this notion, family firms may be forced to 
replace scarce capital with labour, as we also observe that family firm production is on 
average less capital intensive. For example, the capital to labour ratio, K/L, is 
significantly lower for family firms in 22 of 32 industries and in all age brackets.   
 
Table 21 also reports what we will refer to as the ‘family participation rate’, which is 
the ratio of the number of family firms over the total number of all firms operating in 
any given industry. Not including those industries where family participation is either 0 
or 100 percent, we can see that family firms represent very large proportions, i.e. 60 
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Table 21: Family ownership effect on efficiency by industry
a
 (1996-1998) 
 ANZSIC & Industry Category N Family Non-
Family 
Family 
Participation 
PE  
FOE 
TE  
FOE 
SE  
FOE 
K/L  
FOE 
100 Mining 79 19 60 24.05% -0.019 0.022 -0.047 -2039.05*** 
  Manufacturing          
200 between 100 & 200 employees 279 79 200 28.32% -0.003 0.045* -0.047 -71.26*** 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  410 213 197 51.95% -0.032* -0.002 -0.052** -76.31*** 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing  327 189 138 57.80% 0.009 -0.011 0.029 -58.73*** 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  203 125 78 61.58% -0.036 -0.036 -0.011 1.54 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  302 183 119 60.60% -0.036 -0.045 0.016 -32.33* 
225 Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product Manufacturing  497 214 283 43.06% -0.021 -0.021 -0.009 -94.61*** 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  177 115 62 64.97% -0.091** -0.042 -0.080*** -30.64** 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  559 315 244 56.35% -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.015 -29.77*** 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  1040 532 508 51.15% -0.001 -0.010 0.011 -35.65*** 
229 Other Manufacturing  388 240 148 61.86% -0.036* -0.044 -0.025 -55.43** 
  Construction          
300 between 100 & 200 employees 21 14 7 66.67% -0.191 -0.041 -0.178 149.88** 
341 General Construction  194 130 64 67.01% -0.008 0.060 -0.11** -104.23 
342 Construction Trade Services  375 272 103 72.53% -0.007 -0.088*** 0.043 31.32*** 
  Wholesale Trade          
400 between 100 & 200 employees 95 34 61 35.79% -0.026 0.013 -0.032 -147.84*** 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  393 224 169 57.00% -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.002 -122.32*** 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  684 310 374 45.32% -0.020 -0.015 -0.01 -129.19*** 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  543 319 224 58.75% 0.000 0.041** -0.059*** -40.83*** 
  Retail Trade          
500 between 100 & 200 employees 63 29 34 46.03% 0.030 -0.003 0.05 -56.48* 
551 Food Retailing  236 169 67 71.61% -0.029 -0.067* 0.014 11.15 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  374 214 160 57.22% -0.110*** -0.127*** -0.047** -80.22 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  405 235 170 58.02% -0.042* -0.022 -0.049** -25.73** 
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  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants          
600 between 100 & 200 employees 10 5 5 50.00% -0.055 n/a -0.055 -10.18*** 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  360 172 188 47.78% -0.036 -0.043* -0.013 -54.25*** 
700 Transport and Storage  376 212 164 56.38% -0.039** -0.038 -0.073** -117.81** 
  Finance and Insurance          
800 between 100 & 200 employees 4 0 4 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  218 104 114 47.71% -0.048 -0.063* -0.036 -250.27* 
  Property and Business Services          
900 between 100 & 200 employees 68 10 58 14.71% 0.059 0.202*** -0.084 1702.55 
977 Property Services  317 150 167 47.32% -0.091*** -0.020 -0.116*** -166.94 
978 Business Services  958 287 671 29.96% -0.057*** 0.042*** -0.202*** -5.13 
  Cultural and Recreational Services          
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 14 0 14 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  110 24 86 21.82% 0.069 0.155*** -0.075 -429.94** 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  9 0 9 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1093 Sport and Recreation  53 24 29 45.28% 0.089 0.057 0.050 -26.80 
  Personal and Other Services          
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 0 100.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1195 Personal Services  205 108 97 52.68% 0.003 -0.014 0.002 8.29 
 
a 
Efficiency FOEs by industry have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various efficiency measures compared, and ff and nf denote family and 
non-family firms respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Table 22: Family ownership effect on efficiency by age (1996 -1998) 
Age Range (bracket) N Family 
Non-
Family 
% of family 
firms PE FOE TE FOE SE FOE K/L FOE 
Less than 2 years (1) 126 38 88 30.16% -0.047 -0.018 -0.120** -53.148** 
2 to less than 5 years (2) 1111 495 616 44.55% -0.035** 0.025 -0.096*** -98.715*** 
5 to less than 10 years (3) 2867 1339 1528 46.70% -0.041*** -0.011 -0.062*** -94.076*** 
10 to less than 20 years (4) 3428 1755 1673 51.20% -0.041*** -0.020** -0.048*** -135.571*** 
20 years or more (5) 2818 1647 1171 58.45% -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.013* -47.720*** 
 
Efficiency FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various efficiency measures compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
 
Table 23: Pearson’s correlations between family industry participation rate  and efficiency FOE (1996-1998) 
 
Family Participation PE FOE TE FOE SE FOE K/L FOE 
Family Participation 
1         
-         
PE FOE 
-0.441 1       
(-2.691)** -       
TE FOE 
-0.718 0.636 1     
(-5.648)*** (4.515)*** -     
SE FOE 
0.214 0.483 -0.283 1   
(1.198) (3.02)*** (-1.616) -   
K/L FOE 
0.041 0.103 0.254 -0.069 1 
(0.226) (0.568) (1.436) (-0.377) - 
T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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precent or higher, in sectors such as Manufacturing, Construction, and Retail Trade. 
Lowering this threshold, we find that in more than half, or in 18 of 32 industries, the 
family firm participation rate is greater than 50 percent. 
 
These proportions allow us to investigate whether family firms systematically cluster in 
industries where the potential efficiency consequences of family ownership are 
minimised, or put in other terms, family firms may gravitate to those industries where 
they are least inefficient. To provide some insight into this question, Table 23 reports 
the Pearson's correlations between the family participation rate and various efficiency 
differentials.  
 
The correlations and corresponding significance tests in Table 23 show that there is in 
fact a significant negative correlation between the rate of family participation in a given 
industry and an efficiency FOE. Specifically, family owned firms tend to cluster in 
those industries where the PE FOE is lowest. When we decompose this into TE and SE, 
we find that this result is driven by a strong negative correlation between family firm 
participation and the TE FOE. This is a strong value at -0.718 and significant at the one 
percent level and supports the notion that family firms attempt to overcome their 
apparent scale disadvantages by actively pursuing improvements in TE. To accomplish 
this, they may gravitate to, or simply tend to survive in, those industries where the 
negative TE differentials are smallest. 
 
When looking at the general relationships between our calculated efficiency scores, 
capital intensity, firm size and internal financing, Table 24 also demonstrates 
correlations in accordance with our discussion in Chapter 2. Specifically, there are clear 
interrelationships between a greater proportion of internal finance, a smaller firm, and 
lower capital intensity and efficiency.   
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Table 24: Pearson's correlations between efficiency, internal finance and firm size (1996-1998) 
 
PE TE SE 
Share of 
internal 
finance
a
 Capital Labour Output 
Capital 
intensity 
PE 1.00 
       
 
- 
       TE 0.77*** 1.00 
      
 
(123.37) - 
      SE 0.43*** -0.16*** 1.00 
     
 
(48.36) (-16.92) - 
     Share of internal finance
a
 -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 1.00 
    
 
(-11.13) (-6.15) (-8.41) - 
    Capital 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.02 -0.14*** 1.00 
   
 
(10.52) (10.60) (1.53) (-14.11) - 
   Labour 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.10*** -0.27*** 0.30*** 1.00 
  
 
(15.41) (11.07) (10.68) (-29.08) (32.42) - 
  Output 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.06*** -0.25*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 1.00 
 
 
(26.75) (25.30) (6.15) (-26.66) (99.00) (70.17) - 
 Capital intensity 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.02* -0.11*** 0.54*** 0.06*** 0.43*** 1.00 
 
(10.87) (9.55) (1.85) (-11.77) (65.89) (5.83) (48.02) - 
 
a
 Share of internal finance is found as the sum of the proportion of internal debt, internal equity, and working owner’s equity. The sign and direction of these 
correlations do not change when we consider these variables separately. T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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For example, no matter the measure, a larger firm is significantly correlated with greater 
efficiency scores. We further observe that efficiency and capital intensity are also 
positively correlated, and as expected, a greater capital to labour ratio is also related to a 
larger firm. Finally, the share of internal finance is negatively correlated with both 
capital intensity and PE. Also, the correlation between internal finance and efficiency is 
stronger with respect to SE relative to that of TE.  
 
These interrelations will need to be considered when designing our hypotheses tests in 
the next chapter, but first we further investigate how family ownership affects capital 
intensity while considering the above mentioned relationship between efficiency and 
capital intensity. 
  
 Capital intensity  4.5.1
 
The data presented thus far have also demonstrated that on average family firms exhibit 
significantly lower K/L ratios across time (Table 20), industry (Table 21) and firm age 
(Table 22). Although these results are consistent with a capital constraint specific to 
family firms, we recognise that any comparison of K/L ratios may be confounded by 
efficiency itself. For example, as seen in Table 24, family firms may exhibit a lower 
capital intensive means of production as a direct result of poor resource allocation rather 
than a size constraint; thus as a final comparison of capital intensity, Table 25 
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Table 25: Average family and non-family relative K/L by efficiency band (1996-1998) 
Efficiency Band (PE) 0.9 to 1 
0.8 to < 
0.9 
0.7 to < 
0.8 
0.6 to < 
0.7 
0.5 to < 
0.6 
0.4 to < 
0.5 
0.3 to < 
0.4 
0.2 to < 
0.3 
0.1 to < 
0.2 
< 0.1 
1996                     
All firms 161 41 96 150 280 497 684 752 548 241 
Family firms 63 13 42 68 133 246 339 408 294 152 
Non-family firms 98 28 54 82 147 251 345 344 254 89 
All firms average rel K/L 2.125 1.122 1.270 0.797 0.738 0.719 0.746 0.746 0.868 0.767 
Family average rel K/L 1.182 0.664 1.354 0.449 0.554 0.618 0.632 0.693 0.780 0.677 
Non-family average rel K/L  2.731 1.335 1.204 1.085 0.905 0.817 0.858 0.808 0.969 0.921 
FOE -1.548** -0.670 0.150 -0.636*** -0.351*** -0.199** -0.226*** -0.116* -0.188* -0.244 
1997                     
All firms 145 42 90 118 218 420 658 780 707 272 
Family firms 62 19 39 56 97 188 344 395 390 168 
Non-family firms 83 23 51 62 121 232 314 385 317 104 
All firms average rel K/L 2.202 1.224 0.915 0.895 0.935 0.716 0.725 0.822 0.808 0.879 
Family average rel K/L 1.592 0.889 0.690 0.589 0.668 0.542 0.597 0.751 0.783 0.775 
Non-family average rel K/L 2.658 1.501 1.086 1.171 1.149 0.857 0.867 0.894 0.837 1.045 
FOE -1.066 -0.612 -0.397 -0.582 -0.481** -0.315*** -0.270*** -0.142 -0.054 -0.270 
1998                     
All firms 146 65 80 136 228 460 696 839 627 173 
Family firms 58 18 35 72 108 232 366 427 346 96 
Non-family firms 88 47 45 64 120 228 330 412 281 77 
All firms average rel K/L 3.279 1.185 1.052 0.945 0.605 0.685 0.681 0.875 0.866 1.224 
Family average rel K/L 1.895 0.810 0.807 0.755 0.575 0.550 0.585 0.766 0.767 1.016 
Non-family average rel K/L 4.192 1.328 1.243 1.159 0.631 0.822 0.788 0.988 0.988 1.483 
FOE -2.297* -0.518 -0.436 -0.404 -0.055 -0.273*** -0.203*** -0.222** -0.221* -0.467 
 
The ‘relative’ K/L measure for firm i operating in industry j is calculated as  
  
  
∑     
∑     
⁄  . 
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presents the difference between the average family and non-family ‘relative K/L’71 by 
efficiency band across all observed periods in our sample. 
 
As seen in Table 25 regardless of efficiency band or time period being examined, family 
firms are on average found to exhibit a lower relative K/L than their non-family 
counterparts. This negative FOE is generally found to be statistically significant half of 
the time and largest for those firms near or directly on the efficient frontier. This further 
reinforces our previous findings and supports the notion that the lower capital intensity 
of family firm production may be a result of constrained capital, and not simply poor 
resource allocation. 
 
 Returns to scale  4.5.2
 
Another important factor yet to be considered in our comparisons of scale efficiency 
across family and non-family firms is scale returns. As outlined in Section 4.3.1, the 
assumption of variable returns to scale when estimating the efficient frontier implies 
that firms may exhibit either increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale. This 
will greatly impact the interpretation of our calculated SE scores.  
 
An SE score of less than 1 implies that the firm is not exhibiting CRS and thus is 
inefficient in terms of scale; however, this inefficiency may be due to either the 
                                                 
 
71
 Since capital intensities vary widely across industry, we compare a relative K/L measure 
across ownership, which is found by the ratio of the observed firm’s capital intensity over the 
industry total capital to labour ratio in which the observed firm is operating. The industry total 
K/L for industry j is found by 
∑     
∑     
 and the relative K/L measure for firm i operating in industry 
j is calculated as  
  
  
∑     
∑     
⁄  . This treatment ensures that our comparisons of capital intensity 
across efficiency are not biased by any industry effects. By this measure, a relative K/L greater 
than (or less than) 1 indicates that firm i’s production means are more (or less) capital intensive 
than the industry in which it operates. A relative K/L equating to 1 indicates that firm i’s 
production is as capital intensive as its respective industry. It is important to note that an 
alternate measure of a relative K/L, using the average industry capital intensity as the 
denominator was also compared across ownership and did not significantly change the results 
presented in Table 25. In other words the relative K/L was also calculated as 
  
  
[
∑ (
  
  
)
 
 
  
]⁄ , where 
n denotes the number of firms operating in industry j.    
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exhibition of IRS or DRS, i.e. scale inefficient firms should be optimally larger or 
smaller. As, the SE score defined in this Chapter itself does not discriminate between 
IRS or DRS firms, it would be inappropriate to simply compare the raw SE scores 
across family and non-family firms without considering returns to scale. For an 
explanation, see Appendix A.3.  
 
This is especially important in the context of the arguments presented in this thesis, as 
we would expect sub-optimally scaled family firms to belong mostly to the IRS 
category, i.e. they are sub-optimally small. In fact, given our argument of a constrained 
firm size due to financing preferences, we further expect that any family firms in the 
DRS category, i.e. they are sub-optimally large, would exhibit greater scale efficiencies 
relative to their non-family DRS counterparts. In other words family firms in the DRS 
category are expected to be not as large as their sub-optimally large non-family 
counterparts. 
 
To explore these expectations, Table 26 categorizes our sample into three sub-groups 
based on returns to scale and compares incidence of family owned firms, average SE, 
and average age across time. The statistical significance of the FOE is also reported. As 
no differences in scale efficiency will be found in the CRS sub-group by construction of 
the SE score, we focus our attention on the IRS and DRS sub-groups. Starting with 
firms exhibiting IRS, we find that, in every period, family firms are significantly greater 
in number and score lower in average SE. That is, of all sub-optimally small firms, 
family firms represent a greater proportion and tend to be even smaller. 
  
With respect to firms exhibiting DRS, Table 26 shows that family firms are 
significantly lower in number and score higher in average SE. That is, of all sub-
optimally large firms, family firms represent a lower proportion and again tend to be 
smaller. Table 26 demonstrates that, like their non-family counterparts, family firms can 
be sub-optimally small or large, however, the tendencies mentioned above support the
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Table 26: Average annual family and non-family descriptive statistics by returns to scale  
  1996 1997 1998 
Returns to scale (RTS) Count 
Sub-group 
proportion 
Avg sub-
group SE 
Avg 
age
b
 
Count 
Sub-group 
proportion 
Avg sub-
group SE 
Avg 
age
b
 
Count 
Sub-group 
proportion 
Avg sub-
group SE 
Avg 
age
b
 
All firms in IRS sub-group 2121 1.00 0.719 3.79 2123 1.00 0.738 3.88 1958 1.00 0.758 4.01 
Family firms 1135 0.54 0.684 4.01 1134 0.53 0.703 4.10 1062 0.54 0.735 4.18 
Non-family firms 986 0.46 0.760 3.60 989 0.47 0.777 3.68 896 0.46 0.784 3.86 
FOE
a 
 149 0.07*** -0.076*** 0.41*** 145 0.07*** -0.074*** 0.42*** 166 0.08*** -0.048*** 0.31*** 
All firms in CRS sub-group 245 1.00 1.000 3.53 201 1.00 1.000 3.77 206 1.00 1.000 3.72 
Family firms 116 0.47 1.000 3.74 88 0.44 1.000 3.85 97 0.47 1.000 3.79 
Non-family firms 129 0.53 1.000 3.35 113 0.56 1.000 3.70 109 0.53 1.000 3.65 
FOE
a 
 -13 -0.05 - 0.39*** -25 -0.12* - 0.15 -12 -0.06 - 0.14 
All firms in DRS sub-group 1084 1.00 0.859 3.48 1126 1.00 0.807 3.70 1286 1.00 0.795 3.82 
Family firms 507 0.47 0.864 3.54 536 0.48 0.802 3.77 599 0.47 0.810 3.89 
Non-family firms 577 0.53 0.855 3.41 590 0.52 0.812 3.62 687 0.53 0.783 3.75 
FOE
a 
 -70 -0.06** 0.009* 0.13*** -54 -0.05 -0.010 0.15*** -88 -0.07** 0.027*** 0.14*** 
 
a
 FOE is found by xff-xnf, where x are listed variables and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. 
b
 Age ranges are as follows: (1) Less than 2 years, (2) 2 to less than 5 years, (3) 5 to less than 10 years, (4) 10 to less than 20 years, (5) 20 years or more. 
 
 
  
  
 
Chapter 4: Measuring Efficiency and Preliminary Analysis 123 
 
Table 27: Average family and non-family finance composition by source and returns to scale (1996-1998) 
Returns to scale (RTS) Count 
Sub-group 
proportion 
Average SE 
within sub-
group 
Average age 
range within 
sub-group
b
 
Average % of 
internal debt 
Average % 
of external 
debt 
Average % of 
equity from 
working owners 
Average % 
of internal 
equity  
Average % of 
external 
equity  
All firms in IRS sub-group 6201 1.00 0.738 3.66 0.135 0.025 0.699 0.056 0.039 
Family firms 3331 0.54 0.707 3.73 0.165 0.022 0.789 0.068 0.019 
Non-family firms 2870 0.46 0.773 3.59 0.100 0.029 0.595 0.042 0.062 
FOE
a 
 461 0.07*** -0.07*** 0.14*** 0.064*** -0.007* 0.193*** 0.026*** -0.043*** 
All firms in CRS sub-group 653 1.00 1.000 3.66 0.079 0.021 0.569 0.064 0.053 
Family firms 301 0.46 1.000 3.79 0.112 0.030 0.753 0.088 0.029 
Non-family firms 352 0.54 1.000 3.56 0.051 0.013 0.412 0.043 0.073 
FOE
a 
 -51 -0.08** - 0.23*** 0.061*** 0.017 0.341*** 0.045** -0.044*** 
All firms in DRS sub-group 3495 1.00 0.819 3.90 0.088 0.020 0.594 0.063 0.061 
Family firms 1642 0.47 0.824 4.10 0.121 0.021 0.743 0.096 0.030 
Non-family firms 1853 0.53 0.814 3.72 0.059 0.020 0.463 0.034 0.090 
FOE
a 
 -211 -0.06*** 0.01* 0.38*** 0.062*** 0.000 0.279*** 0.062*** -0.060*** 
 
a
 FOE is found by xff-xnf, where x are listed variables and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms respectively. 
b
 Age ranges are as follows: (1) Less than 2 years, (2) 2 to less than 5 years, (3) 5 to less than 10 years, (4) 10 to less than 20 years, (5) 20 years or more. 
notion that family firm size is constrained. With respect to scale efficiency, such a 
constraint can potentially be harmful for IRS firms, but also beneficial for DRS firms. 
With this in mind, and as a final examination, we present Table 27 which depicts the 
same information as Table 26, but aggregates the time periods and includes the FOE in 
both internal and external financing composition across return to scale sub-groups.  
 
Consistent with Table 26, Table 27 shows that family firms represent a significantly 
larger proportion of IRS firms and a lower proportion of DRS firms. Further, family 
firms exhibit a significantly lower SE in the IRS category and higher SE in the DRS 
category. Looking to debt and equity proportions, internally sourced debt and equity is 
significantly higher for family firms across all scale return categories. Consistent with 
our previous findings, there is no difference between family and non-family firms with 
respect to externally sourced debt except in the IRS category, where the FOE is 
significantly negative. Further, the FOE associated with externally sourced equity is 
negative and significant across nearly all scale returns sub-groups. 
  
4.6 Summary of preliminary findings 
 
Based on the preliminary results presented in the previous sections, we have supported 
the notion that the smaller scale exhibited by family firms (shown in Chapter 3) is due 
to limitations on their size. For example, family firms are found to be significantly less 
scale efficient than non-family firms, i.e. if optimally scaled they would reap efficiency 
benefits.  
 
This finding reinforces Hypothesis 8 and remains even after considering returns to 
scale. For example, by identifying scale inefficient firms as either sub-optimally large or 
sub-optimally small, we continue to find significant differences across firm ownership. 
Specifically, of all sub-optimally small firms, family firms represent a greater 
proportion and tend to exhibit greater scale inefficiencies. Further, of all sub-optimally 
large firms, family firms represent a lower proportion and tend to exhibit lower scale 
inefficiencies. Additional to these results, controlling for time period, industry, age, and 
efficiency itself, family firms are consistently found to be significantly less capital 
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intensive than non-family firms, which aligns with our expectations stated in 
Hypothesis 9. Lower capital to labour ratios may also indicate that family firm size is 
constrained.        
   
With respect to TE in resource use, we show that, contrary to Hypothesis 10, family 
firms can be more, less but are mostly equally as efficient as their non-family 
counterparts. Although we do not find strong support for the notion that family firms 
compensate their scale inefficiencies by allocating their resources in a more efficient 
manner, we do find that family firms tend to cluster in those industries where the TE 
differential between family and non-family firms is lowest. 
 
We have also shown that the proportion of internal finance, firm size, capital intensity 
and efficiency are interrelated. For example, a greater proportion of internal finance is 
negatively correlated with capital, labour, output and capital intensity. As these 
variables are all positively related to efficiency, a greater proportion of internal finance 
is also systematically related to lower levels of efficiency, both TE and SE. These 
correlations are consistent with the argument posed in Chapter 2 and demonstrate the 
endogenous relationships between the variables of interest in this thesis. Such 
endogeneity is addressed in the hypotheses tests performed in the next chapter.  
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter we have explained the well-founded theoretical underpinnings and 
precise measurement of the efficiency construct which will be used in this thesis to 
compare family and non-family firm performance. As we have explained in this chapter, 
to test the efficiency hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2, we require a measure which 
enables the observation of efficiencies related to a suboptimal scale of production 
separately from those related to the suboptimal use of resources. We show here that PE 
is particularly well suited for this purpose since it can be decomposed into TE and SE. 
This is especially important in the context of family firms given that they have been 
shown to be smaller across numerous measures of production scale, and thus any 
superficial comparison of ‘efficiency’ may be confounded by the effect of firm size. 
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Taking these complexities into consideration we have calculated PE for each firm in the 
BLS sample according to the DEA method described here. This efficiency score is 
further decomposed into efficiency related to the technical use of resources (devoid of 
any scale effects) and efficiency related to production scale itself. With an attention to 
whether the firm is family owned, we presented descriptive statistics and performed 
preliminary data analysis on the efficiency score differentials between family and non-
family firms. By controlling for multiple covariates and utilising preliminary statistical 
tests, we have shown that there are significant differences between family and non-
family firms. In conjunction with the previous chapter, these findings reinforce our 
hypotheses related to family firm efficiency and encourage us to perform more robust 
econometric analysis. 
 
In line with the central arguments presented in Chapter 2, we have also shown that the 
proportion of internal financing, firm size, capital intensity and efficiency are 
interrelated. It will be important to consider these reciprocal relationships as a potential 
source of endogeneity when designing our hypotheses tests. In the next chapter, we 
outline these methods in detail and report the accompanying results. 
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Chapter 5. Panel Regression Analysis and 
Results  
5.1 Chapter introduction 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 we revealed that family firms are comparatively different to non-
family firms with respect to the composition of debt and equity finance, firm size and 
efficiency.  This preliminary analysis supported many of our hypotheses and leads us to 
perform more robust empirical testing. The purpose of this chapter is to describe these 
tests and report our findings. We do this by specifying and subsequently testing each 
hypothesis according to the argument developed in Chapter 2 and outlined in Figure 16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 Proposed Relationships Operationalization Testable Hypotheses 
(1) 
Family ownership will affect 
financing preferences. 
Composition of debt and 
equity financing 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 
(2) 
Family ownership will affect 
firm size. 
Scale of production  Hypotheses 5 to 7 
(3) 
Family ownership will affect 
firm performance. 
Efficiency Hypotheses 8 to 10 
Family 
Ownership 
Composition 
of Finance 
 
Proportion of debt 
and equity by source 
 
Efficiency 
 
Technical and scale 
efficiency, capital 
intensity 
Scale of 
Production 
 
Total capital, labour, 
and output 
(1) (2) (3) 
Figure 16: Channels through which family ownership impacts the firm 
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As per Figure 16, we expect that family ownership will influence three main aspects of 
the firm 1) the composition of finance, 2) firm size, and 3) efficiency. This influence is 
again referred to herein as a FOE. With respect to each aspect we present the 
appropriate regression specification, describe how it relates to our proposed hypotheses, 
and subsequently present the FOE and other estimated coefficients of interest. 
  
To facilitate this discussion, Section 2 describes various panel regression estimation 
techniques which we utilise to measure and statistically test for a FOE. These 
techniques are the fixed effects, random effects, and hybrid models. According to these 
models, Section 3 specifies very specific hypothesis tests and presents our results with 
respect to the composition of finance, firm size and efficiency. Section 4 specifies the 
full model which is designed to simultaneously test our framework while addressing 
potential endogenous variables, and Section 5 summarises our results. 
 
5.2 Panel Regression Analysis: Testing for a family ownership effect 
 
Given that the BLS data are longitudinal, we utilize both the cross-sectional and time-
series dimensions to estimate the magnitude, direction and significance level of the 
relationships between family ownership, financing composition, firm size, and 
efficiency. These panel data improve the efficiency of our econometric estimates and 
enable us to effectively control for any unobserved individual firm and time 
heterogeneity. Specifically, any ‘between-firm effects’ are eliminated by specifying a 
firm-specific intercept parameter in the equation. With these benefits in mind, we test 
our hypotheses by estimating the following general fixed effects (FE) model 
 
(13)                       i = (1...n); t = (1...T). 
 
Where yit is a dependent variable associated with firm i in time period t, αi is an 
intercept parameter specific to individual firm i and captures the average accumulated 
effects of all unobserved time invariant, or ‘fixed’, factors on the dependent variable, x′it 
is a vector of exogenous time varying control variables pertaining to the i
th
 firm in time 
t, and β is a corresponding vector of estimated slope parameters which are restricted to 
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remain constant across individuals and time. γt is a an intercept parameter specific to 
time period t and captures any overall year effect. eit is assumed to be an independent 
and identically normally distributed error term over i and t
72
.  
 
Since the parameter αi in (13) is firm specific, it represents the natural heterogeneity in 
the population and therefore controls for the impact of potentially omitted variables 
which are constant over time. If unaccounted for, these unobserved variables can lead to 
biased coefficient estimates. As our measure of family ownership is time invariant, from 
equation (13) it is understood that, in addition to other unobserved fixed effects which 
impact y, αi will also contain the effect of family ownership. While observing this effect 
is central to testing our proposed hypotheses in this thesis, as a result of our time 
invariant measure of family ownership, the FOE is absorbed in αi and cannot be directly 
estimated in (13) (Baltagi 2001).  
 
To overcome this issue, we find the effect of family ownership by estimating αi with an 
attention to whether the i
th 
firm is classified as a family firm or not. By doing so, we are 
further able to find the group average fixed effects for family and non-family firms. 
These averages can then be compared to determine the direction and significance of the 
FOE on the dependent variable.  
 
Specifically, to find the average FOE on any given dependent variable, we divide the 
sample population into the total number of family firms, denoted as ff, and the total 
number of non-family firms, denoted as nf. We further define the set of all family and 
non-family firms as FF and NF respectively. After estimating αi in (13), we can 
subsequently define the FOE as 
 
                                                 
 
72
 Heteroskedasticity of eit, which is likely to occur in panel data, is accounted for by using a 
Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) methodology (Beck and Katz 1995) to estimate the 
standard errors and p-values in (13). To account for potential serial correlation, we also estimate 
(1) to allow for within cluster correlations by clustering the standard errors by firm (Wooldridge 
2002). Finally, we also account for any non-normality issues by bootstrapping the standard 
errors. In this chapter we present the PCSE and note that no differences within 4 significant 
digits were observed between the PCSE, clustered, and bootstrapped standard errors. 
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(14) Family ownership effect = (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        )           . 
 
Where λff and λnf denote the average individual firm fixed effect for family and non-
family firms respectively. By this definition, the presence of a FOE would imply that λff 
≠ λnf. Further, a positive (or negative) FOE would indicate that λff > λnf (or λff < λnf). To 
test the statistical significance of the FOE, we perform an F-test which compares the 
sum of squared errors from the unrestricted model specified in (13) with that of a 
restricted model which assumes no difference between the average family and non-
family fixed effect. In other words, the restricted model imposes the condition that λff – 
λnf = 0. As per the standard F-test
73
, if we find the sum of squared error for the 
unrestricted and restricted models to be substantially different from one another, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of no FOE. 
 
Since all time invariant effects are absorbed into the firm specific intercept, an 
important issue to consider is that the FOE defined in (14) may be confounded by time 
invariant industry effects, as we have demonstrated in the Chapter 3 that family 
ownership is not equally distributed across all industries in our sample. Thus, to 
effectively control for industry, we also separately measure the FOE in each industry, 
denoted by j, by calculating  
      
(15) Family ownership effectj = (
 
   
∑          )  (
 
   
∑         )             . 
 
Where ψffj and ψnfj denote the average firm fixed effect for family and non-family firms 
operating in industry j respectively. As with (14), a positive (or negative) intra-industry 
FOE would indicate that ψffj > ψnfj (or ψffj < ψnfj). As with the overall FOE in (14), we 
use an F-test to find the significance of the j
th
 intra-industry FOE by testing the 
following restriction that ψffj – ψnfj = 0. If the equivalence of the restricted and 
                                                 
 
73
 The F-statistic is specifically found as 
              
             
 . Where SSR is the sum of the squared 
residual for the restricted (r) and unrestricted (ur) models. q denotes the number on restrictions 
(in this case q = 1), n is the number of observations, and k the number of parameters.  
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unrestricted models is rejected, we can ascertain that the FOE in industry j is 
statistically significant.  
 
 Robustness checks 5.2.1
 
5.2.1.1 Random effects model 
 
By further assuming that individual firm effects, αi, in (13), are a function of family 
ownership, FF, and some random disturbance, ui, the following random effects (RE) 
specification would allow us to test the FOE directly,  
 
(  )                                  i = (1...n); t = (1...T). 
 
Where yit, x′it, γt and eit are as described in (13), except that we are now able to include 
industry dummies in x′it. α is a common intercept which represents the fixed population 
average with respect to yit. Based on this, time invariant effects on the dependent 
variable, like family ownership, can be directly estimated in (  ). FF is therefore a time 
invariant, dichotomous dummy variable equating to 1 if the i
th
 firm is a family firm and 
0 otherwise. As such, λ measures the FOE as it captures the average difference in y, 
from the population average, exhibited by family firms
74
. (eit + ui) is the combined 
disturbance term which is composed of both ui, the random unobserved individual 
effects pertaining to firm i, and eit, the regression random error across time, t, and cross 
section, i. 
 
The additional assumption found in (  ) implies that the underlying sample has been 
randomly drawn from the population so that the disturbances ui and eit are uncorrelated. 
If this assumption holds then we prefer the estimates produced by (  ), as these are 
                                                 
 
74
 Provided that λ is statistically significant, the population average for family firms can 
therefore be found by α + λ, which in turn would designate α as the non-family population 
average. If λ is statistically insignificant, i.e. there is no family ownership effect, then both 
family and non-family firms share the population average α. 
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unbiased and efficient. However, if the assumption is violated, as is commonly the case 
with panel data, the estimates derived form (  ) may be biased (Greene 2012).  
 
In this thesis we employ the test posed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) to determine the 
equivalence of the RE and FE estimates. If equivalent, we prefer the more efficient RE 
estimates in (  ). On the other hand, if the test rejects equivalence, then we prefer the 
unbiased FE estimates in (13)
75
.  
 
5.2.1.2 Hybrid model 
 
Based on the seminal work of Mundlak (1978), an alternate approach to estimating the 
family ownership effect, which combines the qualities of both the fixed and random 
effect methods, is what Allison (2009) refers to as the ‘hybrid model’. This method 
produces coefficient estimates that are identical to those estimated in (13), but allows 
for the direct estimation of the FOE, as in (  ).  
 
In essence, using a random effects estimator, the hybrid model includes variables 
measuring both the firm specific means and deviations from those means for all time-
varying variables. As a result, ‘between-firm effects’ are represented by the coefficients 
pertaining to firm specific means across time,  ̅  , while ‘within-firm effects’ are 
represented by the coefficients pertaining to the deviations from these means,       
 ̅   . Specifically, we estimate  
 
(  )                        ̅      ̅            i = (1...n); t = (1...T).  
 
Where x′it, as defined in (13), is a vector of time varying control variables relating to 
firm i in time period t, and  ̅   is a vector of the average value of these variables across 
time. As the β estimates in (  ) capture the relationship between yit and the ‘group 
                                                 
 
75 The Hausman χ2 test statistic along with the relevant probability values are presented in Tables 
28 to 30. It is worth noting here that the test is rejected in all estimations except for those 
associated with external debt and external equity. With that said there are little to no differences 
in the FE and RE estimates presented in Section 3.  
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mean centered’ x′it variables, they are equivalent to those derived from the FE model in 
(13) (see for example Frondel and Vance 2010; Greene 2012 pg. 421). As in (4), to 
directly estimate the FOE, measured by λ, we impose the additional common intercept, 
α, and time invariant error, ui, on (  ), however, we can now observe the variable 
specific fixed effects directly in the model by also including the average individual time 
invariant effects; these are captured by a vector of coefficients denoted as δ. 
 
In the next section we estimate the fixed, random, and hybrid models described here. 
Depending on the Hausman diagnostics reported in Tables 1 to 3, we then report our 
findings pertaining to the FOE as well as the interrelations relating to the composition 
of debt and equity, firm size, and efficiency. 
 
 Addressing endogeneity 5.2.2
 
For each fixed specification related to financing composition, firm size and efficiency, 
we use the standard Hausman (1978) test to identify endogenous explanatory variables 
in (13). These somewhat truncated tests are outlined in Appendix A.5. If we find no 
endogenous explanatory variables, we consider the results presented in the next Section 
to be unbiased and consistent. On the other hand, if we find evidence endogenous 
explanatory variables, we utilise the two-stage least squares technique when estimating 
(13) to deal with the endogeneity problem
76
.  
 
Further modelling of potentially endogenous relationships is performed in Section 5.4, 
where we specify and estimate the reduced-form of a system of equations which allows 
for the contemporaneous interrelation between internal finance proportions, firm size 
and efficiency. 
  
                                                 
 
76
 We address endogeneity in equation (1) by following the instrumental variable procedure for 
panel data developed by Griliches and Hausman (1986). They state that the biases introduced by 
errors in variables may become magnified by conventional within estimators, and they argue 
that one advantage of panel data is that lagged values of independent variables provide obvious 
choices for instruments. 
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5.3 Hypotheses testing 
 
 The composition of debt and equity 5.3.1
 
As a starting point, we conduct panel regression analysis to test hypotheses 1 through 4, 
which relate to the differences between the composition of finance held by family and 
non-family firms. These were developed in Chapter 2 and are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: 
Bank debt, as a proportion of total debt, is greater for family firms relative 
to non-family firms.  
Hypothesis 1b: 
Trade credit, as a proportion of total debt, is lower for family firms relative 
to non-family firms.  
Hypothesis 2a: 
Loans from internal sources, as a proportion of total debt, are greater for 
family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 2b: 
Loans from external sources, as a proportion of total debt, are lower for 
family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Equity from working owners, as a proportion of total equity, is greater for 
family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 4a: 
Equity from internal sources other than working owners, as a proportion of 
total equity, is greater for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 4b: 
Equity from external sources, as a proportion of total equity, is lower for 
family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
In the Chapter 3 we revealed that, on average and relative to their non-family 
counterparts, family firms hold a greater proportion of bank and internal debt as well as 
working owner and internal equity. Also, we revealed that the proportion of trade credit 
and external equity are lower in family firms. However, to test the above hypotheses we 
estimate equation (18) which describes the proportion of finance as a function of firm 
specific fixed effects, including family ownership, and other covariates 
 
(18)                                                               
                         i = 1…3350; t = 1…3; j = 1…7. 
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Where ‘Composition’ is a vector of specific debt and equity proportions by source, j, for 
the i
th
 firm in time period t. As a result, we estimate 7 separate regressions based on 
finance source. αji measures the i
th
 firm’s fixed effect pertaining to composition j, and 
contains the FOE. As per our discussion in Chapter 3, in (18) we control for efficiency 
(measured by productive efficiency) firm size (measured by total assets), age (measured 
by range
77
), capital intensity (measured by the capital to labour ratio, K/L), and capital 
structure (measured by the debt ratio, TD/TA). As the benchmark year is 1996, overall 
time effects for the years 1997 and 1998 are captured in γjt.   
 
To test hypotheses 1 through 4, we estimate (18) for all debt and equity proportions of 
interest and extract the FOE as described in Section 5.2. These results are presented in 
Table 28. Further, we confirm the direction, magnitude, and significance of the FOE by 
also estimating a random effects and hybrid model as described in Section 5.2.1. These 
results along with the FOE by industry are reported in Appendix A.4 in Tables A10 to 
A12. Confirming Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the first and second columns in Table 28 show 
that, relative to their non-family counterparts, family firms hold 8.9 percent more and 
16.8 percent less debt sourced from banks and trade creditors respectively. These values 
are significant and are stable across alternate estimation techniques (see Appendix A.4, 
Table A10 and A11). We also see that these findings are consistent across most 
industries, as Table A11 shows that 71.88 percent of industries exhibit a positive and 
significant FOE with respect to bank credit proportions, while there is a negative and 
significant FOE with respect to the proportion of trade credit in 87.5 percent of all 
industries.    
 
Looking to the other sources of debt finance, column 3 in Table 28 shows that family 
firms hold 7 percent more debt obtained from internal sources, confirming Hypothesis 
2a. This finding is consistent across alternate estimation techniques and found to be 
significant and positive in nearly 71.88 percent of all industries. However, consistent 
with the descriptive results in Chapter 3, column 4 outlines that Hypothesis 2b is not 
supported since there is no significant difference in the average proportion of external 
                                                 
 
77
 Age ranges are as follows: (1) Less than 2 years, (2) 2 to less than 5 years, (3) 5 to less than 
10 years, (4) 10 to less than 20 years, (5) 20 years or more. 
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debt between family and non-family firms. This is reinforced by our industry analysis, 
as our industry specific F-tests confirm that there are no significant FOEs with respect 
to external debt in 56.25 percent of all industries. With that said the estimated 
coefficient associated with the average FOE shown in column 4 is itself negative, which 
implies that family firms hold less debt sourced from external debt. It is important to 
note here that the FE estimates of internal equity are found to be equivalent to those 
estimated with the RE model. As seen in Table A10, the RE estimates are consistent 
with the conclusion that there is no FOE with respect to the proportion of external debt. 
   
Moving on to equity proportions, Hypothesis 3 is supported as column 5 shows that 
family firms hold a significantly greater proportion, 22.3 percent, of equity sourced 
from working owners than do non-family firms. In fact positive and significant FOEs 
are found in 84.38 percent of all industries and are robust to multiple methods of 
estimation. With respect to other sources of equity finance, columns 6 and 7 
respectively show that family firms hold 4 percent more internal equity and 3.6 percent 
less external equity. These differentials are robust, significant and confirm Hypotheses 
4a and 4b respectively. In fact our industry analysis shows that in 68.75 percent of all 
industries there are positive and significant FOEs with respect to internal equity 
proportions, while in 65.63 percent of all industries, there are negative and significant 
FOEs with respect to external equity proportions. As seen in the insignificant χ2 value in 
Table 28, column 7, we find once more that the FE estimates are equivalent to the RE 
estimates with respect to external equity. As a result we prefer the RE estimates in Table 
A10 which also confirm a negative and significant external equity FOE coefficient in 
the order of 3.8 percent. 
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Table 28: Debt and equity composition (fixed effect model) 
 Share of debt finance  Share of equity finance 
 
Bank credit Trade credit Internal debt External debt  Working owner’s equity Internal equity External equity 
Constant 0.368*** 0.353*** 0.175*** 0.026*  0.613*** 0.083*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.035) (0.040) (0.024) (0.014)  (0.039) (0.021) (0.016) 
Productive efficiency -0.069*** 0.001 0.004 0.005  0.025 -0.011 0.010 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.008)  (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) 
Firm size -2.68E-07 2.68E-07 -1.04E-07 3.52E-07  2.05E-07 -1.46E-08 4.72E-09 
 
(3.13E-07) (3.27E-07) (9.30E-08) (2.60E-07)  (7.60E-07) (1.00E-07) (1.05E-07) 
Firm age -0.009 0.033*** -0.017*** -0.002  0.013 -0.005 -0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) 
Capital intensity 1.95E-05** -2.05E-05** 1.37E-06 -1.60E-06  -9.57E-06 4.85E-06 3.84E-06 
 
(7.73E-06) (8.62E-06) (3.28E-06) (5.76E-06)  (1.23E-05) (4.52E-06) (2.94E-06) 
Capital structure 0.005 -0.004 0.004 4.47E-04  1.15E-04 -7.80E-04 8.46E-04 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (5.00E-04)  (2.66E-03) (1.88E-03) (8.90E-04) 
FOE
a
 0.089*** -0.168*** 0.070*** -4.84E-04  0.223*** 0.040*** -0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
N 10350 10350 10350 10350  10350 10350 10350 
R
2
 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.53  0.77 0.65 0.69 
Adjusted R
2
 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.30  0.66 0.48 0.53 
χ2 (FE vs. RE)b 37.17*** 66.37*** 25.64*** 1.33  19.96*** 13.24** 4.17 
Time effects not reported for brevity. Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
a
 FOE is found separately as per (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        )           . One-tail significance is determined by F-testing the restriction         . 
b 
Tests the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in FE and RE coefficients. 
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Based on the arguments outlined in Figure 16, the difference in financing proportions 
found here are also expected to have a bearing on the quantum of finance and ultimately 
firm size. In the next section, we go on to test whether family firms are smaller than 
their non-family counterparts and also investigate the extent to which internally sourced 
finance is related to the quantum of debt and equity finance as well as various measures 
of firm size.  
 
 The quantum of finance and firm size 5.3.2
 
As per the arguments posed in Chapter 2, the finding that family firms obtain a 
relatively greater proportion of both their debt and equity finance from internal sources 
leads us to believe that they will hold a relatively lower quantum of debt and equity and 
therefore also be smaller in size. Specifically, the following hypotheses, numbered 5 
through 7, were developed:  
 
Hypothesis 5: 
The quantum of total debt is lower for family firms relative to non-family 
firms. 
Hypothesis 6: 
The quantum of total equity is lower for family firms relative to non-family 
firms. 
Hypothesis 7: Other things being equal, family firms are smaller than non-family firms. 
 
We test these hypotheses relating to firm size in very much the same way as the 
previous section. Specifically, we specify and estimate equations (19) and (20) which 
respectively describe the quantum of debt and equity as well as various measures of 
firm size as a function of firm specific effects, including family ownership, and other 
covariates. Beginning with equation (19), we specify 
 
(19)                                                              
                                   i = 1…3350; t = 1…3; j = 1,2. 
 
Where ‘Quantum’ is a j x 1 vector of the total dollar value of both debt and equity, 
denoted as j, for the i
th
 firm in time period t. Thus, we estimate two regressions 
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independently. As with the previous specification, αji is the individual intercept term for 
firm i and contains the family ownership effect. In addition to what has already been 
defined in (18), the time varying control variables in (19) are productive efficiency 
(PE), and the shares of internal debt (ID), internal equity (IE), and working owner’s 
equity (WOE) respectively.  To test hypotheses 5 and 6, we estimate αji in (19) and 
measure the FOE as described in Section 5.2.  
 
In addition to the quantum of debt and equity, a more direct estimate of firm size itself 
is predicted in equation (20), specified as  
 
(20)                                                           
                                   i = 1…3350; t = 1…3; j = 1…3. 
 
Where ‘Size’ is a j x 1 vector of various size measures, namely output, as well as labour 
and capital inputs, denoted as j, for the i
th
 firm in time period t. Three separate 
regressions are therefore estimated. Otherwise, all parameters and independent variables 
specified in (20) are identical to those in (19). With that said, the β coefficients 
associated with internal debt and equity proportions are of particular interest in both 
equations as these indicate the broader relationship between the proportion of finance 
obtained from internal sources and firm size.    
 
To test Hypothesis 7, we estimate (20) and extract the FOE as described in Section 5.2.  
These results are presented in Table 29. Further, we confirm the direction, magnitude, 
and significance of the FOE by random effects, hybrid model, and inter-industry 
estimations as described in Section 5.2.1. These are presented in Table A13, Table A14 
and Table A16 in Appendix A.4.  
 
The first two columns in Table 29 confirm hypotheses 5 and 6 as family firms are 
shown to hold a significantly lower quantum of both debt and equity on their balance 
sheets. When analysing this FOE in each industry, Table A16 shows that family firms 
are found to hold a significantly lower quantum of debt and equity in half of all 
industries. In almost all remaining industries there is no significant difference between 
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family and non-family firms. It is also worth noting that the direction and significance 
of these results hold across the RE estimations of the FOE (see Table A13 in Appendix 
A.4). 
 
Moving on to Hypothesis 7, no matter the measure of firm size, family firms are found 
to be significantly smaller than their non-family counterparts. Columns 3, 4 and 5 in 
Table 29 respectively show that family ownership is associated with a significantly 
lower value of output, number of employees, and level of capital. On average, family 
firms relatively produce $2 million less in output, employ 11 fewer workers, and own 
$4 million less capital. These magnitudes are stable across alternate estimation 
techniques and support Hypothesis 7.  
 
Looking to specific industries, we also find that in the vast majority of industries, family 
firms are significantly smaller across all measures of firm size. It is also important to 
note here that a standard Hausman (1978) test indicates that PE is endogenous in (20). 
As a result we also estimate (20) utilising a two-stage least squares estimator and 
present the results in Table A15 of Appendix A.4. Here it can be seen that this has not 
significantly changed our findings, as Table A15 also reports a negative and significant 
FOE with respect to output, labour and capital.  
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Table 29: Quantum of finance and firm size (fixed effect model) 
 Quantum of finance  Firm size 
 
Total Liabilities (000) Total Equity (000)  Value added (000) Labour (FTE) Capital (000) 
Constant 3215.23*** 1791.02***  842.05*** 23.90*** 5002.86*** 
 
(427.40) (341.01)  (293.62) (1.34) (595.46) 
Productive efficiency -1539.67** -395.22  3795.70*** -1.26 -2200.35** 
 
(770.43) (343.79)  (491.51) (0.96) (1058.23) 
Internal debt -123.74 -9.12  -94.86* -0.59* -137.69 
 
(80.71) (60.21)  (58.45) (0.35) (110.26) 
Internal equity 70.51 20.82  -195.42 -0.41 43.23 
 
(255.09) (97.51)  (141.74) (0.74) (313.72) 
Working owner’s equity 149.85 17.14  -285.40* -0.39 117.03 
 
(362.54) (90.71)  (153.46) (0.46) (469.11) 
Firm age -11.76 68.10  210.56*** 1.06*** 47.13 
 
(96.92) (80.34)  (64.58) (0.33) (128.61) 
Capital intensity 2.72 0.93  1.20 -0.01*** 4.71 
 
(2.34) (0.59)  (0.87) (0.00) (3.13) 
Capital structure 58.23 -125.94**  -79.16*** 0.10 -87.62 
 
(89.52) (57.97)  (13.69) (0.15) (77.59) 
FOE
a
 -3055.68*** -1789.72***  -2103.74*** -11.49*** -4344.05*** 
 (110.64) (74.43)  (45.21) (0.19) (133.70) 
N 10350 10350  10350 10350 10350 
R
2
 0.94 0.97  0.94 0.95 0.97 
Adjusted R
2
 0.91 0.96  0.92 0.93 0.95 
χ2 (FE vs. RE)b 5162.89*** 632.44***  1391.64*** 455.15*** 1788.51*** 
Time effects not reported for brevity. Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
a
 FOE is found separately as per (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        )           . One-tail significance is determined by F-testing the restriction         . 
b 
Tests the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in FE and RE coefficients. 
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Although we do not directly hypothesize the relationship in this thesis
78
, at this point we 
are able to observe the effect that internal finance has on firm size. Beginning with the 
fixed effects estimates in Table 29 and the two-stage least squares estimates in Table 
A15, whenever significant, the coefficients associated with internal finance demonstrate 
that the share of internal finance has a negative effect on firm size. Specifically, the 
proportions of internal debt and working owner’s equity are significantly associated 
with lower output, and with respect to internal debt only, lower levels of labour as well. 
Looking to our random effects estimates in Table A13, the link between internal finance 
and firm size is much stronger, as most of the coefficients associated with internally 
sourced debt and equity are negative and significant with respect to total liabilities, 
output, labour, and capital. 
  
With that said, the time varying effects of internal finance on firm size are not as strong 
as the ‘internal finance theory of growth’ would suggest. In this sense, the results 
related to the Hybrid model presented in Table A14 are particularly interesting. Here we 
can see that the time-invariant internal finance levels averaged across time are highly 
significant and negative across the quantum of debt and equity finance and nearly all 
measures of firm size. Furthermore, once these fixed effects are included in the model, 
the fixed FOEs are noticeably weakened. For example, the FOEs with respect to total 
equity and capital are no longer significant, while the magnitudes of the FOEs with 
respect to total debt, output, and labour are considerably lower relative to our previous 
findings. This suggests that our internal finance variables, although varying over time, 
are potentially slow-changing or ‘sluggish’79. That is, we have shown that the main 
effects of internal finance on firm size are found ‘between’ firms rather than ‘within’ 
firms. 
                                                 
 
78
 In Chapter 2 we explained how the long-standing theory that the growth of small firms is 
constrained by the quantity of internal finance, otherwise known as the ‘internal finance theory 
of growth’, has already empirically been shown to hold (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). 
 
79
 Sluggish refers to variables in panel data that do not vary much over time and thus exhibit 
little within-cluster variance. Since the FE model produces solely within-cluster effects, a noted 
disadvantage is that one cannot retrieve ‘good’ estimates of sluggish, or slowly-changing, 
variables (Beck and Katz 2001; Plümper and Troeger 2007). The slow moving nature of 
financing proportions are demonstrated in Table 5 of Chapter 3. 
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These results also suggest that the FOEs on firm size are (in part) due to the fact that 
family firms hold larger proportions of internal finance. Although still present, once the 
fixed effects of internal finance proportions are considered, the remaining FOEs on firm 
size are diminished. Such findings justify our overall conceptual framework with 
respect to the relationship between family ownership, financing composition, and firm 
size. However, in the next section we empirically test whether the size of a family firm 
is constrained and how such a constraint might impact efficiency.    
 
 Efficiency 5.3.3
 
Following the arguments presented in this thesis, the propensity for family SMEs to be 
smaller in size, which has been established in Table 29, is expected to have an effect on 
their scale and technical efficiency. In Chapter 2 we specifically developed the 
following hypotheses: 
  
Hypothesis 8: 
Family firms will exhibit lower scale efficiency relative to their non-family 
counterparts. 
Hypothesis 9: 
Family firms will exhibit lower capital to labour ratios relative to their non-
family counterparts.     
Hypothesis 10: 
Controlling for production scale, family firms will exhibit greater technical 
efficiency relative to their non-family counterparts.     
 
We test the above hypotheses by using a similar structure as our previous tests. Starting 
with hypothesis 8, equation (21) identifies scale efficiency as a function of family 
ownership, 
 
(21)                                                             
                                                                
         i = 1…3350; t = 1…3. 
 
Where ‘SE’ is our scale efficiency score, defined in Chapter 4, for the ith firm in time 
period t. In equation (21) additional dummy intercept and slope parameters are specified 
to account for the distinction between those sub-optimally scaled firms which exhibit 
increasing and decreasing returns to scale, denoted as IRS and DRS respectively. 
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The IRSit and DRSit variables in (21) are dummy variables which equate to 1 if the i
th
 
firm exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to scale in time period t respectively, and 
0 otherwise. As they may vary across time, we are able to include these ‘return to scale’ 
dummies in the fixed effect estimation. By this approach, we are also able to isolate the 
magnitude, direction, and significance of any FOE among IRS and DRS firms 
separately by interacting each return to scale category with the family firm variable, FFi, 
which equates to 1 if the i
th
 firm is a family firm and 0 otherwise. In addition to any 
unobserved firm fixed effects, αi in (21) captures the average SE for the i
th
 firm, family 
or otherwise, which exhibits CRS in any time period t
80
. As with our previous 
specifications the β coefficients are time varying control variables which are expected to 
co-vary with SE, such as firm size, the proportion of internal finance, firm age, capital 
intensity and capital structure.  
 
In this specification, δ1 and δ2 capture the average scale efficiency difference, from αi, 
for IRS and DRS non-family firms respectively. Given the construction of the scale 
efficiency score, these coefficients are expected to be negative
81. Further, λ1 and λ2 
capture the average scale efficiency difference, from δ1 and δ2 respectively, associated 
with family ownership and thus measure the FOEs in each category. Based on 
hypothesis 8, we expect λ1 to be negative and significant. That is, of all firms which are 
sub-optimally small, family firms are expected to be even more sub-optimally small. 
Furthermore, if family firm size is indeed constrained, we expect λ2 to be positive and 
significant. That is, of all sub-optimally large firms, family firms are expected to be less 
sub-optimally large.  
 
Moving on to Hypothesis 9, to investigate the potential family firm differences in the 
capital intensity of production, equation (  ) expresses capital intensity as 
  
                                                 
 
80
 As all firms in the CRS category have a SE score of 1, i.e. they are perfectly scale efficient, 
there are no SE differences between family and non-family firms in this category. 
 
81
 Any sub-optimally scaled firm, either too large or too small, will have a SE score less than 1; 
thus the difference from the optimal scale, i.e. a SE score of 1, will by definition always be 
negative.   
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(  )                                                                     
                           i = 1…3350; t = 1…3. 
 
Where ‘K/L’ is the capital to labour ratio for the ith firm in time period t. Consistent 
with our hypotheses testing thus far, αi contains the FOE. Time varying control 
variables pertaining to firm i in time period t which co-vary with the capital intensity of 
production have been specified as productive efficiency, firm size, the proportion of 
internal finance, firm age and capital structure.  
 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 10, we investigate whether TE scores are systematically 
different across firm ownership. To do so, we further estimate  
 
(  )                                                       
                                     i = 1…3350; t = 1…3. 
 
Where ‘TE’ is the technical efficiency score, as defined in Chapter 4, for the ith firm in 
time period t. All other parameters in (  ) are as explained previously. To test 
hypotheses 9 and 10, we estimate (  ) and (  ) respectively and extract the FOEs as 
described in Section 5.2. These results are presented in Table 30. Consistent with our 
analysis thus far, we also estimate the FOE via a random effect and hybrid model, and 
by industry. These results are presented in Table A17, Table A18 and Table A19 in 
Appendix A.4. 
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Table 30: Scale & technical efficiency and capital intensity (fixed effect model) 
 Scale & Technical efficiency  Capital intensity 
 
SE TE PE 
 
K/L 
Constant 0.928*** 0.461*** 0.343*** 
 
-43.812 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
 
(66.709) 
Increasing returns -0.155*** - - 
 
- 
 
(0.011) - - 
 
- 
Decreasing returns -0.188*** - - 
 
- 
 
(0.011) - - 
 
- 
FOEIRS -0.031** - - 
 
- 
 
(0.016) - - 
 
- 
FOEDRS 0.015 - - 
 
- 
 
(0.016) - - 
 
- 
Productive efficiency - - - 
 
184.768*** 
 
- - - 
 
(60.208) 
Firm size -2.8E-07 -1.22E-06*** -1.23E-06*** 
 
0.012* 
 
(2.95E-07) (3.78E-07) (5.17E-07) 
 
(0.007) 
Internal debt 0.003 0.008 0.003 
 
4.801 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
(10.987) 
Internal equity 0.015 -0.019 -0.007 
 
16.215 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) 
 
(22.578) 
Working owner’s equity 0.003 0.003 0.006 
 
-10.631 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
(19.744) 
Firm age 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 
19.771* 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(12.014) 
Capital intensity 1.20E-06 3.68E-05*** 3.91E-05*** 
 
- 
 
(6.12E-06) (8.23E-06) (8.66E-06) 
 
- 
Capital structure 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 
 
-4.426** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (1.751) 
FOE
a
 - -0.026*** -0.043***  -24.632*** 
 - (0.004) (0.003)  (8.336) 
N 10350 10350 10350 
 
10350 
R
2
 0.77 0.74 0.73 
 
0.83 
Adjusted R
2
 0.65 0.62 0.60 
 
0.74 
χ
2
 (FE vs. RE)
b
 179.84*** 19.09*** 20.75*** 25.56*** 
 
Time effects not reported for brevity. Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
 
a
 FOE is found separately as per (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        )           . One-tail significance is 
determined by F-testing the restriction         . 
 
b 
Tests the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in FE and RE coefficients. 
 
Beginning with hypothesis 8, the negative and significant coefficient associated with the 
SE differential of family firms which exhibit increasing returns to scale in column 1, 
row 4, of Table 30 demonstrates that family firms are on average 3.1 percent sub-
optimally smaller than their non-family counterparts. Although the coefficient is 
positive, Table 30 also shows that there is no significant FOE among firms exhibiting 
decreasing returns to scale. These results are consistent across alternate methods of 
estimation and industries (see Table A17, Table A18 and Table A19 in Appendix A.4) 
and to a large extent confirm Hypothesis 8. That is, of all sub-optimally small firms, 
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family firms are found to exhibit greater inefficiencies related to a suboptimal scale of 
production relative to their non-family counterparts. 
   
Column 4 in Table 30 also shows that family firms exhibit significantly lower capital to 
labour ratios (K/L) than non-family firms. The magnitude of the average FOEs are 
consistent across all estimation techniques (see Table A17 and Table A18) and support 
hypothesis 9. However, it is apparent when viewing Table A19 that family firms are 
significantly less capital intensive in certain industries only. Namely, in the Mining; 
Food, beverage and tobacco manufacturing; General construction; Personal and 
household good retailing; and Motion Picture, radio and television services industries. 
With that said, in all other industries there is no significant difference in family and 
non-family capital to labour ratios.  
 
Based on our discussion in Chapter 2, it is no surprise that firm size, measured as the 
level of capital, is positively related to capital intensity no matter the estimation 
procedure. Further, when looking to the relationships depicted by the random and 
hybrid estimates in Table A17 and Table A18 respectively, we can see that, as expected, 
an increase in the proportion of internal finance in the form of working owner’s equity 
significantly lowers the capital to labour ratio. 
 
Moving on to our final hypothesis, Table 30 shows that the average technical 
efficiencies exhibited by family firms are significantly lower than their non-family 
counterparts. The magnitude of this negative TE FOE is 2.6 percent and is significant in 
both the FE and RE estimates presented in Table 30 and Table A17 respectively. 
However, the hybrid estimates in Table A18, show that the fixed effects of firm size, 
age, and the level of internal debt are better determinants of TE than family ownership. 
The industry analysis in Table A19 also shows that in 6 out of 32 industries, family 
firms are significantly more technically efficient in terms of resource use, whereas in 13 
industries the FOEs are significantly negative, and in the remaining 13 industries there 
is no significant effect at all. These results do not support hypothesis 10 and 
demonstrate that family firms have a tendency to exhibit lower or equivalent pure 
technical efficiency scores relative to their non-family peers. 
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We also report in this section the FOE with respect to PE, which, as described in 
Chapter 4, encompasses both SE and TE. In column 3 of Table 30 we can see that the 
FOE is significantly negative by the order of 4.3 percent. This finding is consistent 
across our other methods of estimation (see Table A17 and Table A18) and is also 
evident across industries as well (see Table A19). When we decompose this PE 
differential, the magnitude of the coefficients presented in Table 30, Table A17, Table 
A18, and Table A19 imply that although family firms are less efficient with respect to 
both scale and resource use, the main driver of inefficiency for family firms is due to 
their deviation from an optimal scale. 
 
5.4 Simultaneous reduced-form estimations 
 
The results associated with equations (6) through to (11) confirm that, with the 
exception of Hypothesis 2b and 10, all of our hypotheses are supported. With that said, 
up to this point we have estimated the family ownership effect related to each of our 
individual hypotheses in isolation. However, the argument posed in this thesis proposes 
that our dependent variables are also interdependent.  For example, in our tests thus far, 
we have expressed internal finance as a function of size and efficiency, size as a 
function of internal finance and efficiency, and efficiency as a function of internal 
finance and size. These specifications are inherently endogenous.  
 
Further, as an additional robustness measure, we also consider the potential time lag 
between these relationships. For example, it is feasible that previous values of 
financing, firm size and efficiency will have a significant effect on their current values. 
Specifically, the proportion of this year’s internally sourced finance may depend on last 
year’s proportions, and as we have shown in Section 5.3.2, the composition of financing 
is potentially slow moving across time. Similar arguments can be made about firm size 
and efficiency across time for various reasons.  
 
If values of financing composition, firm size, and efficiency are in fact jointly 
determined, or if their previous values have a significant effect on their current values, 
then our hypotheses tests may suffer from endogeneity or misspecification issues. To 
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address this in our analysis, our overall framework is condensed into a system of 
equations, which specify the following structural simultaneous relationships 
  
(  )                                                        
                                    ,  
 
(  )                                                       
                                      , and 
 
(  )                                            
                                                   
 
Where ‘IF’, ‘Size’ and ‘PE’ respectively denote the ith firm’s proportion of internally 
sourced debt and equity finance
82
, firm size
83
, and productive efficiency
84
 in time period 
t. As in our previous fixed effect specifications, the time-invariant FOEs with respect to 
internal finance, firm size, and efficiency are contained in α1i, β1i and γ1i respectively. 
Consistent across all specifications, we control for the contemporaneous effects of firm 
age, capital intensity and capital structure. 
  
As seen in the above system, the proportion of internal finance, firm size, and efficiency 
are presumed to be jointly determined. We have also imposed a lag structure to account 
for the possibility that the relationships proposed in Chapter 2 are occurring across 
multiple periods of time. Solving the equations by substitution, the reduced-form system 
of equations can be specified as 
                                                 
 
82 
As our main focus in this thesis is the propensity of family firms to prefer debt and equity 
obtained from internal sources, the ‘IF’ variable is measured by the sum of internal debt and 
equity as a proportion of total liabilities and equity respectively. 
 
83
 Although we have multiple measures of firm size, it is necessary at this point in the analysis 
to specify one measure of firm size; thus the ‘Size’ variable is measured by the value of capital. 
It is important to note that our findings are consistent when repeating the analysis using total 
output and labour as alternate proxy measures of firm size.  
 
84
 Overall PE has been selected to capture performance in the model, as it embodies both SE and 
TE. 
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(  )                                                
                            , 
 
(  )                                                 
                            , and 
 
(  )                                               
                            .  
 
Where the reduced form parameters δi, εi, and ζi all incorporate αi, βi and γi as well as 
the error terms eit, uit, and vit (see Appendix A.6). As a result, the above system accounts 
for the full effect of the contemporaneous relationships between internal finance, size, 
and efficiency. The FOEs contained in δ1i, ε1i, and ζ1i of (15.1), (16.1) and (17.1) 
respectively are extracted as per the method described in Section 5.2. These results are 
presented in Table 31. 
 
Table 31 shows that after controlling for any endogenous relationships, the FOEs are 
significant and consistent with the results presented in the previous section. For 
example, Column 1 shows that family firms on average hold 44.1 percent (out of a 
possible 200 percent) more internal debt and equity finance. At the same time, column 2 
shows that family firms are significantly smaller than non-family firms, and column 3 
confirms that family firms are 5.5 percent less technically efficient. When we 
decompose this inefficiency into SE and TE, we see that family firm inefficiency is  
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Table 31: Family ownership effect on internal finance, firm size and efficiency (full model with lagged variables) 
 Main model  Efficiency decomposed
a
 
 Internal finance Firm size PE  SEIRS SEDRS TE 
Constant 1.310*** 6043.047*** 0.419*** 
 
0.740*** 0.899*** 0.474*** 
 
(0.073) (1303.874) (0.036) 
 
(0.053) (0.085) (0.041) 
Internal finance t-1 -0.354*** -368.640 0.003 
 
-0.027** 0.005 0.012 
 
(0.015) (271.468) (0.007) 
 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.008) 
Firm Size t-1 -1.13E-06 -0.281*** -4.78E-07 
 
-2.73E-06 -9.64E-07 -1.04E-07 
 
(7.76E-07) (0.014) (3.77E-07) 
 
(1.94E-06) (9.57E-07) (4.31E-07) 
Technical efficiency t-1 -0.030 736.858 -0.370*** 
 
-0.277*** -0.192*** -0.302*** 
 
(0.036) (632.848) (0.017) 
 
(0.029) (0.040) (0.020) 
Firm age -0.037** 94.059 0.012 
 
0.036*** -0.016 0.018* 
 
(0.018) (325.259) (0.009) 
 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.010) 
Capital intensity -6.58E-06 2.358*** 4.57E-05*** 
 
1.32E-05 1.22E-04*** 3.39E-05*** 
 
(1.44E-05) (0.257) (7.01E-06) 
 
(1.11E-05) (4.59E-05) (8.02E-06) 
Capital structure -0.002 -115.751 0.010*** 
 
-0.011** 0.030 0.012*** 
 
(0.005) (80.231) (0.002) 
 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.003) 
FOE
b
 0.441*** -6348.92*** -0.055***  -0.048*** -0.002 -0.035*** 
 (0.010) (177.69) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) 
N 6900 6900 6900 
 
2540 1690 6900 
R
2
 0.87 0.99 0.82 
 
0.90 0.83 0.83 
Adjusted R
2
 0.74 0.97 0.65 
 
0.73 0.43 0.65 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
a 
IRS and DRS subscripts denote increasing and decreasing return to scale subgroups respectively.  
b
 FOE is found separately as per (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        )           . One-tail significance is determined by F-testing the restriction         . 
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primarily related to a suboptimal scale, as column 4 demonstrates that SE is 
significantly lower by 4.8 percent for those family firms in the increasing returns to 
scale category (SEIRS). It is also interesting to note that although the lagged value of 
internal finance is not significant in the determination of firm size, it does have a 
significant negative effect on SEIRS.Similar to the results in Table 30, no significant 
efficiency differentials are found with respect to SE in the decreasing returns to scale 
category (SEDRS).  
 
These findings are also supported when evaluating the FOEs by industry (see Table A20 
in Appendix A.4). For example, the FOEs with respect to internal finance are found to 
be positive and significant in 90.63 percent of all industries. The FOE with respect to 
firm size is found to be negative and significant in 68.75 percent of all industries. In 
46.88 percent of all industries the FOE with respect to PE is negative and significant. 
When this is decomposed, we find that in 90.32 percent of all industries the FOEs with 
respect to SEIRS are negative and significant, while in 84.62 percent of industries the 
SEDRS differentials are insignificant. Finally, consistent with our previous findings, 
while in the majority of industries the FOEs with respect to TE are negative and 
significant, there is also a large proportion of industries in which positive and 
significant or insignificant FOEs are found.    
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter we define the econometric specifications designed to test our hypotheses 
related to the effect that family ownership has on internal financing, firm size and 
efficiency, as well as the interrelationships between these variables. Using these 
specifications we find that we support most of our hypotheses. These results are robust 
across alternate methods of estimation and hold after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as identified covariates. It is also worth mentioning that our 
results are not being driven by any industry effects, as we have supported our findings 
by estimating the FOEs in each industry. We have also produced similar findings after 
addressing the endogeneity issue by estimating the reduced-form parameters 
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representing the simultaneous effects of internal financing, firm size and efficiency. A 
summary of our findings can be seen in Table 32. 
 
Based on these empirical comparisons, we find that family ownership is related to 
significantly higher proportions of debt financing from banks and lower proportions of 
debt financing from trade creditors, which supports Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Confirming 
Hypotheses 2a, 4a and 3 respectively, we further find that family firms carry 
significantly higher proportions of internal debt and equity finance, including equity 
from working owners. We also observe that family firms hold significantly lower 
proportions of equity obtained from external sources, which supports Hypothesis 4b; 
although inconsistent with Hypothesis 2b, we find no significant FOE with respect to 
externally sourced debt.  
 
We also report strong evidence that higher proportions of internal finance in general are 
negatively related to firm size, as the proportion of internal debt and working owner’s 
equity are all negatively related to various measures of firm size. Another interesting 
finding which resulted from our hybrid estimates is that the across time average values 
of internal debt and equity, as well as working owner’s equity, are all significantly 
related to a lower value of debt and equity and a smaller firm. These results support the 
notion that family firm size may be constrained by their tendencies to hold internally 
sourced finance. In fact, confirming Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7, we have observed that 
family firms hold significantly lower quantities of debt and equity on their balance 
sheets and are significantly smaller than non-family firms in terms of output levels, 
number of employees, and total value of capital.  
 
We find that family firms on average are significantly less capital intensive than non-
family firms, which supports Hypothesis 9. While this is occurring in certain industries 
only, it is worth noting that we only observe two industries in which family firms are 
producing with a significantly higher capital to labour ratio relative to their non-family 
peers. This finding further supports the notion that the level of capital in family firms is 
constrained, as family firms may be forced to substitute scarce capital with labour. 
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Table 32: Summary of results for hypotheses tests 
Composition of finance Test result 
Hypothesis 1a: Bank debt, as a proportion of total debt, is greater for family firms relative to non-family firms.  Supported 
Hypothesis 1b: Trade credit, as a proportion of total debt, is lower for family firms relative to non-family firms.  Supported 
Hypothesis 2a: 
Loans from internal sources, as a proportion of total debt, are greater for family firms relative to non-
family firms. Supported 
Hypothesis 2b: 
Loans from external sources, as a proportion of total debt, are lower for family firms relative to non-
family firms. Unsupported 
Hypothesis 3: 
Equity from working owners, as a proportion of total equity, is greater for family firms relative to non-
family firms. Supported 
Hypothesis 4a: 
Equity from internal sources other than working owners, as a proportion of total equity, is greater for 
family firms relative to non-family firms. Supported 
Hypothesis 4b: 
Equity from external sources, as a proportion of total equity, is lower for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
Supported 
Firm Size Test result 
Hypothesis 5: The quantum of total debt is lower for family firms relative to non-family firms. Supported 
Hypothesis 6: The quantum of total equity is lower for family firms relative to non-family firms. Supported 
Hypothesis 7: All things being equal, family firms are smaller than non-family firms. Supported 
Firm Efficiency Test result 
Hypothesis 8: Family firms will exhibit lower scale efficiency relative to their non-family counterparts. Supported 
Hypothesis 9: Family firms will exhibit lower capital to labour ratios relative to their non-family counterparts.     Supported 
Hypothesis 10: 
Controlling for production scale, family firms will exhibit greater technical efficiency relative to their 
non-family counterparts.  
Unsupported 
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As we find a positive and significant relationship between capital intensity and TE, 
family firm performance is found to be affected by a smaller, more labour intensive 
firm.  
 
For example, when comparing efficiency across family and non-family firms, we find 
that the average PE score of family owned firms is significantly lower. After 
decomposing this score into TE and SE, we discover that the main source of family firm 
inefficiency is related to a suboptimal scale of production, confirming Hypothesis 8. 
Despite our expectation that family firms compensate any potential size constraint by 
arranging their production inputs in a more efficient manner, we do not find any 
evidence that family firms exhibit higher TE scores. In fact, on average family firms are 
less efficient in terms of their resources use. Although weaker, this finding holds across 
all methods of estimation. Relatively speaking, we can conclude from the tests 
performed here that family firms can be more, less or equivalently efficient in terms of 
resource use, which is contrary to Hypothesis 10.  
 
A tendency for family firms to exhibit lower scale and technical efficiency score gives 
rise to questions regarding the long-run survivability of family SMEs in competitive 
environments. These and other implications of the results shown in this chapter are 
important to our understanding of how family ownership may impact firm performance 
and further discussed in the next chapter.          
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
 
Given that family owned firms are economically significant and known to pursue non-
economic objectives, this thesis is motivated to understand and quantify the effect of 
family ownership on firm performance. In particular, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) 
examine how family firms differ from non-family firms along five broad categories of 
SEW inspired behaviour, which in turn influence firm performance. Noticeably missing 
among the behaviours listed, are inferences into how the pursuit of various SEW 
objectives might in turn influence the various financing decisions of family owners. 
 
In this thesis we have examined the links between the performance of family firms, their 
size, and their owners’ financing preferences. Utilising a large panel of Australian 
SMEs and applying PE as a performance measure, we further quantified and tested the 
significance of these family ownership effects. Specifically, we have addressed the 
following research questions: 
 
1) What is the effect of family ownership on firm performance?  
2) How does family ownership affect productive efficiency?  
3) Why is productive efficiency affected by family ownership?  
 
In Table 33 we summarise these findings regarding the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 2. Specifically, Table 33 shows the magnitude, direction and significance of the 
FOEs measured in this thesis across three main themes: 1) the composition of finance, 
2) firm size, and 3) firm efficiency
85
. 
 
                                                 
 
85
 As there were no discrepancies between the results derived from both preliminary descriptive 
statistics, conducted in Chapters 3 and 4, and the more robust panel data regression analysis 
conducted in Chapter 5, Table 33 does not report our descriptive findings. 
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Table 33: Summary of panel regression results by theme and estimation technique 
Composition of finance Expectation Test result FOE
a
 FOE
b
 FOE
c
 FOE
d
 Inter-industry
e
 
Hypothesis 1a: Bank debt Higher Supported 8.9% 8.2% 7.7% 7.2% Pos 
Hypothesis 1b: Trade credit Lower Supported -16.8% -16.3% -15.5% -15.5% Neg 
Hypothesis 2a: Internal debt Higher Supported 7.0% 7.2% 6.8% 7.0% Pos 
Hypothesis 2b: External debt Lower Unsupported - - - 0 Insig 
Hypothesis 3: Working owner’s equity  Higher Supported 22.3% 21.4% 21.3% 23.2% Pos 
Hypothesis 4a: Internal equity Higher Supported 4.0% 3.5% 3.3% 5.4% Pos 
Hypothesis 4b: External equity Lower Supported -3.6% -3.8% -3.8% -3.9% Neg 
Firm Size
f
        
Hypothesis 5: The quantum of total debt  Lower Supported -$3055.68 -$2173.15 -$651.34 -$3362.89 Neg 
Hypothesis 6: The quantum of total equity  Lower Supported -$1789.72 -$2085.52 - -$1130.92 Neg 
Hypothesis 7: Production scale:         
    Value added Lower Supported -$2103.74 -$1653.59 -$684.27 -$2323.08 Neg 
    Capital Lower Supported -$4344.05 -$3244.24 - -$4692.23 Neg 
    Labour Lower Supported -11.49 -9.27 -4.73 -7.34 Neg 
Firm Efficiency        
Hypothesis 8: Scale efficiency         
    Increasing returns to scale Lower Supported -3.1% -5.8% -5.2% -4.7% Neg 
    Decreasing returns to scale Higher Unsupported - - - 0.9% Pos 
Hypothesis 9: Capital intensity  Lower Supported -24.63 -32.07 -25.92 -65.72 Insig 
Hypothesis 10: Technical efficiency  Higher Unsupported -2.6% -1.3% -1.0% -0.1% Neg 
Insignificant FOEs not reported. 
a Fixed effects estimates:                     , FOE =  (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        ) 
b Random effects estimates:                                , FOE = λ 
c Hybrid model estimates:                        ̅      ̅           , FOE = λ 
d Inter-industry fixed effects estimates (on average):                     , FOEj = (
 
   
∑          )  (
 
   
∑         ), where j =industry. 
e The direction and significance most frequently observed in FOEs across all industries, i.e. Positive and significant (Pos), Negative and significant (Neg), and Insignificant (Insig).  
f Total debt, equity, value added and capital measured in 000’s. Labour is measured in FTE.
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In the following sections, we discuss these results and their meaning in greater depth 
beginning with our overarching research question. 
 
6.2 What is the effect of family ownership on firm performance?  
 
Our results show that family firms are on average less productively efficient than their 
non-family counterparts. In particular, the FOE approximately ranges from - 2 to - 4 
percent depending on the estimation method
86
. This finding corresponds with what 
Stewart and Hitt (2012) noticed in their brief review of 59 empirical studies regarding 
the effect of family involvement on performance. By distinguishing between studies 
with samples of public firms from those with private firms, the authors find that, 
although the effects varied, “overall, the performance of privately held family firms 
does not compare favorably with privately held nonfamily firms” pg. 62.  
 
Although we similarly report a significant negative average FOE in our sample of 
privately held SMEs, when we probe deeper into the inter-industry efficiency FOEs, we 
also find mixed results. That is, we observe some instances where the FOE on PE is 
positive and significant. These seemingly random positive effects are found across all 
sectors of the economy. As these results reinforce the diverse findings found in the 
family business literature to date, beyond an overall negative effect, they do not 
necessarily add to our understanding of how family ownership impacts PE (Carney et al. 
2010; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011; Sacristán-Navarro et al. 2011; Stewart and Hitt 2012).    
 
However, as we have shown, PE is a particularly useful measure of performance since it 
can be disaggregated into two components, scale and technical efficiency. These are 
respectively related to the firm’s scale and means of production, which we argued might 
be impacted by family ownership in different ways.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
86
 These were presented in Chapter 5 (Table 30) and Appendix A.4 (Tables A17, A18, A19). 
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6.3 How does family ownership affect productive efficiency?   
 
Investigating the FOEs on scale and technical efficiency independently provided a 
richer understanding of the overall negative FOEs found with respect to PE. Our 
analysis yielded three interesting and related findings: 1) There are negative FOEs on 
both scale and technical efficiency, 2) FOEs on technical efficiency are not as 
consistently negative as those on scale efficiency, and 3) the largest component of 
family firm inefficiency is due to a suboptimal scale of production. At this point, we 
discuss these and other results derived from this thesis in light of our hypotheses. For 
convenience, these are discussed in reverse.   
 
 Hypothesis 10: family firms will exhibit greater technical efficiency relative 6.3.1
to their non-family counterparts. 
 
Starting with technical efficiency, we do not find much support for Hypothesis 10, as 
depending on the method of estimation, the average FOEs range from - 0.1 to - 2.6 
percent and are statistically significant. With that said, the inter-industry results show 
that family firms on occasion can be more technically efficient than non-family firms. 
For example, although family firms exhibit significantly lower TE scores in 50 percent 
of all industries, we also find that they exhibit equivalent or significantly higher PE 
scores in 31 and 19 percent of the cases respectively87.  
 
This translates to 7 industries where on average family firms are found to be more 
technically efficient than non-family firms
88
. Though these industries represent the 
minority of all cases, the FOEs are still based on a relatively large sample of 1,989 
                                                 
 
87
 The significant positive FOEs are even more pronounced in our reduced-form estimates 
where we find that family firms exhibit significantly lower TE scores in 50 percent of all 
industries, and equivalent or significantly higher TE scores in 28 and 22 percent of the cases 
respectively. 
 
88
 These are (ANZSIC code in brackets) the General construction (341), Personal and household 
good wholesaling (447), Large wholesale trade (500), Large property and business services 
(900), Business services (978), Motion picture, radio and television services (1091), and Sport 
and recreation (1093) industries.   
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observations in total, which represents 663 firms across three years. Interestingly, in 4 
of these 7 industries (341, 447, 900, and 978) the FOE on TE is significantly positive 
while the FOE on SE is significantly negative.  
 
Although this may give some credence to notions put forward by Górriz and Fumás 
(1996; 2005) about how family firms might overcome the disadvantage of size-growth 
constraints by being more technically efficient, in the vast majority of industries, we do 
not find this to be the case. We do however find that family firms tend to cluster in 
those industries where the negative effects of family ownership on technical efficiency 
are minimised, which may be indicative of a more long-run scenario where family firms 
gravitate to, or simply tend to survive in, those industries where the technical efficiency 
FOEs are smallest.  
 
Systematically lower FOE on TE may be caused by many family ownership factors 
beyond the scope of this thesis
89
. Notwithstanding that we have laid the groundwork for 
future research to investigate these issues in greater depth, one possible explanation put 
forward by this thesis is that the means by which family firms produce may be overly 
labour intensive due to potential capital constraints. 
 
 Hypothesis 9: Family firms will exhibit lower capital to labour ratios 6.3.2
relative to their non-family counterparts.     
 
If capital constraints were binding, and labour was used as a substitute, then family 
firms may utilise a suboptimal input mix. We argued how this in turn could impact TE 
in the sense that a heavier reliance on labour might in turn translate to a technically 
inefficient level of capital in production. On average, we find strong support for 
Hypothesis 9 since, no matter the estimation method, family firms are found to 
consistently be less capital intensive than their non-family peers. Our findings further 
                                                 
 
89
 In our analysis, we have controlled for age, industry, internal finance, size, efficiency, capital 
intensity, and capital structure; however, TE may also be affected by other unobserved factors, 
such as the ability of management, and the quality of inputs (i.e. the ability of labour and the 
condition of capital). 
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show that capital intensity itself is positively related to TE, thus we provide some 
evidence of the relationship between the two FOEs.  
 
Based on our inter-industry analysis, whenever a significant capital intensity FOE does 
exist, the effect is negative in all but one industry, namely large manufacturing firms 
(200). However, we also observe that in 63 percent of all industries, there are no 
significant FOEs with respect to the capital-labour ratio. Specifically, the average 
negative capital intensity FOE is being driven by 11 key industries spanning across 
many broad sectors of the economy
90
. These instances represent 31 percent of the cases 
and consist of 1,329 firms across three years. Interestingly, in many of these, the FOE 
with respect to TE is also significantly negative
91
.  
 
Based on this discussion, despite an overall significant negative FOE on both TE and 
capital intensity, our analysis thus far has emphasized average tendencies rather than 
definitive widespread differences between family and non-family firms. These weaker 
findings to some extent explain the mixed FOEs found with PE, which are mirrored by 
our inter-industry fixed effects estimates regarding technical efficiency and capital 
intensity. However, this is not the case when analysing the FOEs with respect to scale 
efficiency.  
 
 Hypothesis 8: Family firms will exhibit lower scale efficiency relative to 6.3.3
their non-family counterparts.  
 
This thesis provides strong evidence that family firms are consistently less scale 
efficient than their non-family peers. We also find that the main component of family 
                                                 
 
90
 Specifically, the FOE with respect to capital intensity is significantly negative in  Mining 
(100), Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing (221), Machinery and Equipment 
Manufacturing (228), Other Manufacturing (229), General construction (341), Large wholesale 
trade (400), Basic material wholesaling (445), Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling 
(446), Personal and Household Good Retailing (552), Services to Finance and Insurance (875), 
and Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services (1091). 
 
91
 With the notable exceptions of the General construction (341), and Motion picture, radio and 
television services (1091) industries. 
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firm productive inefficiency is a result of a sub-optimal scale of production. For 
example, Depending on the estimation method, we report significant average scale 
efficiency FOEs which range from - 3.1 to - 5.8 percent. These values support 
Hypothesis 8 and are much larger in magnitude than the FOEs concerning TE. As 
expected, a negative FOE on SE is significant among firms in the increasing returns to 
scale category.  
 
The inter-industry effects also show that, whenever significant, the FOE on SE is almost 
always negative. Specifically, there is a negative and significant FOE on SE in 49 
percent of all industries, and a positive and significant FOE on SE in just 2 percent of 
the cases. This translates to a single industry where family firms are observed to exhibit 
higher levels of SE, namely large retail trade (500)
92
. Given that we find an overall 
insignificant FOE on SE among firms in the decreasing returns to scale category, our 
results demonstrate that the main source of scale inefficiency for family firms is a lack 
of both capital and labour inputs employed in the production process. In other words, 
family firms are not reaching the most productive scale size, and as a result are paying a 
measurable efficiency penalty.      
 
Our findings also imply that, compared to non-family firms, family firm size is 
systematically constrained. A smaller family firm has anecdotally been observed in 
many family business studies; however, previous family business studies have rarely 
used firm size as an outcome of family ownership. Rather, size is most commonly 
considered as a control, antecedent or moderating variable situated on the right-hand-
side of the equation. This thesis has shown that firm size can also be considered an 
endogenous choice variable that is simultaneously determined with family owners’ 
chosen financing arrangements.  
 
                                                 
 
92
 The significant negative FOEs are even more pronounced in our reduced-form estimates 
where we find that family firms exhibit significantly lower SE scores in 90 percent of all 
industries, and equivalent SE scores 10 percent of the time. Based on these results, there were 
no instances where we found a significant positive FOE on SE. 
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6.4 Why is productive efficiency affected by family ownership?  
 
A sub-optimally smaller family firm would in turn explain the systematically lower 
scale efficiency scores we have discussed thus far. This thesis has offered and tested an 
explanation on why this phenomenon might be occurring. In this regard, our 
econometric comparisons have yielded three related findings: 1) Family firms rely more 
heavily on internal sources of finance, 2) internal sources of debt and equity finance are 
related to a lower quantum of debt and equity, as well as a smaller firm, and 3) FOEs on 
various measures of firm size are consistently negative.    
 
These findings support the notion that a smaller family firm size is a result of an owner-
imposed dependence on internally sourced finance, which may ultimately limit the 
quantum of debt and equity finance that family firms are able or willing to raise. Less 
finance in turn implies less capital and labour used, and output generated, in the 
production process. All of these production scale variables are also traditional measures 
of a firm’s size.  
 
 Hypothesis 7: Other things being equal, family firms are smaller than non-6.4.1
family firms. 
 
No matter the measure of firm size, we consistently find strong evidence which supports 
Hypothesis 7. For example, the FOEs on output, and capital and labour inputs are all 
negative and significant on average as well as in the majority of all industries. Since 
these size measures are all related to the scale of production, there is a clear link 
between firm size and PE
93
. In fact, PE is found to be endogenous in the determination 
of firm size, however, our two-stage least squares estimates still indicate negative and 
significant FOEs. Interestingly, our hybrid model estimates, which separate the fixed 
effects of the average level of internal finance from the fixed effects of family 
ownership, indicate weaker negative FOEs on size.  
 
                                                 
 
93
 For example, PE is measured as the distance between the firm’s actual output/input ratio 
relative to the optimal output/input ratio. 
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We therefore acknowledge that the significant fixed effects of internal finance explain a 
substantial part of the FOE on size, which is in accordance with the long-standing 
‘internal finance theory of growth’ (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). This theory states 
that the growth of most small firms is constrained by the unavailability of external 
finance. Specifically, these firms will rely more heavily on internally sourced finance, 
which is subject to stricter limits in quantity.  
 
 Hypothesis 6: The quantum of total equity is lower for family firms relative 6.4.2
to non-family firms. 
 
 Hypothesis 5: The quantum of total debt is lower for family firms relative to 6.4.3
non-family firms. 
 
Our expectations with respect to the quantum of debt and equity of family firms are 
confirmed, as we provide strong support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. Thus in addition to 
being significantly smaller, we also find that family firms hold a lower quantum of both 
debt and equity finance. Specifically, the FOEs approximately range from - $2 million 
to - $3 million with respect to debt, and - $1 million to - $ 2 million with respect to 
equity. These negative FOEs are also consistent across the majority of industries. As 
with our firm size estimates, the magnitude of the FOEs on the quantum of debt and 
equity are considerably weakened after controlling for the fixed effects of internal 
finance in the hybrid model, although we still observe significant negative effects. This 
further reinforces the notion that the level of internal finance is in fact negatively related 
to the size of and the quantum of finance held by the firm.     
 
It is important to keep in mind that our sample consists entirely of SMEs, which are 
already well known to face internal financing constraints. However, based on the 
dispersed family business literature on the subject, we argued family owners’ SEW-
inspired financing preferences will translate to a higher level of internally sourced 
finance relative to non-family SMEs. This thesis has therefore attempted to capture 
these preferences in various compositional FOEs on both debt and equity finance by 
source.  
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In the remaining discussion, we focus on the Hypotheses related to the financing 
preferences of family owners and infer how such observed tendencies could be related 
to SEW objectives. In this way we further shed light on how family ownership can 
impact behaviour, which can further impact real performance outcomes for the firm. 
 
 Hypothesis 4a: Equity from internal sources other than working owners, as 6.4.4
a proportion of total equity, is greater for family firms relative to non-
family firms. 
 
 Hypothesis 4b: Equity from external sources, as a proportion of total 6.4.5
equity, is lower for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
Beginning with equity finance, we find that the FOEs on internal and external finance 
support Hypothesis 4a and b. Specifically, the significant and positive FOEs on internal 
equity range from 3.3 to 5.4 percent, while the significant and negative FOEs on 
external equity range from - 3.6 to - 3.9 percent. Based on the averages presented in 
Chapter 3, family firms obtain more than double the proportion of internal equity, and 
less than half the proportion of external equity, relative to comparable non-family firms. 
Focusing on internal equity, our inter-industry analysis demonstrates that the FOEs on 
internal equity proportions are positive and significant in 67 percent of the cases and 
rarely negative
94
.  
 
In this thesis we defined ‘internal equity’ as equity sourced from related non-working 
owners such as other family members. By this definition it is not surprising that ‘family 
firms’ would exhibit greater proportions of internal equity; however, the lower 
proportions of ‘external equity’ – which is defined as equity sourced from unrelated 
non-working owners, venture capitalists and other unrelated business – also give 
credence to the notion that family owners prefer internally sourced equity as a means to 
preserve their control, minimise transactions costs, and avoid the external monitoring 
that external equity implies (Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar 2007). These findings 
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 This is reinforced in our external equity FOEs, which across industry are always negative 
when significant. 
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are in line with the SEW behaviours discussed in this thesis and further reinforce 
conjectures made in the literature about the limitations to external equity faced by 
private family firms in particular (Sirmon and Hitt 2003; Dawson 2011). 
 
Overall, our results suggest that family SMEs tend to have a more limited external 
equity financing base, but a wider base of internally generated equity, excluding equity 
from working owners, which has been tested for separately in Hypothesis 3.  
 
 Hypothesis 3: Equity from working owners, as a proportion of total equity, 6.4.6
is greater for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
Although it is understood that SMEs in general will rely heavily on equity from 
working owners, we find that family firms in particular rely much more heavily on 
working owners as a source of equity finance. In particular, the positive and significant 
FOEs on the proportion of working owner’s equity range from 21 to 23 percent. The 
positive FOEs are significant in the vast majority of industries and support Hypothesis 
3. As with our findings on internal equity, these results are consistent with our current 
understanding of SEW. For example, internal equity financing sourced from family and 
working owners implicitly prevents the loss of control and external monitoring, which 
may ultimately threaten family owners’ ability to actively preserve their SEW 
endowment (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011; Berrone et al. 2012). 
With that said, these results also reinforce our arguments about the relative convenience 
of owner’s equity in family firms given greater patient and survivability capital (Sirmon 
and Hitt 2003), which also suggest that family firms might have greater access to equity 
sourced from working owners in general.  
 
However, the consequences of relying too heavily on internally sourced equity have 
been highlighted in this thesis. For example, in the various regression models that were 
estimated in the previous chapter, we have observed that the estimated coefficients 
associated with internal and working owner’s equity are significantly related to a lower 
quantum of equity finance, a smaller firm, a lower capital to labour ratio, and lower 
levels of both scale and technical efficiency. As this thesis has been concerned with the 
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total financing preferences of family owners, we have also observed similar findings 
with respect to debt financing.  
 
 Hypothesis 2a: Loans from internal sources, as a proportion of total debt, 6.4.7
are greater for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
 Hypothesis 2b: Loans from external sources, as a proportion of total debt, 6.4.8
are lower for family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
Similar to the case of internal equity, our analysis supports Hypothesis 2a. Specifically, 
the FOEs on internal debt range from - 6.8 to - 7.2 percent. This translates to family 
firms holding double the proportion of internal debt financing on average relative to 
non-family firms. The significant negative FOEs are consistent across the majority of 
industries. As internal debt is defined in this thesis as the proportion of total debt 
sourced from individuals involved in the business or their families, it comes as no 
surprise that family firms hold a greater proportion of internal debt; however, contrary 
to our expectations expressed in Hypothesis 2b, we observed an overall insignificant 
FOE on external debt proportions. Our inter-industry analysis has confirmed this 
finding since an insignificant effect is noticeable in most industries, and when 
significant, the FOEs can be positive or negative
95
. 
 
These results provide strong evidence that family owners have a preference for internal 
providers of both debt and equity finance; however, given the Hypothesis 2b result, we 
further explore this in terms of the composition of ‘conventional’ external debt. Based 
on this, we reported that all SMEs rely primarily on banks and trade creditors as sources 
of debt. Interestingly we have also found significant FOEs on the proportions of these 
sources as well.  
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 Although we have also observed that a preference for internal debt does not necessarily imply 
that family firms hold a lower proportion of debt obtained from what we have strictly defined as 
external sources, i.e. the proportion of total debt sourced from ‘other’ individuals and unrelated 
businesses, a larger proportion of internally sourced debt does automatically imply a lower 
proportion of debt obtained from other components of total debt (see Appendix A.1). 
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 Hypothesis 1a: Bank debt, as a proportion of total debt, is greater for 6.4.9
family firms relative to non-family firms.  
 
 Hypothesis 1b: Trade credit, as a proportion of total debt, is lower for 6.4.10
family firms relative to non-family firms. 
 
We report that family SMEs prefer bank credit over trade credit. These findings 
reinforce the literature which outlines how family owners may accommodate a closer 
relationship with their bank (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006; Chua et al. 2011). 
These findings also support the notion that a larger SEW endowment motivates a long-
term commitment by family owners, which can alleviate the inherent asymmetric 
information problems between banks and SME borrowers (Bopaiah 1998). As there is a 
well-established understanding that trade credit is a direct substitute for bank credit 
(Biais and Gollier 1997; Petersen and Rajan 1997), we also find that family firms utilise 
less trade credit in their financing mix. However, this thesis has shown that family and 
non-family firms alike hold similar proportions of bank and trade credit combined. 
 
As a final summary of our findings, Figure 17 provides an illustration of the significant 
links investigated in this thesis. 
  
Figure 17: Summary of significant family ownership effects 
H10: Technical Efficiency FOE = -0.1 to -2.6% H8: Scale Efficiency FOE = -3.1 to -5.8% 
Productive Efficiency FOE = -2.2 to -4.3% 
Output FOE = -$0.68 to -$2.32 Million 
Capital FOE = -$3.24 to -$4.69 Million 
Labour FOE = -4.73 to -11.49 FTE 
H6: Total Equity FOE = -$1.13 to -$2.08 Million H5: Total Debt FOE = -$0.65 to -$3.36 Million  
H4a: Internal equity FOE = 3.3 to 5.4% 
H4b: External equity FOE = -3.9 to -3.9% 
H2a: Internal Debt FOE = 6.8 to 7.2% 
H1b: Trade credit FOE = -15.5 to -16.8% 
H9: Capital Intensity FOE = -24.63 to -65.72 
H3: Working owner’s equity FOE = 21.3 to 23.2% H1a: Bank credit FOE = 7.2 to 8.9% 
H7: Firm Size FOE 
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6.5 Implications of the results 
 
The national breadth and quantity of the data used in this thesis helps to overcome the 
generalization problems associated with many family business studies which use 
samples of limited geographic or industry scope. Accordingly we are confident about 
the external validity of our results, which pertain to the effect of family ownership on 
financing preferences, firm size and efficiency. Externally valid insights into such 
matters contribute to our understanding of how non-economic objectives might affect 
family firm performance and have implications for family business researchers, policy 
makers, family firm owners as well as the providers of external finance.   
 
 For family business researchers 6.5.1
 
By exploring how SEW considerations affect how family owners finance the firm and 
employing DEA which has yet to be used in this context, we contribute to family 
business research on both a conceptual and methodological level. The links between 
family ownership, financing arrangements, firm size and efficiency proposed in this 
thesis strengthen the arguments posed by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011). SMEs in general 
are known to have difficulty accessing finance, but this thesis highlights an additional 
behavioural outcome of family ownership not yet associated with the SEW literature. 
Unlike other studies which have treated firm size as an exogenous control variable, we 
modify the theory presented by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) by considering how firm size 
is also an outcome of SEW preservation. We further quantify these effects on family 
firm performance and outline the procedure to allow for future researchers to replicate 
our analysis. 
 
Using longitudinal data derived from Australian SMEs, this thesis specifically addresses 
previous difficulties with determining the impact of family ownership on firm 
performance by measuring family and non-family technical efficiency via the popular 
non-parametric technique known as Data Envelopment Analysis. Since the original 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1979) paper, the DEA method has had rapid and 
continuous growth in its use across multiple disciplines (Emrouznejad et al. 2008). This 
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is accredited to the fact that DEA, by design, is naturally suited for the complex multi-
input/output structure that measuring efficiency and productivity entails. Yet, despite its 
growing popularity over the past 30 plus years, studies which use DEA to compare 
efficiency across various ownership structures have been few and far between (see 
Seiford 1996 for an extensive bibliography of past DEA studies).  
 
Some notable exceptions include Brockett et al. (1998) who compare efficiency across 
stock and mutual ownership in the insurance industry, and Byrnes et al. (1986) who 
compare efficiency across public and privately owned water utilities. That said, as far as 
we can ascertain, this thesis is the first study to utilise a DEA method to compare 
various efficiency differentials across family and non-family owned SMEs, despite the 
inherent advantages of this approach.  
 
By using economic theory to derive a performance measure which has not previously 
been used in a family firm context, and by implementing robust econometric techniques 
to compare family and non-family performance, we also address the issue of improving 
the rigor of the measures and techniques used in empirical family business research 
(Richard et al. 2009; Pearson and Lumpkin 2011). With that said, the accurate 
measurement of SME efficiency is important for many economic reasons beyond 
academic curiosity alone. Therefore, the research presented in this thesis also has 
implications for policy makers, and both family and non-family businesses. 
 
 For policy makers 6.5.2
 
By accurately measuring efficiency, policy makers can target incentives concerning the 
sources of efficiency differentials, which is essential to the development of public and 
private policies designed to improve firm performance. Further, improvements in 
aggregate efficiency in the long run are an important source of economic growth, rising 
living standards, and increases in the overall welfare of society (Solow 1957; Baumol 
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1986). With that said, given their economic significance
96
, any financing driven size 
constraint specific to family firms can bring about a wide range of economic 
consequences. This has implications for policy-makers, as broader economic 
efficiencies could potentially be gained by understanding the arguments and analysis 
presented in this thesis. 
 
For example, in relation to an SME financing gap, much policy emphasis has been 
placed on supply-side issues i.e. resolving the apparent problem that SMEs cannot 
obtain financing due to deprived access; however, this thesis draws attention to the 
unique demand-side issues specifically related to family owned firms i.e. family owners 
have a strong aversion to relinquishing control, which may result in sub-optimal levels 
of both debt and equity financing by choice. Policy designed to overcome issues related 
to an SME financing gap could therefore be more effective by acknowledging the 
distinctive financing outcomes related to family ownership.  
 
Specifically, economic benefits could be realised by policies which encourage and 
facilitate entrepreneurship and new venture creation within families given that family 
businesses rely heavily on the family unit itself as a primary source of finance (Rogoff 
and Heck 2003). Other policy initiatives would ideally target education to both family 
owned firms and the providers of external finance. 
 
 For family firm owners and providers of external finance 6.5.3
 
As we have discussed, family owners are known to make decisions which are grounded 
in preserving their SEW endowment. When there is a threat to that endowment, the 
family is willing to make decisions that are not driven solely by economic 
considerations. In fact family owners would even be willing to put the firm at risk if this 
is what it would take to preserve their SEW endowment (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). In 
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 Based on the BLS data presented in Chapter 3, of all private firms sampled, just over half are 
family owned. Further, family SMEs employ more than 40 percent of all full-time equivalent 
employees, own 30 percent of all assets, and contribute nearly 32 percent towards total output in 
all sectors in Australia. 
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other words, there are times when family owners face economic trade-offs when 
pursuing their non-economic objectives.  
 
It is possible for family owners to exercise control, and extract the associated SEW 
benefits, by keeping the firm small and decisions centralised. As size increases family 
owners are physically unable to maintain control in this manner and, therefore, is forced 
to decentralise, e.g. hire professional directors, implement management control systems, 
or carry out formal training of both family and non-family employees (Stewart and Hitt 
2012). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) explain that greater decentralization may lower levels 
of psychological ownership among family owners and thus reduce the incentive and 
ability to pursue SEW objectives. Another way of looking at the same issue has been 
highlighted in this thesis. That is, the SEW objectives of family owners are preventing 
family firms from growing, which will have implicit costs. 
  
In particular, we have measured the trade-off between maintaining control of the firm, 
via internally sourced finance, and the efficiency consequences related to such financing 
preferences. We therefore enable a better understanding of the dilemmas faced by 
family business owners when making the apparent trade-off between non-economic and 
economic objectives, which family owners themselves may or may not be fully aware 
of. With the understanding that family firms are subject to the same efficiency 
requirements that other forms of ownership face (Pollak 1985), the results presented in 
this thesis provoke questions about the long-run viability of family SMEs in those 
industries where the FOE on TE and SE are both negative. 
 
In the context of an SME financing gap, economic growth could be promoted by 
providing education to family owners in terms of enhancing their ability to recognise 
viable external sources of finance, how to attract such finance, and the potential 
efficiency benefits associated with such partnerships. By doing so, a potential solution is 
to broaden the family firm's capital through external private debt or equity investors. 
However, despite the available efficiency gains shown in this thesis, external finance 
professionals are likely to associate the combination of family and business with 
negative qualities, such as emotions, conflict, and misunderstandings (Dawson 2011).  
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The inefficiencies linked to family ownership quantified in this thesis represent profit 
opportunities for external finance investors. As a result, they would benefit from 
investing in family owned firms, but prefer those that are already ‘professionalized’ or 
those that reduce the family’s presence after the external finance transaction (Dawson 
2011). The results in this thesis suggest that many family SMEs are not willing or able 
to make this trade-off. However, given the control priorities and resulting financing 
preferences of family owners, we provide insight to external suppliers of finance in 
terms of the means to successfully target, penetrate and exploit the family business 
market. This can potentially be accomplished by catering to the family’s need to 
preserve their SEW in ways that complement the external investor’s need to pursue 
economic objectives. 
 
6.6 Future research and limitations of the thesis 
 
While this thesis was being written, Berrone et al. (2012) attempted to address the issue 
of how to measure the SEW construct. Based on their review of prior research, the 
authors propose that there are five major dimensions of SEW, and collectively labelled 
them as FIBER
97
. These identified dimensions are consistent with our reasoning 
throughout this thesis, i.e. family control is a primary factor in, and a necessary 
condition for, a larger SEW endowment. With that said, our data do not allow for the 
direct measurement of SEW. Instead, as with the vast majority of prior studies to date, 
our proxy for a greater SEW endowment is the presence or absence of family ownership 
itself. Although this measure is clearly problematic as there is no variation within it, 
there are numerous reasons which reinforce the notion that SEW is strictly a family firm 
phenomenon (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011). Nevertheless, this thesis provides the 
foundations for future research which would preferably show how the degree of a SEW 
endowment might impact the degree of firm inefficiency related to both production 
scale and technology.  
 
                                                 
 
97
 The FIBER acronym stands for 1) Family control and influence, 2) Family members’ 
identification with the firm, 3) Binding social ties, 4) Emotional attachment, and 5) Renewal of 
family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession. 
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Also, despite the many strengths of the BLS data outlined in Chapter 3, there are some 
who would call attention to their age. On this point we would argue that the 
relationships investigated in this thesis are somewhat unaffected by time, and although 
we would like to see future replications of this study that use more recent data, the age 
of the BLS data is outweighed by their quality and representative nature. Moreover, the 
BLS has proven to still be relevant today, as demonstrated by recent studies which have 
utilised the data (Cassar 2004; Watson 2007; Eberhard and Craig 2012; Barbera and 
Hasso 2013; Barbera and Moores 2013). With that said, a quantitative study of this 
nature requires a large number of data, the likes of which are difficult to access, 
especially in a family SME context.   
 
Finally, our calculation of the efficiency scores used to compare family and non-family 
firm performance are predicated on the assumption that both firm types share the same 
(albeit industry specific) efficient frontier. This frontier reflects a profit maximisation 
objective, which may be criticised on the basis that family and non-family owners have 
different objectives, i.e. non-family owners wish to maximise profit, while family 
owners also have non-economic objectives. If family owners are maximising a different 
objective function, then using a single benchmark to compare family firms with their 
profit maximising non-family counterparts may overstate the efficiency differentials 
quantified in this thesis. According to this argument, the choices of family owners may 
be consistent with their distinct SEW objectives. If the utility gained from SEW 
objectives outweighed the utility lost in diminished efficiency, then such utility 
maximising behaviour can still be considered rational (Becker and Murphy 1988), albeit 
inefficient from a profit maximisation perspective.  
 
Future research could account for this by measuring family and non-family efficiency 
using separate benchmarks for each group. However, the single benchmark used in this 
thesis helps us to understand the economic value of the trade-off between SEW and 
performance. For example, ‘inefficiency’ as measured in this thesis is a sign that family 
owners are less interested in maximising profits. Specifically, if family owners are 
willing to take actions which forego a given level of efficiency – for the purpose of 
maintaining their SEW endowment – then we might conclude that the perceived value 
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of the SEW ‘gained’ by such actions should be equal to or greater than their associated 
efficiency costs.  
 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
 
Given their economic significance, and a known tendency to pursue non-economic 
objectives, the overarching purpose of this thesis is to quantify the effect of family 
ownership on firm performance. Based on an investigation of the economic, finance and 
family business literatures, the use of a theoretically founded measure of performance, 
and robust panel regression analysis, three main themes have emerged.  
 
First, family SMEs do not finance their assets in the same way as their non-family 
counterparts. Specifically, compared to their non-family counterparts, family SMEs rely 
more heavily on internally sourced finance. Second, these financing decisions have a 
simultaneous effect on the size of the firm. In particular, family firms own less capital, 
employ fewer workers, and produce less output. Finally, firm size in and of itself has 
measurable efficiency consequences which are separate from those related to the 
efficiency of how resources are arranged in the production process. Specifically, family 
firms are relatively more labour intensive and exhibit greater inefficiencies related to a 
suboptimal scale of production. Contrary to our expectations, family SMEs are not 
compensating for their smaller size by being more technically efficient in their resource 
use.  
 
By quantifying these effects, we enable a better understanding of the dilemmas faced by 
family business owners and managers when making the apparent trade-off between non-
economic and economic objectives. In the broader context of the challenges specific to 
SME financing, this thesis yields new insights into how, why and to what extent family 
ownership affects firm performance. 
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Appendices 
A.1 Comparison of unaltered financing compositional FOEs  
 
In Chapter 3, Section 3.6 we presented the descriptive statistics and performed 
preliminary data analysis on the compositional differences between family and non-
family debt (sub-section 3.6.1.1) and equity (sub-section 3.6.1.2). We also reported key 
statistics on aggregate financing composition and linked it to firm size (sub-section 
3.6.3). The results reported in these sections were based on reweighted proportions of 
debt and equity after removing those variables that are not a part of the focus of this 
thesis. The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that, even without reweighting, 
the results presented in Section 3.6 remain unaltered. 
  
Starting with the composition of debt, sub-section 5.1.1, the following list outlines 
seven debt source variables used in our analysis and the shortened codes we will use in 
the tables presented in this appendix.  
   
Debt source code Proportion of total debt sourced from… 
1 BANK Banks and other financial creditors  
2 TRADE Trade and other creditors 
3 RELIND Individuals involved in the business or their families 
4 UNREL Other individuals & unrelated businesses 
5 PAR Parent company 
6 PROV Provisions 
7 OTHER Other Sources 
 
As per our discussion in Section 3.5.1, debt sources 1 and 2 are considered separately 
and not allocated an internal or external classification. Debt source 3 is classified as 
internal and debt source 4 is classified as external. We do not classify debt sources 5, 6, 
and 7 for the reasons already explained. We present the tabulated statistics on all of the 
 Appendix A.1: Comparison of unaltered financing compositional FOEs 177 
 
7 debt sources identified in our sample, but for the sake of brevity we will only 
comment on the first 4 sources in this appendix.  
 
As a starting point, we present Table A1 which corresponds to Table 5 reported in 
Section 3.6.1.1 and presents the descriptive debt composition statistics for family and 
non-family firms for each year of our sample period. As we can see in Table A1, bank 
and trade credit represent the majority of all debt financing for both family and non-
family SMEs. When comparing between family and non-family firms we can see that 
our results are consistent with the reweighted comparisons reported in Table 5. 
Compared to non-family firms, family bank credit and internal debt proportions are 
higher, and family external debt proportions are generally the same. As with the 
reweighted compositions, these results also hold across industry and age. In fact the 
unweighted debt composition differentials are nearly identical to the reported 
reweighted values. These can be seen in Table A2 and Table A3, which correspond to  
Table 6 and Table 7 in Section 3.6.1.1 respectively. 
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Table A1: Descriptive annual debt composition statistics for family and non-family firms by year 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 3450/year) Panel B: Family Firms (N = 1758/year) Panel C: Non-Family Firms (N = 1692/year) 
Variable (year) 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
ST BANK (96) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ST BANK (97) 0.0000 0.1144 0.0000 0.1600 0.0000 0.1316 0.0000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0966 0.0000 0.1100 
ST BANK (98) 0.0000 0.1057 0.0000 0.1400 0.0000 0.1187 0.0000 0.1900 0.0000 0.0922 0.0000 0.0925 
ST BANK (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0734 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0834 0.0000 0.1300 0.0000 0.0629 0.0000 0.0675 
LT BANK (96) 0.0000 0.2935 0.2000 0.5400 0.0000 0.3485 0.3000 0.6000 0.0000 0.2363 0.0500 0.4500 
LT BANK (97) 0.0000 0.1717 0.0000 0.2800 0.0000 0.2003 0.0000 0.3475 0.0000 0.1420 0.0000 0.1700 
LT BANK (98) 0.0000 0.1531 0.0000 0.2200 0.0000 0.1780 0.0000 0.3000 0.0000 0.1273 0.0000 0.1400 
LT BANK (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.2061 0.0667 0.3467 0.0000 0.2423 0.1000 0.4158 0.0000 0.1685 0.0167 0.2533 
TRADE (96) 0.0900 0.3756 0.2800 0.6000 0.0700 0.3194 0.2200 0.5000 0.1100 0.4340 0.3500 0.7600 
TRADE (97) 0.0900 0.3855 0.2800 0.6300 0.0700 0.3456 0.2400 0.5500 0.1000 0.4269 0.3400 0.7225 
TRADE (98) 0.1025 0.4291 0.3200 0.7600 0.1000 0.3987 0.2700 0.7000 0.1400 0.4606 0.3700 0.8400 
TRADE (96-98)
a
 0.0800 0.3725 0.2700 0.6000 0.0600 0.3292 0.2200 0.5000 0.1000 0.4175 0.3200 0.7100 
RELIND (96) 0.0000 0.1200 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000 0.1585 0.0000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0000 0.0000 
RELIND (97) 0.0000 0.1072 0.0000 0.0700 0.0000 0.1349 0.0000 0.1400 0.0000 0.0784 0.0000 0.0000 
RELIND (98) 0.0000 0.0973 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.1226 0.0000 0.1200 0.0000 0.0710 0.0000 0.0000 
RELIND (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.1057 0.0000 0.0700 0.0000 0.1364 0.0000 0.1500 0.0000 0.0738 0.0000 0.0000 
UNREL (96) 0.0000 0.0227 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0248 0.0000 0.0000 
UNREL (97) 0.0000 0.0195 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.0000 
UNREL (98) 0.0000 0.0182 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0189 0.0000 0.0000 
UNREL (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0195 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0207 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (96) 0.0000 0.0421 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0625 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (97) 0.0000 0.0409 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0590 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (98) 0.0000 0.0436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0253 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0626 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0420 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0236 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0610 0.0000 0.0000 
PROV (96) 0.0000 0.0707 0.0000 0.1500 0.0000 0.0575 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000 0.0845 0.0000 0.1000 
PROV (97) 0.0000 0.0616 0.0000 0.1300 0.0000 0.0488 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0748 0.0000 0.0900 
PROV (98) 0.0000 0.0655 0.0000 0.1400 0.0000 0.0515 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0800 0.0000 0.0900 
PROV (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0657 0.0000 0.0700 0.0000 0.0523 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0797 0.0000 0.1000 
OTHER (96) 0.0000 0.0753 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 0.0730 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0778 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHER (97) 0.0000 0.0992 0.0000 0.1700 0.0000 0.0950 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000 0.1036 0.0000 0.0400 
OTHER (98) 0.0000 0.0876 0.0000 0.1500 0.0000 0.0876 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000 0.0875 0.0000 0.0500 
OTHER (96-98)
a
 0.0000 0.0858 0.0000 0.0100 0.0000 0.0835 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0881 0.0000 0.0200 
Total sample across 1996 to 1998 consists of 10350 firms of which 5274 are family and 5076 are non-family.  
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Table A2: Family ownership effects on debt composition by industry (1996-1998) 
 
 
 ANZSIC & Industry Category N Family Non-
Family 
BANK 
FOE 
TRADE 
FOE 
RELIND 
FOE 
UNREL 
FOE 
OTHER 
FOE 
100 Mining 79 19 60 0.230*** 0.075 0.099 -0.036** -0.318*** 
  Manufacturing               
200 between 100 & 200 employees 279 79 200 0.079** -0.068* 0.062*** 0.002 -0.065* 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  410 213 197 0.106*** -0.075** 0.042** -0.016* -0.057** 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing  327 189 138 0.056* -0.154*** 0.093*** -0.005 0.004 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  203 125 78 0.035 -0.118** 0.052 0.028** -0.001 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  302 183 119 0.051 -0.114*** 0.112*** -0.017 -0.092** 
225 Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product 
Manufacturing  
497 214 283 0.098*** -0.087*** 0.059*** 0.014 -0.088*** 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  177 115 62 0.207*** -0.136** 0.014 -0.001 -0.087* 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  559 315 244 0.110*** -0.133*** 0.074*** 0.011** -0.072*** 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  1040 532 508 0.118*** -0.090*** 0.097*** -0.001 -0.101*** 
229 Other Manufacturing  388 240 148 0.069** -0.065* 0.000 -0.011 0.013 
  Construction               
300 between 100 & 200 employees 21 14 7 -0.072 0.186 -0.035* 0.001 -0.080 
341 General Construction  194 130 64 0.096* -0.087 -0.012 -0.007 -0.012 
342 Construction Trade Services  375 272 103 0.086** -0.043 0.054** 0.001 -0.052* 
  Wholesale Trade               
400 between 100 & 200 employees 95 34 61 0.047 -0.067 0.013 0.004 0.003 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  393 224 169 0.008 -0.031 0.088*** 0.008 -0.091*** 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  684 310 374 0.102*** -0.105*** 0.108*** 0.001 -0.105*** 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  543 319 224 0.060** -0.059** 0.046*** -0.021** -0.028 
  Retail Trade               
500 between 100 & 200 employees 63 29 34 -0.155** 0.065 0.070** 0.017 0.003 
551 Food Retailing  236 169 67 -0.023 -0.060 0.065** 0.027** -0.041 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  374 214 160 0.136*** -0.133*** 0.043 0.006 -0.061** 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  405 235 170 0.047 -0.090** 0.007 -0.009 0.052** 
  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants               
600 between 100 & 200 employees 10 5 5 -0.274 -0.114 0.198** 0.098* 0.092* 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  360 172 188 0.108*** -0.081** 0.072*** -0.012 -0.083** 
700 Transport and Storage  376 212 164 0.198*** -0.171*** 0.067*** -0.012 -0.094*** 
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  Finance and Insurance               
800 between 100 & 200 employees 4 0 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  218 104 114 0.281*** -0.158*** 0.059* -0.005 -0.103** 
  Property and Business Services               
900 between 100 & 200 employees 68 10 58 0.290* -0.059 0.054 -0.018* -0.215*** 
977 Property Services  317 150 167 0.018 -0.146*** 0.135*** 0.023 -0.004 
978 Business Services  958 287 671 0.020 -0.139*** 0.084*** -0.004 -0.009 
  Cultural and Recreational Services                  
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 14 0 14 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  110 24 86 0.193** -0.127** 0.110 -0.025* -0.146* 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  9 0 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1093 Sport and Recreation  53 24 29 0.115 0.049 0.072 -0.033 -0.134* 
  Personal and Other Services               
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1195 Personal Services  205 108 97 0.088* -0.108** -0.010 0.019 0.015 
 
Debt composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various debt sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
 
Table A3: Family ownership effects on debt composition by age (1996-1998) 
 
Age Range (bracket) N Family 
Non-
Family 
Proportion 
of family 
firms 
BANK 
FOE 
TRADE 
FOE 
RELIND 
FOE 
UNREL 
FOE 
PAR 
FOE 
PROV 
FOE 
OTHER 
FOE 
Less than 2 years (1) 126 38 88 30.16% 0.06 -0.16** 0.08 0.04 -0.06** -0.05** 0.05 
2 to less than 5 years (2) 1111 495 616 44.55% 0.06*** -0.10*** 0.08*** 0.00 -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.00 
5 to less than 10 years (3) 2867 1339 1528 46.70% 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.07*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 
10 to less than 20 years (4) 3428 1755 1673 51.20% 0.11*** -0.08*** 0.05*** 0.00 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.01 
20 years or more (5) 2818 1647 1171 58.45% 0.10*** -0.09*** 0.08*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.01 
 
Debt composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various debt sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family firms 
respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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With respect to equity composition, the following list outlines seven equity source 
variables and the shortened codes we will use in the tables presented in this appendix. 
 
Equity source code Proportion of equity sourced from… 
1 WO Working owners 
2 NWOF Non-working owners (family members) 
3 NWONF Non-working owners (non-family) 
4 PAR Parent company 
5 VC & URB Venture or development capitalists & other unrelated businesses 
6 EMP Employees (excluding directors) 
7 OTHER Other sources (including shareholders) 
 
As in the previous section, at this point we define what constitutes an internal or 
external equity source. Equity source 1 is considered separately and not allocated an 
internal or external classification. Equity source 2 is classified as internal and equity 
sources 3 and 5 are classified as external. We do not classify debt sources 4, 6, and 7 
and thus for the sake of brevity do not focus on them the body of the text.  
 
Table A4 shows the unaltered equity composition statistics for family and non-family 
firms for each year of our sample period and corresponds to Table 8 in Section 3.6.1.2. 
Table A4 shows that on average and consistent across all periods, family firms obtain a 
greater proportion of equity from working owners and what we classify as internal 
sources, and less from external sources, than do non-family firms. Considering industry 
and age, Table A5 and Table A6 report the FOEs on our equity proportions of interest 
across industry and firm age. These correspond to Table 9 and Table 10 presented in 
Section 3.6.1.2. Again we can see that the reweighting has not significantly influenced 
the results as the effects reported in Table A5 and Table A6 are nearly identical in terms 
of relative size and significance to those found using the reweighted proportions.  
 
Moving on to the aggregates reported in Section 3.6.2, Table A7 and Figure A1 
correspond to Table 12 and Figure 5 respectively. These display a single aggregate, 
averaged across industry and time, of the financing composition differences between 
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family and non-family firms. When these unaltered aggregates are considered the results 
presented in Section 3.6.2 still hold. Finally, Table A8 and Table A9 correspond to the 
correlations between firm size and financing presented in Table 13 and Table 14 
respectively. Again we demonstrate that the reweighting performed in Section 3.6 has 
not significantly changed our reweighted results, as the relative strength and 
significance of the relationship between firm size and finance composition are 
consistent with what we report in Chapter 3. 
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Table A4: Descriptive annual equity composition statistics for family and non-family firms by year 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 3450/year) Panel B: Family Firms (N = 1758/year) Panel C: Non-Family Firms (N = 1692/year) 
Variable (year)a 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
WO (96) 0.0850 0.6802 1.0000 1.0000 0.7500 0.8032 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5524 0.7500 1.0000 
WO (97) 0.0500 0.6670 1.0000 1.0000 0.6525 0.7911 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5382 0.6000 1.0000 
WO (98) 0.0000 0.6680 1.0000 1.0000 0.6050 0.7837 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5478 0.7500 1.0000 
WO (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.6432 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.7611 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5208 0.5000 1.0000 
NWOF (96) 0.0000 0.0558 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0754 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0355 0.0000 0.0000 
NWOF (97) 0.0000 0.0622 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0797 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0441 0.0000 0.0000 
NWOF (98) 0.0000 0.0608 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0768 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0442 0.0000 0.0000 
NWOF (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.0582 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0761 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0397 0.0000 0.0000 
NWONF (96) 0.0000 0.0209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0339 0.0000 0.0000 
NWONF (97) 0.0000 0.0191 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0330 0.0000 0.0000 
NWONF (98) 0.0000 0.0169 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0272 0.0000 0.0000 
NWONF (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0301 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (96) 0.0000 0.1470 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0583 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2393 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (97) 0.0000 0.1456 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0618 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2327 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (98) 0.0000 0.1463 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0613 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2345 0.0000 0.0000 
PAR (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.1454 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0605 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2337 0.0000 0.0000 
VC & URB (96) 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0123 0.0000 0.0000 
VC & URB (97) 0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0131 0.0000 0.0000 
VC & URB (98) 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0134 0.0000 0.0000 
VC & URB (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 
EMP (96) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
EMP (97) 0.0000 0.0204 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0193 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0215 0.0000 0.0000 
EMP (98) 0.0000 0.0118 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0149 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 0.0000 
EMP (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHER (96) 0.0000 0.0871 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0489 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1266 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHER (97) 0.0000 0.0774 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0388 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1174 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHER (98) 0.0000 0.0885 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0542 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1241 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHER (96-98)
b
 0.0000 0.0809 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0438 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1194 0.0000 0.0000 
 
a 
All values are represented as proportions. i.e. value of financing source x divided by total equity. 
b
 Total sample across 1996 to 1998 consists of 10350 firms of which 5274 are family and 5076 are non-family.  
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Table A5: Family ownership effects on equity composition by industry (1996-1998) 
 
 
ANZSIC & Industry Category N Family 
Non-
Family 
WO 
FOE 
NWOF 
FOE 
NWONF 
FOE 
VC & URB 
FOE 
OTHER 
FOE 
100 Mining 79 19 60 0.593*** 0.126** -0.036 -0.004 -0.679*** 
  Manufacturing                  
200 between 100 & 200 employees 279 79 200 0.237*** 0.180*** -0.013 0.002 -0.408*** 
221 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing  410 213 197 0.268*** 0.070*** -0.032*** -0.038** -0.272*** 
222 Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing  327 189 138 0.190*** 0.010 -0.016 -0.013 -0.148*** 
223 Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing  203 125 78 -0.017 0.077** -0.066** 0.000 -0.037 
224 Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media  302 183 119 0.298*** 0.020 -0.016 0.003 -0.272*** 
225 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product 
Manufacturing  
497 214 283 0.341*** 0.069*** -0.012 -0.020* -0.372*** 
226 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  177 115 62 0.508*** -0.049 -0.071** -0.036* -0.320*** 
227 Metal Product Manufacturing  559 315 244 0.162*** 0.056*** -0.015 0.010 -0.211*** 
228 Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  1040 532 508 0.219*** 0.036*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.219*** 
229 Other Manufacturing  388 240 148 0.099** 0.016 -0.011 -0.005 -0.065* 
  Construction                  
300 between 100 & 200 employees 21 14 7 -0.241 0.167* -0.046 0.000 0.119 
341 General Construction  194 130 64 0.103* -0.099** -0.017 0.001 -0.049 
342 Construction Trade Services  375 272 103 0.118** 0.020 -0.044** -0.006 -0.106*** 
  Wholesale Trade                  
400 between 100 & 200 employees 95 34 61 0.614*** 0.034 0.021 -0.035* -0.618*** 
445 Basic Material Wholesaling  393 224 169 0.237*** 0.101*** -0.057*** -0.015* -0.257*** 
446 Machinery and Motor Vehicle Wholesaling  684 310 374 0.448*** 0.027* -0.022*** -0.005** -0.479*** 
447 Personal and Household Good Wholesaling  543 319 224 0.287*** 0.031** -0.019** 0.009 -0.310*** 
  Retail Trade                  
500 between 100 & 200 employees 63 29 34 0.308*** 0.059 -0.032 0.000 -0.369*** 
551 Food Retailing  236 169 67 0.057 0.044** -0.029 -0.021* -0.051 
552 Personal and Household Good Retailing  374 214 160 0.142*** -0.007 0.001 -0.006 -0.134*** 
553 Motor Vehicle Retailing and Services  405 235 170 0.062 -0.036* -0.024** -0.018* 0.010 
  Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants                  
600 between 100 & 200 employees 10 5 5 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.400 
657 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  360 172 188 0.451*** 0.041** -0.035** -0.020** -0.479*** 
700 Transport and Storage  376 212 164 0.195*** 0.050** -0.030*** -0.027** -0.197*** 
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  Finance and Insurance                  
800 between 100 & 200 employees 4 0 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
875 Services to Finance and Insurance  218 104 114 0.225*** 0.019 -0.009 0.000 -0.288*** 
  Property and Business Services                  
900 between 100 & 200 employees 68 10 58 0.439*** 0.143 0.000 0.000 -0.530*** 
977 Property Services  317 150 167 0.120*** 0.047** -0.063*** -0.007* -0.101*** 
978 Business Services  958 287 671 0.084*** 0.017 -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.085*** 
  Cultural and Recreational Services                  
1000 between 100 & 200 employees 14 0 14 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1091 Motion Picture, Radio and Television Services  110 24 86 0.467*** -0.017 -0.013 0.000 -0.414*** 
1092 Libraries, Museums and the Arts  9 0 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1093 Sport and Recreation  53 24 29 0.558*** -0.010 -0.061* 0.000 -0.570*** 
  Personal and Other Services                  
1100 between 100 & 200 employees 3 3 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1195 Personal Services  205 108 97 0.095* 0.033 -0.026* 0.000 -0.057 
 
Equity composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various equity sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family 
firms respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
 
Table A6: Family ownership effects on equity composition by age (1996-1998) 
Age Range (bracket) N Family Non-Family 
Proportion of family 
firms 
WO  
FOE 
NWOF  
FOE 
NWONF  
FOE 
PAR  
FOE 
EMP  
FOE 
VC & URB  
FOE 
 OTHER  
FOE 
Less than 2 years (1) 126 38 88 30.16% 0.21** -0.06 -0.02 -0.20*** -0.02* -0.02* 0.02 
2 to less than 5 years (2) 1111 495 616 44.55% 0.26*** 0.03** 0.02*** -0.20*** 0.00 -0.02*** -0.07*** 
5 to less than 10 years (3) 2867 1339 1528 46.70% 0.19*** 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.05*** 
10 to less than 20 years (4) 3428 1755 1673 51.20% 0.24*** 0.01** 0.01*** -0.17*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.06*** 
20 years or more (5) 2818 1647 1171 58.45% 0.32*** 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.23*** 0.00 -0.01** -0.14*** 
 
 
Equity composition FOEs have been determined by xff – xnf, where x is the mean of the various equity sources compared, and ff and nf denote family and non-family 
firms respectively. T-tests are performed on xff and xnf. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Figure A1: Average aggregate family and non-family finance composition by debt and equity source 
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Aggregate finance compositions are averaged first by industry, then by ownership. 
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Table A7: Average aggregate family and non-family finance composition by debt and equity source 
 
 Average finance composition by source
a
 FF NF FF-NF % z-stat 
 Source of debt finance          
BANK Banks & other financial creditors  0.351 0.244 0.108 44.3 (12.095)*** 
TRADE Trade and other creditors 0.311 0.410 -0.099 -24.1 (-10.518)*** 
RELIND Individuals involved in the business or their families 0.122 0.056 0.065 116.1 (11.799)*** 
UNREL Other individuals & unrelated businesses 0.015 0.017 -0.002 -14.0 (-0.982) 
PAR Parent company 0.026 0.060 -0.034 -56.3 (-8.453)*** 
PROV Provisions 0.052 0.089 -0.038 -42.2 (-7.486)*** 
OTHER Other sources 0.122 0.123 -0.001 -0.5 (-0.096) 
 Source of equity finance          
WO Working owners 0.737 0.468 0.269 57.4 (29.019)*** 
NWOF Non-working owners (family) 0.107 0.040 0.067 169.9 (13.293)*** 
NWONF Non-working owners (non-family) 0.006 0.032 -0.026 -80.6 (-9.563)*** 
PAR Parent company 0.064 0.261 -0.197 -75.6 (-28.071)*** 
VC & URB Venture capitalists & other unrelated businesses 0.003 0.010 -0.008 -75.2 (-4.905)*** 
EMP Employees (excluding directors) 0.009 0.009 0.000 -4.4 (-0.223) 
OTHER Other (including shareholders) 0.075 0.180 -0.105 -58.3 (-16.167)*** 
a 
Aggregate finance compositions are averaged first by industry, then by ownership. 
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Table A8: Pearson’s correlations between source of debt finance and firm size (1996-1998) 
 
 
Size Variables Share of debt finance (proportion) 
 
Output Labour Capital Total Debt BANK TRADE PROV PAR RELIND UNREL OTHER 
Output 
1                     
-                     
Labour 
0.568 1                   
(70.174)*** -                   
Capital 
0.697 0.304 1                 
(99.002)*** (32.425)*** -                 
Total Debt 
0.624 0.295 0.835 1               
(81.286)*** (31.384)*** (154.301)*** -               
BANK 
-0.042 -0.052 0.008 0.012 1             
(-4.298)*** (-5.250)*** (0.776) (1.171) -             
TRADE 
0.018 0.069 -0.012 -0.02 -0.432 1           
(1.806)* (7.019)*** (-1.235) (-2.043)** (-48.688)*** -           
PROV 
0.175 0.183 0.064 0.03 -0.178 -0.072 1         
(18.031)*** (18.899)*** (6.506)*** (3.065)*** (-18.427)*** (-7.298)*** -         
PAR 
0.131 0.167 0.081 0.135 -0.162 -0.15 0.009 1       
(13.423)*** (17.191)*** (8.276)*** (13.840)*** (-16.684)*** (-15.399)*** (0.894) -       
RELIND 
-0.11 -0.15 -0.058 -0.059 -0.159 -0.284 -0.104 -0.109 1     
(-11.242)*** (-15.411)*** (-5.925)*** (-5.967)*** (-16.390)*** (-30.170)*** (-10.620)*** (-11.168)*** -     
UNREL 
-0.024 -0.041 -0.002 0.003 -0.07 -0.107 -0.04 -0.041 -0.04 1   
(-2.429)** (-4.219)*** (-0.169) (0.304) (-7.167)*** (-10.951)*** (-4.090)*** (-4.139)*** (-4.099)*** -   
OTHER 
0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.218 -0.273 -0.074 -0.072 -0.136 -0.046 1 
(0.660) (-0.413) (-0.443) (-1.269) (-22.675)*** (-28.918)*** (-7.564)*** (-7.292)*** (-14.002)*** (-4.671)*** - 
 
T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 
  
 Appendix A.1: Comparison of unaltered financing compositional FOEs 189 
 
Table A9: Pearson’s correlations between source of equity finance and firm size (1996-1998) 
 
 
Size Variables Share of equity finance (proportion) 
 
Output Labour Capital Total Equity WO NWOF NWONF PAR VC & URB EMP OTHER 
Output 1                     
  -                     
Labour 0.568 1                   
  (70.174)*** -                   
Capital 0.697 0.304 1                 
  (99.002)*** (32.425)*** -                 
Total Equity 0.552 0.218 0.853 1               
  (67.309)*** (22.715)*** (166.341)*** -               
WO -0.24 -0.273 -0.13 -0.072 1             
  (-25.134)*** (-28.881)*** (-13.293)*** (-7.370)*** -             
NWOF -0.023 0.014 -0.015 -0.01 -0.242 1           
  (-2.294)** (1.444) (-1.486) (-1.022) (-25.369)*** -           
NWONF -0.011 0.005 -0.013 -0.01 -0.137 -0.023 1         
  (-1.106) (0.540) (-1.347) (-0.997) (-14.048)*** (-2.388)** -         
PAR 0.285 0.351 0.137 0.069 -0.592 -0.124 -0.067 1       
  (30.216)*** (38.076)*** (14.071)*** (7.007)*** (-74.763)*** (-12.690)*** (-6.879)*** -       
VC & URB 0.027 0.038 0.013 0.007 -0.12 -0.025 -0.009 -0.024 1     
  (2.767)*** (3.880)*** (1.347) (0.708) (-12.258)*** (-2.532)** (-0.943) (-2.437)** -     
EMP 0 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.12 -0.031 -0.015 -0.048 -0.009 1   
  (0.013) (0.643) (0.332) (0.144) (-12.312)*** (-3.148)*** (-1.475) (-4.936)*** (-0.959) -   
OTHER 0.08 0.031 0.07 0.056 -0.414 -0.088 -0.047 -0.116 -0.022 -0.033 1 
  (8.135)*** (3.111)*** (7.168)*** (5.680)*** (-46.283)*** (-8.989)*** (-4.823)*** (-11.867)*** (-2.199)** (-3.406)*** - 
 
T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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A.2 DEA Linear Programming 
 
Based on the method developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1979;1981), The 
DEA frontier itself is the linear programming calculation of a hypothetical, or virtual, 
efficient firm which is then used to compute the TE score of the firm being evaluated. 
This can be accomplished with a sample of input-output data and by imposing some 
basic assumptions regarding the production technology of our sample firms. Here we 
define these assumptions and specify the linear programming problems which are 
solved to find the efficient frontier and calculate the efficiency scores. 
 
We begin by defining the production possibility set. Any production technology 
transforming an input bundle, x, into an output bundle, y, can be characterised by the 
production possibilities set, T, which consists of 
 
(1)     {                                      } 
 
That is, obtaining y is feasible by using x, provided that input and output bundles are not 
negative. In the one input, one output case, the efficient frontier is defined by the 
production function 
 
(2)                    
 
That is, an efficient firm would obtain the maximum y for any given x. Specifically, for 
any input bundle   ,       is the maximum quantity of y that can be produced. Based 
on (2), we can define the equivalent production possibilities set as 
 
(3)     {                    } 
 
The previously mentioned parametric approach arbitrarily chooses a functional form for 
the underlying technology     , for example the Cobb-Douglas (1928) production 
function is commonly utilised, whereas in DEA, the following assumptions are made 
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regarding     , which are consistent with any functional form, but no particular 
function is imposed. 
 
1. All actually observed input-output bundles are feasible. That is, every 
input-output combination  (     )             in the sample of N firms 
is in T. 
2. The production possibility set is convex. That is, if         and         
are both feasible, then any weighted average of the two input bundles can 
produce the corresponding weighted average of the two output bundles. 
This would be true for any number of feasible input-output bundles; hence 
 ̅   ∑   
 
    
  can produce  ̅   ∑   
 
    
  for any set of non-negative 
weights                such that ∑   
 
     .  
3. Inputs are freely disposable. That is, increasing any input without 
reducing any other input would not cause a decrease in output produced. 
More formally, if           and       , in other words, no element of 
the    bundle is smaller than the corresponding element    bundle, then  
         .  
4. Outputs are freely disposable. That is if    can produce   , then it can 
always produce a smaller output bundle       . Formally, if          
  and        , then          . 
 
Using a sample of actually observed input-output data and four assumptions above, 
DEA derives a benchmark input-output quantity with which the actual input-output used 
by a firm can be compared for an efficiency measurement. In other words, the efficient 
frontier can be constructed with the observations from the sample data set   
{(     )          }. Using this data, the production possibilities set for the VRS 
case is defined as  
 
(4)        {        ∑    
    ∑    
      ∑      
 
                   
 
   }  
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A linear programming problem is then solved to construct a best practice piecewise 
linear envelope, or free disposal convex hull, over the observed input-output data by 
assigning the    weights to other peer firms in the sample data. As per the ∑     
 
    
constraint seen in (4), which imposes the condition that all weights must sum to 1, the 
estimated frontier from the set     will exhibit VRS. However, if one assumes that 
CRS holds everywhere along the frontier, the definition of the production possibilities 
set and the resulting measure of PE will also change. With the observations from the 
same sample data set   {(     )          }, the production possibilities set for 
the CRS case is defined as  
 
(5)      {        ∑    
    ∑    
                      
 
   } 
 
An implication of the CRS assumption is that if any input-output bundle       is 
feasible, so would the bundle         for any non-negative t. As a result, the    weights 
are not restricted to add up to unity
98
. This equality constraint is also removed from the 
DEA linear programming problems when CRS is assumed. The removal of this 
constraint makes the CRS DEA problems less restrictive than the corresponding VRS 
models. As a result it will always be the case that        , as stated in Section 4.3.1.  
 
Given (4) and (5), a firm's input oriented efficiency is determined by minimizing the 
distance between the actual inputs used in its production and the inputs used by the best 
practice, or virtual firm, constructed as a weighted average of the input decisions made 
by the nearest peer firms on the best practice convex hull. The TERTS score, (RTS = 
VRS, CRS), for any firm k, can now be formally stated as the optimal solution to   
 
(6)         
        (      )       
 
With an input orientation in mind, the minimization of the scalar,   , is carried out along 
a ray of the observed input proportions holding output fixed. Starting with the CRS 
                                                 
 
98
 For a more technical discussion on the CRS, VRS restrictions, see Rajiv D. Banker et al.  
(2004). 
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scenario, relative to the best practice hull, the       (which we refer to as PE) measure 
of firm k is found by solving the following linear programming problem for each of the 
j firms in the sample 
 
(7)        
s.t ∑       
 
                     
 ∑       
 
                    
                  
 
Although   is unrestricted in (7), it can be seen from (5) that if (     ) is in the sample, 
it will always be true that      . Similarly, the       measure (which we refer to 
as TE) of firm k is found for each of the j firms in the sample by solving the same linear 
programming problem as (7), but with the added convexity constraint seen in (4), which 
can be stated as  
  
(8)        
s.t ∑       
 
                     
 ∑       
 
                    
 ∑      
 
                    
 
As stated,    from the CRS problem in (7) will always be higher or equal to the solution 
found under the VRS scenario in (8).  From these, we can compute scale efficiency as 
described in Section 4.3.1. 
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A.3 Identifying scale returns 
 
In Section 4.5.2 we compared the average family and non-family scale efficiency scores 
across scale return categories. In Table 26 and Table 27, we find that, of all firms which 
exhibit increasing returns to scale (IRS), family firms on average are less scale efficient, 
or in other words are relatively further from the optimal scale; and, of all firms which 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale (DRS), family firms are more scale efficient, or in 
other words are relatively closer to the optimal scale. Figure A 2 illustrates how these 
different scenarios can be interpreted.  
 
Figure A 2: One input, one output measure of technical efficiency with constant and 
varying returns to scale 
 
As seen in the diagram, efficient frontiers OO΄ and SS΄ represent the various input (Y) 
and output (X) combinations of firms using best practices in their production processes 
which exhibit constant and variable returns to scale respectively. When evaluating the 
efficiency of firms using the SS΄ benchmark, the point labelled CRS denotes constant 
returns to scale and represents the optimally scaled firm. The shaded regions to the left 
and right of the optimal scale point identify the degree of sub-optimality in scale for 
firms which exhibit increasing and decreasing returns to scale respectively.  
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For example, firms A, B and C are all efficient with respect to pure technical efficiency 
as they lie on the SS΄ efficient frontier, but only firm B is scale efficient as it also lies on 
the OO΄ efficient frontier. As a result, firm Bs scale efficiency will equate to 1 while 
firms A and Cs scale efficiency will be less than 1.  
 
Using an input orientation, firm A and Cs scale inefficiency can be measured as the 
relative horizontal distance between their position on the SS΄ efficient frontier and their 
scale efficient counterpart’s position on the OO΄ efficient frontier. Specifically GD/GA 
and FE/FC respectively measure A and Cs inefficiency due to the divergence of their 
actual size from the optimal scale. Given this calculation, as firms ‘move away’ from 
the optimal scale point, the scale efficiency score decreases. With that said, while both 
A and C are sub-optimally scaled, we can see in the diagram that firm A is sub-
optimally small and firm C is sub-optimally large; thus differentiating between IRS and 
DRS firms is crucial when comparing scale efficiency scores. 
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A.4 Robustness checks of panel regression analysis 
 
In Chapter 5 we specified our hypotheses tests based on the Fixed effects, Random 
effects and Hybrid models. We also conducted a fixed effects analysis of the FOEs in 
each industry. However, for brevity, we only reported our fixed effects estimates. The 
purpose of this appendix is to present the results based on the random effects, hybrid 
model and inter-industry fixed effects estimates. These tables are presented in the order 
specified below. No commentary is included in this appendix, as these Tables have 
already been discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter 5. 
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Table A10: Debt and equity composition (random effect model) 
 Share of debt finance  Share of equity finance 
 
Bank 
credit 
Trade 
credit 
Internal 
debt 
External 
debt 
 
Working owner’s 
equity 
Internal 
equity 
External 
equity 
Constant 0.294*** 0.380*** 0.176*** 0.033***  0.731*** -0.003 0.055*** 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.007)  (0.029) (0.013) (0.010) 
FOE 0.082*** -0.163*** 0.072*** -0.001  0.214*** 0.035*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003)  (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) 
PE -0.116*** 0.089*** -0.022* -0.001  0.022 -0.023** 0.005 
 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.011) (0.006)  (0.020) (0.010) (0.007) 
Firm size 2.18E-07 2.06E-07 
-3.02E-
07*** 2.13E-08 
 
-8.71E-07* -8.80E-08* 1.02E-08 
 
(1.94E-
07) (2.18E-07) (7.47E-08) (9.88E-08) 
 
(4.93E-07) (4.84E-08) (1.16E-07) 
Firm age 0.000 0.018*** -0.006** -0.002  -0.017*** 0.010*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Capital intensity 
1.78E-
05** -8.97E-06 2.77E-06 5.79E-08 
 
-2.15E-05** 2.87E-06 3.81E-08 
 
(8.53E-
06) (7.79E-06) (3.11E-06) (2.71E-06) 
 
(9.60E-06) (3.64E-06) (2.33E-06) 
Capital structure 0.012*** -0.011*** 0.008*** 4.30E-04  -0.001 -4.28E-04 5.96E-04 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (4.73E-04)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
 
   N 10350 10350 10350 10350  10350 10350 10350 
R
2
 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01  0.06 0.02 0.02 
Adjusted R
2
 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00  0.05 0.01 0.01 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time and industry effects not reported for brevity. FOE significance has been established using a one-tail T-test. 
For all other coefficients, a two-tailed T-test was used. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
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Table A11: Debt and equity composition (hybrid model) 
 Share of debt finance  Share of equity finance 
 
Bank credit Trade credit Internal debt External debt  
Working 
owner’s equity 
Internal 
equity 
External 
equity 
Constant 0.291*** 0.362*** 0.171*** 0.035***  0.798*** -0.014 0.060*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.020) (0.008)  (0.033) (0.014) (0.011) 
FOE 0.077*** -0.155*** 0.068*** -0.002  0.213*** 0.033*** -0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003)  (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) 
PE        ̅    -0.077*** -0.002 0.008 0.005  0.042* -0.015 0.010 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.013) (0.008)  (0.024) (0.013) (0.008) 
PE   ̅    -0.199*** 0.254*** -0.082*** -0.007  -0.033 -0.035** -0.006 
 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.020) (0.009)  (0.037) (0.016) (0.012) 
Firm size        ̅    -3.31E-07 2.57E-07 -7.12E-08 3.76E-07  2.47E-07 2.82E-08 5.27E-09 
 
(3.33E-07) (5.95E-07) (1.64E-07) (3.30E-07)  (9.62E-07) (7.74E-08) (9.98E-08) 
Firm size   ̅    4.14E-07*** -4.43E-08 -3.27E-07*** -2.59E-08  -7.60E-07* -1.26E-07* 6.41E-08 
 (1.99E-07) (2.34E-07) (8.03E-08) (6.19E-08)  (4.29E-07) (6.58E-08) (1.39E-07) 
Firm age        ̅    -0.010 0.033*** -0.017*** -0.002  0.013 -0.005 -0.007* 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) 
Firm age   ̅    0.003 0.015*** -0.003 -0.002  -0.030*** 0.014*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Capital intensity        ̅    2.08E-05** -1.71E-05* -5.17E-07 -3.30E-06  -8.10E-06 4.61E-07 3.15E-06 
 
(9.98E-06) (1.03E-05) (3.49E-06) (4.64E-06)  (1.20E-05) (3.24E-06) (3.01E-06) 
Capital intensity   ̅    1.31E-05 2.79E-06 6.96E-06 2.48E-06  -5.01E-05*** 5.80E-06 -4.66E-06 
 
(1.13E-05) (1.09E-05) (5.74E-06) (2.83E-06)  (1.34E-05) (5.68E-06) (2.99E-06) 
Capital structure        ̅    0.006 -0.003 0.004 4.24E-04  -3.42E-04 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (5.71E-04)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Capital structure   ̅    0.029*** -0.029*** 0.019*** 4.56E-04  -0.005 -7.10E-04 1.49E-04 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (7.12E-04)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) 
         
N 10350 10350 10350 10350  10350 10350 10350 
R
2
 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.005  0.06 0.02 0.02 
Adjusted R
2
 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.000  0.05 0.01 0.01 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time and industry effects not reported for brevity. FOE significance has been established using a one-tail T-test. 
For all other coefficients, a two-tailed T-test was used. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
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Table A12: Family ownership effect by industry (debt and equity proportions) 
 
Share of debt finance 
 
Share of equity finance 
Industry 
Bank 
Credit 
Trade 
Credit 
Internal 
Debt 
External 
Debt 
  
Working Owners 
Equity 
Internal 
Equity 
External 
Equity 
100 0.21*** -0.33*** 0.11** -0.04* 
 
0.50*** 0.15*** -0.04* 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
200 0.08*** -0.16*** 0.08*** 0.01 
 
0.29*** 0.27*** -0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
221 0.10*** -0.16*** 0.06*** -0.02** 
 
0.21*** 0.07*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
222 0.06** -0.16*** 0.11*** 0.00 
 
0.21*** 0.03** -0.05*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
223 -0.02 -0.15*** 0.08*** 0.03** 
 
-0.02 0.08*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
224 0.05** -0.22*** 0.13*** -0.01 
 
0.25*** 0.03** -0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
225 0.10*** -0.22*** 0.08*** 0.02** 
 
0.34*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
226 0.20*** -0.23*** 0.01 0.00 
 
0.52*** -0.06*** -0.12*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
227 0.12*** -0.23*** 0.08*** 0.01** 
 
0.13*** 0.05*** -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
228 0.10*** -0.17*** 0.11*** 0.00 
 
0.19*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
229 0.07*** -0.09*** 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.07*** 0.02* -0.01* 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
300 -0.19 0.21 -0.06 0.00 
 
-0.39** 0.26*** -0.09* 
 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) 
 
(0.17) (0.10) (0.07) 
341 0.14*** -0.14*** -0.04** -0.01 
 
0.08** -0.11*** -0.02 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
342 0.10*** -0.10*** 0.06*** 0.00 
 
0.12*** 0.01 -0.05*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
400 0.02 -0.19*** 0.03 0.02 
 
0.54*** 0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) 
445 -0.02 -0.13*** 0.10*** 0.01 
 
0.21*** 0.10*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
446 0.10*** -0.22*** 0.11*** 0.01 
 
0.41*** 0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
447 0.06*** -0.14*** 0.06*** -0.02** 
 
0.26*** 0.03*** -0.02** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
500 -0.20*** 0.04 0.06 0.03 
 
0.29*** 0.05 0.00 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
551 -0.06** -0.11*** 0.10*** 0.03** 
 
0.03 0.06*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
552 0.14*** -0.22*** 0.03** 0.01* 
 
0.11*** -0.01 0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
553 0.07*** -0.09*** 0.01 -0.02* 
 
0.03 -0.02* -0.04*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
600 -0.50*** 0.05 0.27** 0.17** 
 
0.67*** 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.07) 
 
(0.21) (0.12) (0.08) 
657 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.06*** -0.01 
 
0.49*** 0.04*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
700 0.22*** -0.29*** 0.08*** -0.01 
 
0.20*** 0.06*** -0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
875 0.31*** -0.22*** 0.08*** 0.00 
 
0.14*** 0.03* -0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
900 0.60*** -0.49** -0.04 0.00 
 
0.19 0.31*** 0.01 
 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.10) (0.06) 
 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.06) 
977 -0.01 -0.20*** 0.14*** 0.05*** 
 
0.10*** 0.06*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
978 0.01 -0.16*** 0.08*** -0.01** 
 
0.07*** 0.02** -0.03*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
1091 0.18*** -0.20*** 0.09** -0.03* 
 
0.44*** -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) 
1093 0.09* 0.00 0.10** -0.06** 
 
0.52*** -0.01 -0.07*** 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
1195 0.08*** -0.13*** -0.01 0.01 
 
0.07** 0.03* -0.03** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Average FOE 0.07 -0.15 0.07 0.00 
 
0.23 0.05 -0.04 
Negative and significant 9.38% 87.50% 3.13% 21.88% 
 
3.13% 9.38% 65.63% 
Positive and significant 71.88% 0.00% 71.88% 21.88% 
 
84.38% 68.75% 0.00% 
Insignificant 18.75% 12.50% 25.00% 56.25%  12.50% 21.88% 34.38% 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%
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Table A13: Quantum of finance and firm size (random effect model) 
 Quantum of finance  Firm size 
 
Total Liabilities 
(000) 
Total Equity 
(000) 
 
Value added 
(000) 
Labour (FTE) Capital (000) 
Constant 4348.31*** 2085.52*  1026.22** 18.65*** 6946.16** 
 
(1523.13) (1235.04)  (456.75) (1.33) (3306.28) 
FOE -2173.15*** -1012.46**  -1653.59*** -9.27*** -3244.24*** 
 
(396.18) (561.71)  (166.19) (0.74) (826.48) 
PE -1483.75** -440.40  3947.14*** -5.63*** -2140.84** 
 
(752.56) (336.11)  (407.89) (0.70) (954.70) 
Internal debt -396.55*** -61.93  -299.56*** -1.53*** -368.61*** 
 
(105.98) (68.60)  (61.41) (0.39) (119.09) 
Internal equity -344.23 -52.57  -399.92*** -0.74 -251.03 
 
(268.07) (115.15)  (116.62) (0.68) (330.04) 
Working owner's equity  -551.28 -101.91  -700.92*** -2.04*** -448.06 
 
(384.69) (120.31)  (115.13) (0.40) (489.40) 
Firm age 179.80 77.70  333.01*** 2.55*** 191.27 
 
(114.55) (80.34)  (49.21) (0.22) (135.25) 
Capital intensity 5.51*** 1.91*  1.94** -0.002*** 7.63*** 
 
(1.46) (0.98)  (0.82) (0.000) (2.43) 
Capital structure 276.74 -181.66**  -68.03*** 0.29** -66.65 
 
(174.42) (89.57)  (17.09) (0.14) (62.17) 
   
 
   N 10350 10350  10350 10350 10350 
R
2
 0.10 0.03  0.18 0.35 0.11 
Adjusted R
2
 0.10 0.03  0.18 0.35 0.10 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time and industry effects not reported for brevity. FOE significance has been established using a one-tail T-test. 
For all other coefficients, a two-tailed T-test was used. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.  
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Table A14: Quantum of finance and firm size (hybrid model) 
 Quantum of finance  Firm size 
 
Total Liabilities (000) Total Equity (000) 
 
Value added (000) Labour (FTE) Capital (000) 
Constant 596.59 1119.81 
 
548.36 14.27*** 1990.02 
 
(1488.65) (2016.14) 
 
(492.50) (2.06) (1875.33) 
FOE -651.34** 546.58 
 
-684.27*** -4.73*** -137.72 
 
(292.59) (559.70) 
 
(128.07) (0.73) (809.56) 
PE        ̅    -1857.01** -663.42** 
 
3583.80*** -7.26*** -2687.30*** 
 
(803.34) (311.52) 
 
(428.05) (0.74) (952.95) 
PE   ̅    1609.75 6240.21** 
 
7411.50*** 12.28*** 7950.00** 
 
(1606.41) (3021.30) 
 
(836.24) (2.56) (3834.04) 
Internal debt        ̅    -78.13 24.45 
 
-88.30 -0.24 -76.55 
 
(100.82) (66.48) 
 
(60.69) (0.38) (116.77) 
Internal debt   ̅    -3341.93*** -676.78 
 
-1835.01*** -13.85*** -4010.55*** 
 
(858.70) (1235.29) 
 
(241.52) (1.34) (875.19) 
Internal equity        ̅    136.74 60.49 
 
-115.78 0.15 160.16 
 
(292.69) (115.60) 
 
(124.97) (0.70) (341.90) 
Internal equity   ̅    -3081.11*** -1558.32* 
 
-2578.85*** -8.50*** -4574.28*** 
 
(790.44) (903.09) 
 
(408.23) (2.36) (1210.54) 
Working owner’s equity        ̅    159.88 46.01 
 
-280.73** 0.04 145.37 
 
(423.84) (94.74) 
 
(127.97) (0.41) (492.90) 
Working owner’s equity   ̅    -2907.19*** -644.29 
 
-2898.12*** -16.16*** -3654.85** 
 
(676.93) (970.81) 
 
(294.17) (1.14) (1469.42) 
Firm age        ̅    -38.84 54.02 
 
180.22*** 0.75*** 13.89 
 
(101.42) (82.18) 
 
(61.34) (0.27) (136.55) 
Firm age   ̅    374.58 -41.48 
 
503.66*** 5.41*** 374.66 
 
(238.51) (254.35) 
 
(81.68) (0.41) (298.26) 
Capital intensity        ̅    3.05 1.04 
 
1.29 0.00*** 5.16* 
 
(1.90) (0.95) 
 
(0.86) (0.00) (2.87) 
Capital intensity   ̅    16.44*** 13.97*** 
 
4.87*** 0.00 29.90*** 
 
(4.54) (4.34) 
 
(1.52) (0.00) (9.14) 
Capital structure        ̅    78.05 -108.35 
 
-72.35*** 0.32** -57.08 
 
(147.50) (100.38) 
 
(11.78) (0.14) (64.58) 
Capital structure   ̅    2709.69* -2986.25 
 
9.60 0.07 -254.04 
 
(1439.19) (2004.69) 
 
(179.16) (0.39) (329.21) 
       N 10350 10350 
 
10350 10350 10350 
R2 0.20 0.11 
 
0.23 0.39 0.21 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.10 
 
0.22 0.38 0.20 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time and industry effects not reported for brevity. FOE significance has been established using a one-tail T-test. For all 
other coefficients, a two-tailed T-test was used. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
 Appendix A.4: Robustness checks of panel regression analysis 202 
 
Table A15: Two-stage least squares fixed effects model (Firm size) 
 
 
Value added (000) Labour (FTE) Capital (000) 
Constant -2827.37*** 28.44*** 6690.14*** 
 
(1018.51) (2.48) (1448.02) 
Productive Efficiency
a
 24716.84*** -25.37*** -9026.36*** 
 
(1159.37) (3.17) (1856.12) 
Internal debt -102.08 -0.42 107.65 
 
(418.60) (1.01) (589.47) 
Internal equity -242.60 -0.77 143.14 
 
(484.36) (1.17) (682.13) 
Working owner’s equity -867.90*** -0.42 340.94 
 
(268.29) (0.65) (378.02) 
Firm age 581.17** 1.95*** 344.57 
 
(251.78) (0.61) (355.28) 
Capital intensity 1.25*** 0.00*** 0.92*** 
 
(0.19) (0.00) (0.28) 
Capital structure -319.87*** 0.59*** -26.20 
 
(63.36) (0.15) (89.90) 
FOE
b
 -438.70*** -9.58*** -4662.85*** 
 (213.48) (1.05) (826.53) 
N 6900 6900 6900 
R
2
 0.87 0.96 0.98 
Adjusted R
2
 0.74 0.93 0.97 
Time effects not reported for brevity. Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   
a
 Instrument variable for PEt is PEt-1. 
b
 FOE is found separately as per (
 
  
∑         )  (
 
  
∑        )           . One-tail significance is determined by F-testing the restriction         ..
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Table A16: Family ownership effect by industry (quantum of finance and firm size) 
 
Quantum of finance 
 
Firm Size 
Industry Total Debt Total Equity   Value Added Labour Capital 
100 -32004.61*** -17330.22*** 
 
-22735.72*** -56.58*** -47538.71*** 
 
(1375.90) (925.87) 
 
(562.23) (2.32) (1662.64) 
200 -4031.61*** -8907.61*** 
 
-4603.60*** -12.87*** -11962.24*** 
 
(828.70) (557.65) 
 
(356.42) (0.89) (1245.06) 
221 -1450.23*** -1153.46*** 
 
-813.11*** -3.66*** -2469.08*** 
 
(506.92) (341.12) 
 
(207.14) (0.85) (612.56) 
222 -2800.84*** -1042.63*** 
 
-1421.71*** -7.95*** -3845.92*** 
 
(571.02) (384.25) 
 
(233.33) (0.96) (690.02) 
223 -356.05 -916.36** 
 
-1818.58*** -3.16*** -1254.98* 
 
(731.97) (492.56) 
 
(299.10) (1.23) (884.52) 
224 -889.94* -1174.13*** 
 
-1552.54*** -12.03*** -2054.72*** 
 
(600.37) (404.00) 
 
(245.33) (1.01) (725.49) 
225 -3070.10*** -1811.54*** 
 
-2271.62*** -10.48*** -4794.07*** 
 
(459.15) (308.97) 
 
(187.62) (0.77) (554.84) 
226 -475.00 -1503.30*** 
 
-763.04*** -8.51*** -2019.16** 
 
(788.08) (530.32) 
 
(322.03) (1.33) (952.32) 
227 -1215.53*** -801.80*** 
 
-447.94*** -0.01 -1967.63*** 
 
(432.63) (291.13) 
 
(176.78) (0.73) (522.79) 
228 -732.71** -228.31 
 
-573.99*** -3.54*** -913.76*** 
 
(319.86) (215.24) 
 
(130.70) (0.54) (386.52) 
229 2.71 -205.38 
 
-1.93 0.73 -149.12 
 
(516.65) (347.66) 
 
(211.12) (0.87) (624.32) 
300 3276.12 27764.86*** 
 
5106.14*** 8.36* 30564.37*** 
 
(3275.53) (2204.17) 
 
(1338.46) (5.51) (3958.16) 
341 -170.00 117.73 
 
-459.33* -5.85*** 71.65 
 
(770.53) (518.51) 
 
(314.86) (1.30) (931.11) 
342 -257.18 -0.77 
 
-244.73 -5.47*** -289.30 
 
(579.62) (390.04) 
 
(236.85) (0.98) (700.41) 
400 -11950.43*** -8074.20*** 
 
-11488.61*** -1.91 -20110.87*** 
 
(1225.52) (824.68) 
 
(500.78) (2.06) (1480.92) 
445 -2245.36*** -341.91 
 
-843.95*** -2.51*** -2497.63*** 
 
(525.93) (353.91) 
 
(214.91) (0.89) (635.53) 
446 -6758.11*** -633.47*** 
 
-2591.79*** -11.12*** -7160.89*** 
 
(391.54) (263.48) 
 
(159.99) (0.66) (473.14) 
447 -1874.49*** -773.88*** 
 
-1550.59*** -9.68*** -2603.59*** 
 
(435.23) (292.87) 
 
(177.85) (0.73) (525.93) 
500 -11314.03*** -445.17 
 
-714.16 1.71 -11622.50*** 
 
(1524.44) (1025.83) 
 
(622.92) (2.57) (1842.13) 
551 188.58 -25.95 
 
-62.61 -0.88 151.51 
 
(735.57) (494.98) 
 
(300.57) (1.24) (888.87) 
552 58.36 -56.92 
 
-27.97 -2.42*** 64.06 
 
(524.60) (353.01) 
 
(214.36) (0.88) (633.93) 
553 -761.59* -179.49 
 
-351.29** -3.10*** -921.55* 
 
(502.38) (338.06) 
 
(205.28) (0.85) (607.07) 
600 -469.52 -745.43 
 
-5031.42*** -21.62*** -1191.20 
 
(3987.40) (2683.20) 
 
(1629.35) (6.71) (4818.38) 
657 34.39 -1012.30*** 
 
-369.31** -4.24*** -932.66* 
 
(536.32) (360.90) 
 
(219.15) (0.90) (648.09) 
700 -6142.61*** -4613.48*** 
 
-3226.93*** -16.80*** -10471.60*** 
 
(517.12) (347.98) 
 
(211.31) (0.87) (624.89) 
875 -3153.39*** -2663.94*** 
 
-2502.67*** -16.56*** -5496.37*** 
 
(678.72) (456.73) 
 
(277.34) (1.14) (820.17) 
900 -11011.72*** -300.46 
 
14185.14*** -11.65*** 438023.30*** 
 
(2966.48) (1996.20) 
 
(925.69) (3.81) (2737.48) 
977 -1974.35*** -5346.62*** 
 
-785.82*** -3.86*** -7310.85*** 
 
(565.36) (380.44) 
 
(231.02) (0.95) (683.19) 
978 -392.56 -164.41 
 
-1047.25*** -8.74*** -549.76 
 
(354.83) (238.77) 
 
(144.99) (0.60) (428.77) 
1091 -2945.86*** -1905.73*** 
 
-1039.80** -0.48 -4418.27*** 
 
(1134.29) (763.29) 
 
(463.50) (1.91) (1370.68) 
1093 638.13 -582.19 
 
-235.00 -7.79*** 134.91 
 
(1461.25) (983.30) 
 
(597.10) (2.46) (1765.78) 
1195 282.69 -195.90 
 
559.94** 2.28** 77.61 
  (676.42) (455.18)  (276.40) (1.14) (817.38) 
Average FOE -3362.89 -1130.92 
 
-2323.08 -7.34 -4692.23 
Negative and significant 59.38% 53.13% 
 
71.88% 75.00% 65.63% 
Positive and significant 0.00% 3.13% 
 
9.38% 6.25% 6.25% 
Insignificant 40.63% 43.75%  18.75% 18.75% 28.13% 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%
 Appendix A.4: Robustness checks of panel regression analysis 204 
 
Table A17: Scale & Technical efficiency and capital intensity (random effect model) 
 Scale & Technical efficiency  Capital intensity 
 
SE TE PE 
 
K/L 
Constant 0.884*** 0.405*** 0.271*** 
 
-45.728 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) 
 
(32.901) 
FOE - -0.013** -0.028*** 
 
-32.072** 
 
- (0.007) (0.006) 
 
(14.965) 
Increasing returns -0.169*** - - 
 
- 
 
(0.008) - - 
 
- 
Decreasing returns -0.185*** - - 
 
- 
 
(0.008) - - 
 
- 
FOEIRS -0.058*** - -  
- 
 
(0.007) - - 
 
- 
FOEDRS 1.76E-05 - -  
- 
 
(0.008) - - 
 
- 
Productive efficiency - - - 
 
165.669*** 
 
- - - 
 
(21.668) 
Firm size -2.43E-08 -1.56E-08 -6.82E-08 
 
0.011*** 
 
(1.12E-07) (1.27E-07) (1.08E-07) 
 
(0.000) 
Internal debt -0.013 0.001 -0.015* 
 
9.316 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
 
(18.069) 
Internal equity 0.009 -0.027** -0.020* 
 
-5.922 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
(22.430) 
Working owner’s equity -0.003 0.005 0.002 
 
-28.231** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
 
(11.600) 
Firm age 0.014*** -0.020*** -0.008*** 
 
17.150*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(6.115) 
Capital intensity -3.77E-06 2.96E-05*** 3.08E-05*** 
 
- 
 
(4.34E-06) (4.89E-06) (4.26E-06) 
 
- 
Capital structure 1.22E-04 0.018*** 0.016*** 
 
-6.185* 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
(3.223) 
      N 10350 10350 10350 
 
10350 
R
2
 0.15 0.10 0.14 
 
0.24 
Adjusted R
2
 0.15 0.10 0.13 
 
0.24 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time and industry effects not reported for brevity. FOE significance has been established using a one-tail T-test. 
For all other coefficients, a two-tailed T-test was used. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Table A18: Scale & Technical efficiency and capital intensity (hybrid model) 
 Scale efficiencya  Technical efficiency   Capital intensity 
 
SEDRS SEIRS SECRS 
 
TE PE   K/L 
Constant 0.850*** 0.719*** 1.00*** 
 
0.425*** 0.286***  Constant 9.124 
 
(0.015) (0.020) (0.00) 
 
(0.018) (0.014)   (42.899) 
FOE -0.001 -0.052*** 4.15E-05 
 
-0.010* -0.022***  FOE -25.922*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (8.23E-05) 
 
(0.007) (0.006)   (9.44) 
Firm size        ̅    6.52E-07 -1.42E-06** -4.46E-10 
 
-1.37E-06*** -1.33E-06***  Firm size        ̅    0.012** 
 
(5.81E-07) (6.88E-07) (4.65E-10) 
 
(3.46E-07) (4.37E-07)   (0.005) 
Firm size   ̅    -1.48E-06*** 2.75E-07 -1.41E-10 
 
3.31E-07* 1.86E-07  Firm size   ̅    0.011*** 
 
(2.17E-07) (2.37E-07) (2.29E-10) 
 
(1.81E-07) (1.91E-07)   (0.003) 
Internal debt        ̅    0.038* -0.011 -2.23E-04** 
 
0.010 0.005  Internal debt        ̅    1.296 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (1.05E-04) 
 
(0.012) (0.010)   (10.794) 
Internal debt   ̅    0.085*** -0.057*** -2.00E-04 
 
-0.015 -0.051***  Internal debt   ̅    36.106 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (2.00E-04) 
 
(0.016) (0.013)   (25.711) 
Internal equity        ̅    0.003 0.021 -1.52E-04* 
 
-0.017 -0.005  Internal equity        ̅    -0.648 
 
(0.022) (0.016) (1.00E-04) 
 
(0.014) (0.013)   (21.676) 
Internal equity   ̅    0.005 -0.035 -3.07E-04 
 
-0.049** -0.048**  Internal equity   ̅    -21.549 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (1.83E-04) 
 
(0.023) (0.019)   (31.332) 
Working owner’s equity        ̅    -0.012 0.004 -3.20E-05 
 
0.006 0.008  Working owner’s equity        ̅    -9.930 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (5.33E-05) 
 
(0.008) (0.007)   (16.625) 
Working owner’s equity   ̅    0.021** -0.050*** -8.71E-05 
 
0.004 -0.005  Working owner’s equity   ̅    -72.769*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (9.03E-05) 
 
(0.010) (0.008)   (26.055) 
Firm age        ̅    -0.052*** 0.027*** -4.30E-05 
 
-0.005 -0.003  Firm age        ̅    20.321** 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (4.65E-05) 
 
(0.006) (0.005)   (9.400) 
Firm age   ̅    -0.007** 0.033*** -1.01E-04** 
 
-0.025*** -0.010***  Firm age   ̅    14.052*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (4.04E-05) 
 
(0.004) (0.003)   (4.530) 
Capital intensity        ̅    -4.40E-05 1.27E-06 1.12E-08 
 
3.78E-05 3.82E-05  PE        ̅    185.245*** 
 
(3.56E-05) (9.06E-06) (7.34E-09) 
 
(8.18E-06) (8.21E-06)   (58.284) 
Capital intensity   ̅    2.48E-05 -1.02E-05 7.67E-08 
 
1.68E-05 2.08E-05  PE   ̅    111.997* 
 
(1.46E-05) (1.05E-05) (2.07E-08) 
 
(1.02E-05) (9.74E-06)   (65.813) 
Capital structure        ̅    -0.011 0.004 4.64E-06 
 
0.017 0.016  Capital structure        ̅    -5.861*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (4.80E-06) 
 
(0.003) (0.002)   (2.101) 
Capital structure   ̅    -0.008 -0.001 2.40E-05 
 
0.019 0.017  Capital structure   ̅    -7.972 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (7.65E-06) 
 
(0.004) (0.004)   (5.237) 
       
   
N 3496 6202 652 
 
10350 10350  N 10350 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
0.11 0.14  R2 0.24 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.02 0.02 
 
0.10 0.14  Adjusted R2 0.23 
a return to scale subgroups DRS, IRS, and CRS  account for decreasing, increasing and constant returns to scale. Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time and industry effects not 
reported for brevity. FOE tested using one-tail T-test. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%  
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Table A19: Family ownership effect by industry (Efficiency and capital intensity) 
 
Scale & Technical efficiency 
 
Capital intensity 
Industry SEIRS SEDRS TE PE   K/L 
100 -0.059 0.050* 0.05 0.01 
 
-1328.65*** 
 
(0.058) (0.031) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(89.52) 
200 -0.038 -0.029 0.02 -0.01 
 
85.09* 
 
(0.031) (0.023) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(52.52) 
221 -0.072** -0.035* 0.01 -0.02* 
 
-53.31** 
 
(0.036) (0.023) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(31.79) 
222 -0.037 0.039 -0.01 0.00 
 
-4.11 
 
(0.046) (0.031) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(35.76) 
223 -0.016 0.032 -0.02 -0.03* 
 
12.20 
 
(0.042) (0.029) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(45.54) 
224 -0.043 0.040* -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 
14.51 
 
(0.052) (0.029) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(37.57) 
225 -0.033** 0.029* -0.02** -0.03** 
 
-29.68 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(29.29) 
226 -0.146** -0.051** -0.04** -0.09*** 
 
6.98 
 
(0.064) (0.023) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(49.59) 
227 -0.044** -0.001 -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 
-1.28 
 
(0.027) (0.013) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(27.04) 
228 0.011 0.001 -0.01 0.00 
 
-27.17* 
 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(20.14) 
229 -0.073** 0.008 -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
-47.61* 
 
(0.044) (0.032) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(32.16) 
300 -0.187* n/a -0.08 -0.35*** 
 
-113.21 
 
(0.133) - (0.10) (0.09) 
 
(204.68) 
341 -0.074* -0.019 0.07*** 0.00 
 
-105.33** 
 
(0.053) (0.066) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(47.92) 
342 0.032 0.024 -0.09*** -0.01 
 
31.19 
 
(0.039) (0.051) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(36.11) 
400 -0.014 n/a -0.03 -0.07** 
 
103.56* 
 
(0.035) - (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(77.69) 
445 -0.041 0.047** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 
-85.36*** 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(32.98) 
446 -0.028* 0.022** -0.02* -0.03** 
 
-34.59* 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(25.55) 
447 -0.068*** -0.007 0.03*** -0.01 
 
-9.11 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(27.43) 
500 0.158*** -0.063*** 0.04 0.10** 
 
37.68 
 
(0.053) (0.026) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(95.23) 
551 0.033 -0.007 -0.06*** -0.02 
 
5.79 
 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(45.77) 
552 -0.064*** 0.056* -0.11*** -0.09*** 
 
-69.96** 
 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(32.66) 
553 -0.077*** 0.001 -0.02* -0.04*** 
 
-12.48 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(31.26) 
600 n/a n/a -0.01 -0.02 
 
13.76 
 
- - (0.13) (0.11) 
 
(248.25) 
657 0.038 -0.017 -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
-16.82 
 
(0.030) (0.020) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(34.23) 
700 -0.098*** 0.064* -0.03** -0.04*** 
 
29.21 
 
(0.034) (0.046) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(32.99) 
875 -0.024 0.249*** -0.04** -0.03** 
 
-176.16*** 
 
(0.044) (0.041) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(42.37) 
900 -0.166** n/a 0.31*** 0.01 
 
27.62 
 
(0.080) - (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(184.75) 
977 -0.136*** -0.033* -0.03** -0.10*** 
 
32.66 
 
(0.040) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(35.51) 
978 -0.221*** 0.022 0.04*** -0.06*** 
 
11.69 
 
(0.020) (0.033) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(22.11) 
1091 0.013 -0.174*** 0.15*** 0.06** 
 
-348.85*** 
 
(0.079) (0.066) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(70.78) 
1093 -0.070 0.082 0.14*** 0.13*** 
 
-56.94 
 
(0.118) (0.082) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(91.22) 
1195 0.041 -0.043 -0.03* -0.01 
 
5.70 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.02) (0.02)  (42.10) 
Average FOE -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.03 
 
-65.72 
Negative and significant 49.39% 17.86% 50.00% 56.25% 
 
31.25% 
Positive and significant 2.23% 28.57% 18.75% 9.38% 
 
6.25% 
Insignificant 48.38% 53.57% 31.25% 34.38%  62.50% 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10% 
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Table A20: Family ownership effect by industry (full model with lags) 
 
Industry IF Size PE SEIRS SEDRS TE 
100 1.04*** -65802.87*** 0.08** -0.241*** n/a 0.12** 
 
(0.10) (1786.52) (0.05) (0.054) - (0.05) 
200 0.91*** -15089.31*** 0.00 -0.176*** -0.180 0.03 
 
(0.06) (1012.92) (0.03) (0.063) (0.143) (0.03) 
221 0.41*** -3293.78*** -0.02 -0.193*** -0.146* 0.02 
 
(0.03) (620.15) (0.02) (0.083) (0.110) (0.02) 
222 0.47*** -5230.77*** 0.01 -0.190*** -0.062 0.00 
 
(0.04) (689.13) (0.02) (0.042) (0.112) (0.02) 
223 0.15*** -1503.80** -0.02 -0.145*** -0.085 -0.03 
 
(0.05) (873.41) (0.02) (0.058) (0.119) (0.03) 
224 0.54*** -2435.59*** -0.07*** -0.180*** -0.060 -0.09*** 
 
(0.04) (728.97) (0.02) (0.054) (0.111) (0.02) 
225 0.67*** -6313.69*** -0.03** -0.183*** 0.019 -0.04*** 
 
(0.03) (578.76) (0.02) (0.041) (0.114) (0.02) 
226 0.66*** -2277.37*** -0.14*** -0.372*** -0.151* -0.09*** 
 
(0.05) (949.52) (0.03) (0.116) (0.114) (0.03) 
227 0.35*** -2206.32*** -0.07*** -0.168*** -0.108 -0.08*** 
 
(0.03) (524.68) (0.01) (0.054) (0.110) (0.02) 
228 0.48*** -1276.25*** 0.00 -0.129** -0.090 -0.02* 
 
(0.02) (397.83) (0.01) (0.061) (0.109) (0.01) 
229 0.14*** -217.51 -0.05*** -0.230*** -0.123 -0.06*** 
 
(0.03) (617.68) (0.02) (0.040) (0.112) (0.02) 
300 -0.29* 42072.02*** -0.60*** -0.372 n/a -0.24** 
 
(0.22) (3948.59) (0.11) (0.431) - (0.12) 
341 -0.12** -407.35 0.01 -0.197*** -0.174* 0.11*** 
 
(0.05) (918.80) (0.03) (0.079) (0.121) (0.03) 
342 0.24*** -213.61 -0.02 -0.118*** 0.028 -0.15*** 
 
(0.04) (696.13) (0.02) (0.044) (0.118) (0.02) 
400 0.83*** -24662.29*** 0.00 -0.107 n/a 0.02 
 
(0.08) (1501.59) (0.04) (0.086) - (0.05) 
445 0.57*** -3310.64*** -0.09*** -0.144*** -0.042 -0.09*** 
 
(0.04) (647.46) (0.02) (0.055) (0.111) (0.02) 
446 0.74*** -9419.13*** -0.02* -0.183*** -0.033 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (504.56) (0.01) (0.058) (0.110) (0.02) 
447 0.45*** -3240.68*** 0.00 -0.199*** -0.110 0.04*** 
 
(0.03) (532.56) (0.01) (0.050) (0.112) (0.02) 
500 0.48*** -16157.58*** 0.09** -0.026 -0.134 0.03 
 
(0.10) (1832.59) (0.05) (0.043) (0.146) (0.06) 
551 0.26*** 290.44 -0.02 -0.107*** -0.144 -0.08*** 
 
(0.05) (879.12) (0.02) (0.036) (0.116) (0.03) 
552 0.17*** 198.17 -0.15*** -0.210*** -0.057 -0.17*** 
 
(0.04) (634.09) (0.02) (0.044) (0.119) (0.02) 
553 -0.01 -1114.28** -0.05*** -0.195*** -0.108 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (603.30) (0.02) (0.054) (0.114) (0.02) 
600 1.53*** -1192.13 -0.02 n/a n/a -0.02 
 
(0.27) (4763.42) (0.13) - - (0.14) 
657 0.79*** -1044.65* -0.05*** -0.103** -0.136 -0.06*** 
 
(0.04) (676.44) (0.02) (0.063) (0.114) (0.02) 
700 0.44*** -13740.23*** -0.04*** -0.226*** -0.034 -0.04** 
 
(0.04) (641.54) (0.02) (0.047) (0.112) (0.02) 
875 0.41*** -7896.88*** -0.07*** -0.160** n/a -0.06*** 
 
(0.05) (815.12) (0.02) (0.096) - (0.02) 
900 0.61*** -15163.43*** -0.04 -0.440*** n/a 0.42*** 
 
(0.20) (3547.15) (0.10) (0.043) - (0.11) 
977 0.40*** -8956.40*** -0.14*** -0.254*** -0.134 -0.05*** 
 
(0.04) (692.89) (0.02) (0.066) (0.112) (0.02) 
978 0.21*** -424.63 -0.08*** -0.361*** -0.084 0.05*** 
 
(0.02) (426.28) (0.01) (0.042) (0.115) (0.01) 
1091 0.71*** -8291.47*** 0.10*** -0.165*** -0.245** 0.21*** 
 
(0.08) (1360.96) (0.04) (0.053) (0.131) (0.04) 
1093 0.87*** -301.31 0.14*** -0.464*** -0.082 0.16*** 
 
(0.10) (1756.49) (0.05) (0.199) (0.135) (0.05) 
1195 0.09** 159.04 -0.01 -0.109*** -0.124 -0.05** 
  (0.05) (807.81) (0.02) (0.046) (0.129) (0.02) 
Average FOE 0.47 -5577.01 -0.04 -0.20 -0.08 -0.01 
Negative and significant 6.25% 68.75% 46.88% 90.32% 15.38% 50.00% 
Positive and significant 90.63% 3.13% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 21.88% 
Insignificant 3.13% 28.13% 40.63% 9.68% 84.62% 28.13% 
Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%
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A.5 Hausman tests of structural equations 
 
This appendix outlines our tests for endogeneity using the approach suggested by 
Hausman (1978). Using instrument variables, the test involves estimating our equations 
with both the actual variable and an estimate of the suspected ednogeneous variable. In 
this appendix, we test for endogenous variables in the estimation of 1) internal finance, 
2) firm size, and 3) productive efficiency.   
 
A.5.1 Internal Finance 
 
We test for the endogeneity of size and efficiency in the determination of internal 
finance (both debt and equity) by specifying  
 
(1)                                       .   
 
To generate the appropriate residual terms, we estimate     ̂   and   ̂   with a t-1 
instrument, as per 
   
(1.1)     ̂                                      , and 
 
(1.2)   ̂                                     . 
 
The Hausman test for endogeneity is performed by estimating the effect of both residual 
terms within equation (1) simultaneously by way of 
 
(1.3)                                       ̂       ̂       . 
 
The results of (1.3) are presented in column 1 of Table A21.  
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Table A21: Hausman tests on internal finance estimation 
 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Intercept 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
Size 9.62E-07 8.11E-07 2.12E-07 
PE 0.0471 -0.013872 0.044751 
Age -0.021026 -0.019466 -0.020886 
Leverage ratio 0.000921 0.001661 0.000846 
Capital intensity 1.71E-06 4.66E-06 2.18E-06 
ω -8.41E-07 -7.25E-07 - 
ψ -0.068915 - -0.067148 
N 6900 6900 6900 
R
2
 0.801441 0.801396 0.801433 
Adj R
2
 0.602133 0.602158 0.602232 
 
Test 1 =                                                      
Test 2 =                                               
Test 3 =                                               
Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10% 
 
As seen in Table A21, The coefficients associated with ωit and ψit are insignificant; 
therefore, all variables in (1) are considered to be exogenous. To confirm the above 
endogeneity test, we also estimate the effect of each residual term in (1) individually as 
per 
 
(1.4)                                       ̂       , and 
 
(1.5)                                       ̂       . 
 
The results of (1.4) and (1.5) are respectively presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 
A21 and confirm that all variables in (1) are exogenous.   
 
A.5.2 Firm Size 
 
We test for the endogeneity of internal finance and efficiency in the determination of 
firm size (measured by capital) by specifying 
 
(2)                                        
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To generate residual terms, we estimate   ̂   and   ̂   with a t-1 instrument, as per 
 
(2.1)    ̂                                     , and 
 
(2.2)   ̂                                   . 
 
The Hausman test is performed by estimating the effect of both residual terms within 
equation (2) simultaneously by way of 
 
(2.3)                                       ̂       ̂       .  
 
These estimates are presented in column 1 of Table A22. 
 
Table A22: Hausman tests on firm size estimation 
 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Intercept 5756.40*** 5013.30*** 5815.41*** 
IF 318.43 327.71 80.41 
PE -4187.60** -1048.30* -4188.76** 
Age 219.12 139.82 214.46 
Leverage ratio -87.27 -126.49 -86.93 
Capital intensity 0.68** 0.53** 0.68** 
χ -275.21 -261.09 - 
ϕ 3557.15* - 3554.50*** 
N 6900 6900 6900 
R
2
 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Adj R
2
 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
Test 1 =                                                      
Test 2 =                                               
Test 3 =                                               
Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10% 
 
The coefficients associated with χit are insignificant, however the coefficients associated 
with ϕit are significant; therefore, PE is endogenous in (2). To confirm this finding, we 
also estimate 
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(2.4)                                       ̂       , and 
 
(2.5)                                       ̂       . 
 
The results of (2.4) and (2.5), respectively presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table A22, 
confirm that PE is endogenous in (2). 
 
A.5.3 Productive Efficiency 
 
Finally, we test for endogeneity of internal finance and firm size in the determination of 
PE (which embodies pure TE and SE) by specifying 
 
(3)                                         
 
We find the residuals by estimating   ̂   and     ̂   with t-1 instrument, as per 
 
(3.1)    ̂                                       , and 
 
(3.2)     ̂                                      . 
 
We then perform the Hausman test by estimating 
 
(3.3)                                       ̂       ̂         
 
These estimates are presented in of  
 
Table A23. As seen in column 1 of  
 
Table A23, the coefficients associated with υit and τit are insignificant; therefore, all 
variables in (3) are considered to be exogenous. To confirm this finding, we also 
estimate 
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(3.4)                                       ̂       , and  
 
(3.5)                                       ̂       . 
The results of (3.4) and (3.5) are respectively presented in columns 2 an 3 of  
 
Table A23, and confirm that all variables in (3) are exogenous. 
 
Table A23: Hausman tests on efficiency estimation 
 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Intercept 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
IF -1.65E-03 -1.66E-03 -6.84E-03 
Size -1.08E-07 -7.91E-07* -1.09E-07 
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
Leverage ratio 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
Capital intensity 4.73E-05*** 4.76E-05*** 4.73E-05*** 
υ -6.00E-03 -5.91E-03 - 
τ -7.66E-07 - -7.65E-07 
N 6900 6900 6900 
R
2
 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Adj R
2
 0.60 0.60 0.60 
 
Test 1 =                                                      
Test 2 =                                               
Test 3 =                                               
Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10% 
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A.6 Reduced-form equations and reduced form-parameters 
 
In Chapter 5, Section 5.4 we solved our system of equations by substitution, the reduced-
form system of equations are specified as 
 
(27)                                                    , 
(28)                                                     , and 
(29)                                                   . 
 
Based on these specifications, after substitution the reduced-form parameters for (27) are 
 
    [
                                       
                              
] ,    [
                                 
                              
], 
   [
                                 
                              
],    [
                                 
                              
], 
   [
                                 
                              
], and     [
                                       
                              
]  
 
The reduced-form parameters for (28) are  
 
    [
                                       
                              
],    [
                                 
                              
], 
   [
                                 
                              
],    [
                                 
                              
], 
   [
                                 
                              
], and     [
                                       
                              
]. 
 
Finally the reduced-form parameters for (29) are 
 
    [
                                       
                              
],    [
                                 
                              
],  
   [
                                 
                              
],    [
                                 
                              
], 
   [
                                 
                              
], and    [
                                       
                              
]. 
 
As a result the above system accounts for the full effect of the contemporaneous relationships 
between internal finance, size, and efficiency i.e. the reduced form parameters δi, εi, and ζi all 
incorporate αi, βi and γi as well as the error terms eit, uit, and vit from the structural equations 
(27), (28), and (29). 
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